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ABSTRACT
AUSTERITY, ABUNDANCE, AND THE INVESTOR STATES: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
Manda Shemirani
Old Dominion University, 2010
Director: Dr. David C. Earnest

Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are not new, but their foreign investment created
concerns among many states in 2005 and 2006. Many policy makers argued that the
ownership of foreign governments in specific areas may expose their countries to various
risks. The concerns in the United States were from a national security perspective, while
Europe was more worried about the lack of reciprocity and established standards. The
political economy literature lacks a suitable framework for the study of investor states.
The mainstream economic view contends that SWFs are a result of balance of payments
surpluses and are used for economic smoothing purposes. This dissertation identifies
three alternative theoretical perspectives—drawn from major political economic
theories—to explain the potential goals investor states may pursue through their SWFs. It
also addresses the gap in the literature by proposing a systematic methodology for the
study of these funds, and subsequently applying it to four major SWFs: the Government
Pension Fund-Global (Norway), the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (United Arab
Emirates), Temasek (Singapore), and the National Wealth Fund (Russia). This research
revealed that the dominant conception that investor states are in pursuit of political power
over another state is unjustified. The assertion that SWFs are used for balance of
payments corrections is equally unfounded. None of the funds was shown to have
attempted to exert political power over another state. The national system of political

economy of investor states defines the purpose of SWFs. Some states act as economic
agents or entrepreneurs in order to increase the value of their assets. For others,
accumulating sufficient resources required for domestic compensation is the immediate
goal. Therefore, it would be wrong to treat all funds equally, as most of the analysts and
policy makers do. In fact, investments by SWFs create interdependencies between the
investor and the recipient states. A critical and yet hardly-discussed issue is that
vulnerabilities can go both ways in these interdependent relationships. This means
investor states, too, are exposed to various risks. In summary, we need a "paradigm shift"
in our approach to the study of SWFs.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In late 2005 and early 2006, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs)—some of which
had been in existence since the 1950s—fell under the media spotlight for the first time.
Policy makers in the states that were recipients of SWFs' investments became concerned
about the underlying motivation of these funds, mainly because politicians and academics
understood neither the fundamental reasons for the creation of SWFs nor the functioning
of SWFs. To assess the validity of recipient states' concerns with respect to SWFs'
investments, we first need to study how investor states employ these funds.
While there is no universally accepted definition of a sovereign wealth fund,
various financial institutions, government agencies, and international organizations have
provided definitions that generally share three main characteristics: ownership by
sovereign governments, management of portfolios other than official national reserves,
and involvement in overseas investments. The definition of SWFs in this research
combines all three of these characteristics but also incorporates an additional criterion—
the absence of a monetary or fiscal regulatory function. That means that, for instance,
Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority (SAMA) is excluded from the SWF pool since it
performs a function similar to that of a central bank.
In the United States and some European countries, the political scrutiny of SWFs'
overseas investments intensified due to the lack of information about these funds. More
importantly, the politicians' mindset, which had been influenced by major historical

This paper follows the format requirements of The Chicago Manual of Style 15th edition.
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events, was not open to the idea of government-owned funds making overseas
investments. The dominant realist view that the state's main goal is the pursuit of power,
and the resulting presumption that any investment by sovereign states is a means to exert
political influence over the recipient state, resulted in the rejection of foreign ownership
or the withdrawal of foreign investment proposals in the United States.
In fact, there was very little interest in SWFs and their investments until a Chinese
government-owned company placed a bid to buy an American oil company in 2005, and
later a government-owned company from the United Arab Emirates acquired a British
company whose assets included six port facilities in the United States. In August 2005,
the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) abandoned its initial $18.5
billion cash bid—a more attractive proposal than Chevron's—for Unocal when it was
faced with political opposition in the United States Congress while the proposal was still
under the review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).
Dubai Ports World (DP World), which had acquired Peninsular and Oriental Steam
Navigation Company (P&O), was also made to sell the port facilities to a United Statescontrolled firm under the pressure of widespread, intense congressional opposition
despite prior approval of the ownership change by the CFIUS.1
What these entities shared in their relationship with the United States was general
skepticism and disapproval by the American policy makers. China, with its massive
balance of payments surplus, artificially weak exchange rate, and various political issues,
receives extra attention and scrutiny, as do the states in the Middle East for their oil and
gas policies, positions with regard to regional conflicts, and their potential ties to the

1

Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Yee Wong, and Ketki Sheth, US-China Trade Disputes: Rising Tide, Rising Stakes,
Policy Analyses in International Economics 78 (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2006).
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events of 9/11. Consequently, the investment by these states has been excessively
politicized. The political controversy over foreign investment by Chinese and Emirati
entities in 2005 and 2006 soon evolved into a major presumption among policy makers in
the United States. National security rhetoric was used for the purpose of opposing
investments by states of which the politicians did not approve. The presumption focused
attention on SWFs that had been managing states' assets for decades without causing any
concerns.
The problem is that protectionism—which may result from the politicization of
investment projects by states that may receive SWF investments—can trigger counter
measures by investor states. Once their entry into the market of a potential recipient state
is blocked, the investor states may decide to retaliate by blocking the entry of companies
or capital flows from the protectionist states. In the end, the retributory actions by both
investor and recipient states could put the foundation of the "free market" at risk by
reversing the long-fought-for global trend towards economic openness.
Decision-making processes, based solely on a political rationale, are not efficient.
In other words, politically-based decisions discount the importance of potential economic
benefits. In the case of states that are the recipient of SWF investments, the potential gain
from the inflow of foreign investment is often times overlooked. This is not to say that
investment by sovereign states should be viewed in exactly the same way as investment
by private entities; however, it should be considered with more objectivity. To be sure,
dealing with SWFs and their investments is more complicated than dealing with private
investors for two reasons. First, ownership by the governments makes it difficult to
readily apply conventional economic theories or financial models to SWFs' investments.
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Second, the economic nature of the investment itself makes the application of political or
international relations theories to these funds more difficult.
The point—often missed in the heated debates among politicians—is that a purely
political approach alone is misguided. Potential negative impacts on (or costs to) the
recipient states should be reviewed in close conjunction with the potential economic
benefits of SWF investments. So, in this kind of interdependent relationship, recipient
states do not necessarily lose. SWFs can provide long term liquidity when liquidity is
tight and markets are contracting. SWFs could also contribute to greater market
efficiency and lower volatility by diversifying the global investor base.2
Investor states have various perspectives with respect to their sovereign funds.
The opportunity cost of holding official reserves or excess capital in risk-free or fixedincome assets is continuously increasing, not only because of global inflation and
downward pressures on the dollar—the unit of account for the investor states—but also
because of uncertainties such as the risk of natural disasters, conflicts, wars, and market
crashes. There are, of course, other reasons for the investor states to make overseas
investment. To reiterate, viewing the capital inflow from investor states—which has been
mostly in the form of portfolio investment rather than direct investment—through a
highly political lens can limit both our understanding of the true nature and purpose of
the SWFs, as well as potential gains (economic and otherwise) from sovereign
investments.
Another important issue is that the SWFs are not identical, i.e., their
characteristics vary widely. As this study will show, SWFs' motives and purposes are
driven by the characteristics of the national system of political economy of the investor
2

"Sovereign Wealth Funds-a Work Agenda," (International Monetary Fund, 2008), 12-13.
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states. This multiplicity of forms and motives will be discussed in further details, but for
now suffice it to say that the existence of such diversity among SWFs makes the
application of a single policy ineffective. In other words, policy prescriptions based on
general—and perhaps inaccurate—assumptions about investor states can lead to overand under-estimation of various risks.
In order to address these complications, an original and innovative theoretical
approach, one that brings a new perspective to the political economy literature, is needed.
The current research provides a methodology for a micro-level analysis of SWFs, and
proposes ways to distinguish the various motives of the investor states. In this dissertation,
I propose an answer to the question of whether recipient states should be concerned about
the investments by SWFs. I have observed that the investment decisions and strategies of
the four cases of SWFs examined here, as well as others with similar characteristics, are
based on certain fundamental yet uncomplicated principles other than the pursuit of
power. The current research refutes the two mainstream conceptions of SWFs: (1) the
policy makers' belief that these funds are a means of economic statecraft or foreign policy
tool, aimed at exerting power over another state, and (2) the view of some economists
that the role of these funds is limited to the correction of balance of payments deficit or
monetary imbalances.
In fact, all of investor states studied here—Norway, United Arab Emirates,
Singapore and the Russian Federation—had a balance of payments surplus during most
of the life of their funds. The absence of a large or consistent balance of payments deficit
makes it difficult to assess the merits of the argument that SWFs were created for balance
of payments corrections. In addition to that, there was no evidence indicating that the

6
investor states had ever used their funds in order to exercise power over any of the states
in which they had made investments. Even in the case of the fund of Norway, whose
investment decisions are guided by a set of non-commercial guidelines based on
universal ethical principles, the targets were corporations, rather than the recipient states.
Norway has certainly communicated its intentions to foreign states (e.g., Burma), but has
done so without attempting to directly influence the government in the recipient state.
This is what I have called "benign economic statecraft."
States like United Arab Emirates and Singapore are far too small, and at the
same time, pre-occupied with their internal concerns, one being increasing the value of
their assets. SWFs in these countries have acted mainly as an entrepreneurial arm of the
state. On the other hand, various centers of power in the Russian Federation struggle to
get access to the fund's assets. The whole thrust of this research is that there are
alternative political economic theories that suggest motives for the investor states that are
not adequately considered by the two mainstream theories, and consequently, a more
meaningful explanation for the creation, evolution, and functioning of SWFs.
This research makes a number of important arguments. First, SWFs are a
reflection of—to borrow Gilpin's term—the national system of political economy and a
product of the political leaders' specific mindset, which has been shaped and influenced
by both historical events and national resources endowment. The multiplicity of political
economic systems as well as political mindsets of the leaders suggests a variety of SWF
motives and purposes. Therefore, the one-size-fits-all approach to policy making with

3

Gilpin argues that the role of domestic economies and the differences among them determine the
international economic affairs. Therefore, the differences among national systems of political economies
have significant implications for the global economy. For more information see Robert Gilpin, Global
Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
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respect to these funds is not appropriate. In practice, as the study shows, the only time
SWFs tend to show a similar behavior is at times of financial crisis, or economic
contraction. The recent global financial crisis and economic downturn in countries around
the world provided an excellent opportunity for testing this hypothesis. Its timing and
extent of impact with respect to the various states was consistent.
Second, the management and operation of SWFs are not a static percept but a
dynamic process; learning and adjustment are natural and inevitable. States also undergo
changes over time as a result of changes in modes of production, demography, political
system, technological advancements, and global forces. All these mean investor states
and their sovereign funds have to be studied longitudinally. Again, the Norwegian fund is
a good example. The fund initially served mainly as a vehicle for the preservation of nonrenewable wealth for future generations and a precautionary reserve to protect the
country against global market fluctuations. As the fund matured, however, the primarily
precautionary objectives were gradually re-aligned so that they were more consistent with
the overall direction of Norwegian foreign policy.
Third, the lack transparency is certainly an important issue, and a legitimate
source of concern for the recipient states, but the level of transparency should not become
the sole or primary basis on which policy makers assess the funds. The assumption that
the level of transparency can serve as an indicator of the real agenda of a SWF is
superficial, naive, and most importantly, logically flawed.4 A fully transparent SWF may
include non-commercial principles in its investment decision making processes, as is the
case with the Norwegian fund. A lack of transparency simply means that we do not know

4

For more information see Manda Shemirani, "Sovereign Wealth Funds: The False Promise of
Transparency," Infinity Journal 1, no. 5 (2009).
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enough about these funds. This research attempts to fill this gap by providing a
systematic typology of SWFs and an in-depth analysis of selected funds.
Fourth, and more importantly, we are now on the verge of a new era of increased
state intervention in the economy. Specifically, after the recent crisis, the number of large
companies now owned or controlled by governments has increased. "Today big
government is back with a vengeance: not just as a brute fact, but as a vigorous ideology.
... The world is seeing the rise of a new economic hybrid—what might be termed 'state
capitalism.' ... The most interesting arguments over the next few years will weigh
government failure against market failure."5 Interestingly, history is repeating itself. In
the late 1960s, the expansion of multi-national companies (MNCs) raised concerns
among both politicians and academics that the rise of the new actors would undermine
nation-states. Today, policy makers' minds are occupied with the same fundamental
concerns—the loss of sovereign power. The study of SWFs requires a "paradigm shift" in
our approach to the study of international political economy.
This dissertation provides information, analysis, and a research methodology that
is of benefit to academia and policy makers alike. For the academic world, this research
proposes a systematic methodology for a longitudinal study of SWFs. It also provides a
comparative and multi-dimensional analysis of different funds based on various
characteristics such as size, source of funding, transparency, and purpose. By drawing
upon major international political economic theories, this dissertation also provides a
much broader view of the functioning of SWFs. It emphasizes the need for more specific
policies on both the international and domestic scales.

5

"Leviathan Stirs Again; the Growth of the State," The Economist, January 23, 2010.
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There are also several messages for policy makers at the national and international
level. On the national level, they need to be more open to and appreciative of emerging
state capitalism. Policy makers can, in fact, influence the flow of foreign portfolio
investments, by for instance, providing incentives that serve to direct the capital to areas
that they prefer. Recipient states should also be conscious of the fact that vulnerabilities
go both ways. Although less widely reported, investor states are concerned with the
various political or financial risks to which their overseas investments are exposed.
Recipient states can also learn from the investor states and create their own sovereign
funds in order to entertain growing public expenditures, instead of simply passing the
financial burden on to the tax payers.
On the international level, forums such as the International Working Group of
SWFs (IWG) and later the International Forum of SWFs—both sponsored by the IMF—
can foster greater transparency and cooperation among the investor states on the
international level. The creation of the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices
(GAPP), also known as the Santiago Principles, is only the first step in promoting good
governance and greater transparency. Further efforts that directly engage both the
investor and recipient states on an international level can provide further opportunity for
knowledge transfer and conflict resolution.
The popular question of whether SWFs pose a threat to the sovereignty or
national security of recipient states is best addressed by focusing on the more
fundamental questions of why SWFs were created, what goals they pursue, and more
importantly, how the investor states balance various goals. An important consideration is
that both investor states and their sovereign funds are prone to change over time. This is

because both the international environment and the state's domestic structure (in all its
political, economic, social, and cultural aspects) change over time. As a result, states'
priorities shift in response and with that, so does the purpose of their sovereign funds.
SWFs are live creatures that evolve over time and may pursue multiple goals. Therefore,
a single theoretical perspective is not sufficient for the study of SWFs.
As mentioned earlier, despite the multiplicity of goals, there are certain conditions
under which SWFs are expected to exhibit a similar behavior. We expect states to use the
assets of their SWFs in times of economic hardship or when faced with global financial
crises in order to cope with short-term financial problems. This means that during these
times SWFs would have to temporarily abandon their normal agenda and provide
financial resources for exchange rate stabilization or various government rescue or
stimulus packages. The study of selected SWFs during the recent global financial crisis
showed that all of them provided, in various forms, resources for dealing with the crisis.
On the other hand, during times of normal economic activity (that is, when the
states are not financially constrained), we would expect investor states to pursue their
original goals for the SWFs. This research draws upon the major international political
economic theories and proposes three alternatives to the mainstream economic argument
of balance of payments smoothing. These alternative perspectives can explain the
behavior and goals of SWFs during normal times and enhance our understanding of the
operation and evolution of sovereign funds. The research then tests the applicability of
each alternative theoretical perspective to the selected SWFs.
Each political economic perspective looks at the state from a different angle. The
first draws upon the most prominent theory in international relations, realism. The
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"economic statecraft" argument focuses on the classical concept of power in international
relations theory and the notion that states pursue policies that maximize their power
through various means (including investments by SWFs). Having stakes in other states'
economies or in certain industries can be a source of power for the investor states. SWFs,
through their overseas investments, manage and accumulate national wealth and create
interdependencies between the investor and recipient states. What can be hypothesized is
that investor states use their SWFs in order to exert political power and influence over the
recipient state.
The second theoretical perspective focuses solely on the state, in its role as an
independent economic agent and entrepreneur. As states' assets have grown over time, so
has the opportunity cost of holding these assets in the form of idle reserves. As mentioned
earlier, global inflation and the downward pressure on the US dollar have contributed to
the increasing costs of holding idle reserves. As rational economic agents, states may
seek alternative ways to better utilize available resources and maximize their wealth. In
fact, this is not the first time that states have gotten directly involved in the economy.
State-owned enterprises (SOEs), many of which still exist today, are a prominent
example of states' involvement in the economy. Similarly, investor states have
attempted—much like private sector entrepreneurs—to take advantage of available
opportunities and invest their funds in areas with the highest expected return consistent
with their level of risk tolerance. The hypothesis is that investor states employ their
SWFs for the sole purpose of efficient management of national wealth.
The third theoretical perspective uses the dynamics of the relationship between
the state and the domestic structure on the one hand and the external forces of the global
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political economy on the other to explain the state's management of sovereign funds.
According to this view, investor states use SWFs in order to compensate the society for
domestic deficiencies (economic, political or both). In fact, there are many arguments
that speak to the necessity of domestic compensation, including embedded liberalism and
a new compromise; the problem of smallness and domestic adjustments to external forces;
and the resource curse or the Dutch Disease argument. These three arguments, which
overlap somewhat, can explain how SWFs use national financial assets to compensate
domestic actors and how they provide resources for the redistribution of wealth among
those who incur costs. Accordingly, we can hypothesize that SWFs are intended for
domestic compensation purposes.
In this research, I have looked at world's four largest sovereign funds, including
the most and the least transparent funds. The SWFs of Norway, United Arab Emirates,
Singapore, and Russia provide an intriguing laboratory for the study of state capitalism.
In conducting the current research, I have relied upon information and analyses provided
by various institutions, market intelligence, press releases, and local and international
media. I have used the official data to the fullest possible extent; however, the lack of
transparency still remains a problem. On a few occasions, the lack of reliable and
consistent information has limited the scope of the research. This limitation has applied
even to international official data obtained from major financial institutions, including the
IMF. On many occasions, when using secondary sources, data collection efforts had to be
doubled in order to ensure the accuracy of information. For instance, information
regarding business deals were acquired from multiple sources (including the local and
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international media) and the details of the various reports were compared. In the event of
inconsistencies further sources were sought.
The funds studied here also differed in their reaction to outside inquiries. Contacts
at the Norwegian fund referred all enquiries to the information available online through
the official websites of the central bank or the ministry of finance. When asked about a
specific clause, which contained a list of states to which the sale of weapons or military
material was negatively screened, the central bank simply indicated that the information
is exempt from disclosure.6 The media relations department of the Abu Dhabi
Investment Authority, in response to my inquiries, provided some general information,
but only after I provided them with more details about my research and asserted that the
information was required for academic research. Interestingly, a local reporter in the
United Arab Emirates, who had extensively covered issues pertaining to the Abu Dhabi
fund but was unable to provide any information other than what was already in print,
insisted that the search for further information is fruitless, as no one other than the top
management of the fund is knowledgeable about the fund's investment plans. The fund of
Singapore, on the other hand, was cooperative and open to outside enquiries. It provided
information about a bond issue which was, at the time, unavailable to United States
residents. The Russian fund did not respond to any enquiries.
As the title of this dissertation suggests, I will discuss the activities of the selected
SWFs over a period of time, including times of economic prosperity and times of
hardship. Subsequently, I will compare their behavior during the two periods and test the
hypotheses. Before moving on to the case studies, a thorough discussion of theory and
methodology and how and why these four cases were chosen, is provided. Having
6

Ruth K. Lund, email message to author, August 31, 2009.
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presented a framework for the study of SWFs, the subsequent chapters seek to address
the research questions discussed earlier.
Chapter II presents theoretical perspectives that aim to explain the creation and
functioning of the SWFs. I will start with the economic perspective, and then propose the
alternative political economic theories for the study of the funds. Specifically, I will
discuss the three major perspectives of economic statecraft, state entrepreneurship, and
domestic compensation. While the economic statecraft argument posits that states pursue
power, the entrepreneurship argument focuses on the state's ability to optimize the riskreturn profile of its national wealth through active management of its assets. The
domestic compensation perspective asserts that states are in need of financial resources in
order to provide compensation to domestic actors. There are a number of arguments that
speak to the topic of domestic compensation. For instance, preservation of the postwar
liberal economic order has required states to safeguard domestic society from the
deleterious effects of liberalism. This is what Ruggie refers to as the "embedded
liberalism compromise," a mediation between market and society, with the state
safeguarding society and, at the same time, instituting self-regulating markets.7
Another reason for domestic compensation is the problem of smallness. As
o

Katzenstein argues, in a global economy, small and dependent states are vulnerable.
Therefore, they need resources to protect themselves against unfavorable changes in the
global markets. Resource-abundant states have also been exposed to the price volatility of
their abundant resource (typically petroleum). Moreover, reliance on the resource sector
7
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has slowed their rate of industrialization. Resource-abundance state often times suffer
from what economists refer to as "Dutch Disease," a process of de-industrialization, slow
economic growth and loss of international competitiveness. In non-democratic states or
countries that lack an efficient taxation system, governments have little domestic
resources to draw upon and therefore seek to increase their resources through active
management of public assets.
In Chapter III, I define SWFs as "funds owned by the sovereign states
governments or major sub-national governments, with no monetary or financial
regulatory function, that make overseas investment." Subsequently, I present several
comparisons of the world's twenty-largest SWFs, based on various criteria including,
scale, source of funding, transparency, and perceived objectives. Of these criteria, two
have been the most critical to the existing debate, and therefore to this research:
transparency and objectives. These criteria were used to select the final case studies. In
each group of funds, the most significant (largest) fund is selected. I have chosen four
case studies that achieve a reasonable balance between geographical diversity, age, and
size: the Government Pension Fund-Global of Norway, the Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority of the United Arab Emirates, Temasek of Singapore, and the National Wealth
Fund of the Russian Federation. I have also introduced a set of qualifying questions or
markers for the purpose of hypothesis testing.
The case studies section starts with the study of the fund of Norway. This highly
transparent fund has set the level of expectations high with respect to the volume of data
required for the analysis. Chapter IV examines the Government Pension Fund-Global—
one of the world's largest SWFs, with total assets under management of approximately
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$454.5 billion as of the end of September 2009. The creation of the fund as well as its
role fund during periods of large budget deficits, and specifically during the latest global
financial crisis, has been consistent with both the economic and domestic compensation
perspectives. In the absence of financial constraints, the fund has pursued a defined riskreturn margin through a portfolio focused on equities. The fund's commercial
performance, however, has been constrained by a set of non-economic guidelines that are
expressions of the national political consensus in Norway. The fund is, in fact, a tool for
pursuing multiple goals including profitability and socially-responsible investment, with
a focus on the state's foreign policy agenda, as encapsulated in the Ethical Guidelines.
Norway has pursued foreign policy goals through its fund, but only through negative
screening of or divestment from various states or companies. In other words, the pursuit
of foreign policy through the Norwegian fund has been limited to unilateral and relatively
small-scale sanctions.
Chapter V looks at the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, another of the world's
largest fund, with an estimated value of between $400 billion and $875 billion9 prior to
the recent global financial crisis. This fund remains one of the most secretive funds.
Notwithstanding the Emirate's claims of rapid modernization, many domestic political
and administrative processes—including the management of the fund—still reflect an
adherence to traditional values. Evidence suggests that the fund's operation is more
consistent with state entrepreneurship and domestic compensation perspectives than
economic statecraft or balance of payments correction theses. The emphasis on equities
in the portfolio shows that achieving high returns is a more significant goal. Both the
emirate of Abu Dhabi and the United Arab Emirates have little domestic tax base and
9
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remain heavily dependent on the petroleum sector. Abu Dhabi, as the richest emirate, has
also provided financial support to the federal budget and other emirates. Most recently,
Abu Dhabi provided billions of dollars for the purpose of bailing out various troubled
projects in Dubai, the most prominent one being the world's tallest building (Burj Khalifa,
formerly known as Burj Dubai). Although there is no information as to whether the Abu
Dhabi fund provided the bailout funds, it is nevertheless important to recognize the need
for financial resources for domestic compensation—a purpose for which the fund has
most likely been used.
In Chapter VI, I examine Temasek of Singapore. Temasek is an interesting case
because in a number of ways it differs from most of the typical SWFs. Unlike the
majority of SWFs, which are funded by proceeds from the resource sector, Temasek was
initially endowed with a portfolio of state-owned companies. Therefore, the fund's
portfolio consists for the most part of equities. Another unique feature of this fund is the
issue of corporate bonds for the financing of its operations. State involvement in the
economy is undeniable; however, the entrepreneurial spirit has become embedded in the
management of various state-owned companies. Temasek has acted mainly as the
entrepreneurial arm of the government and has facilitated the process of privatization by
actively managing the state's equities in various business areas. The fund's structure and
management follow corporate models and are relatively transparent. Temasek has
established a sophisticated network of subsidiaries and is active both locally and
internationally. There is no evidence indicating that the fund has ever been used either as
a precautionary instrument for coping with external financial shocks, or as a foreign
policy tool. This is largely because withdrawals from national reserves, including those

held by Temasek, have been difficult to accomplish, due to legal and constitutional
provisions.
The last case study is examined in Chapter VII. The National Wealth Fund of
Russia provides a unique opportunity for the study of a fund in its nascent stage. The
events following the collapse of the communist system had a significant impact on the
thinking of policy makers in Russia; and the idea of establishing a precautionary
(stabilization) fund was formed against that background. Of the three political economy
perspectives under consideration, the domestic compensation thesis is the most relevant
to the Russian fund today. The fund has also been the focus of various centers of power
within the Russian government. The constant domestic struggle over access to the fund's
assets has resulted in the fund's inability to develop a solid agenda. There was no
evidence showing that the state has acted as an entrepreneur in managing the fund's assets.
A major reason for this is the lack of entrepreneurial talent and spirit—something that is
often times confused with rent-seeking behavior. Moreover, the fund's assets were mainly
held in cash or Western government bonds; other assets were lent to domestic banks or
businesses in the wake of the recent financial crisis as a part of the government stimulus
package. The Russian fund certainly has a long way to go in the development of a solid
agenda, investment framework, and independent and strong management—if indeed it
ever reaches those goals. Conditions are bound to change; nevertheless, the fund presents
a unique opportunity to observe the dynamics and challenges of institution-building
within a state in transition.
I present a summary of all the findings and provide a brief comparative analysis
of all four SWFs in Chapter VIII. This final chapter also provides a comparison between

the investment approach and asset size of SWFs and two large pension funds. As I
mentioned earlier, the dynamic nature of investor states and their SWFs, as well as the
multiplicity of goals, has made application of a single theoretical perspective inadequate.
This research proposes a systematic methodology for the study of these funds over their
life span and emphasized the need for a paradigm shift in our approach towards the study
of state capitalism.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

One of the main questions that the current research attempts to answer is what the
purposes of sovereign funds are, in other words, what goals investor states are pursuing.
There are a number of theoretical perspectives that can explain the behavior of investor
states. The orthodox economic view contends that sovereign funds are the product of
foreign reserve surpluses, due to high commodity prices or, in case of oil-exporting
countries, a windfall of petrodollars. The economic view explains the purpose of such
funds in terms of balance of payments corrections, neutralizing external economic shocks,
or inter-temporal wealth smoothing.
But economics is only one side of the story. States may have decided to establish
sovereign funds for reasons other than economic smoothing or shock absorbing.
Moreover, the economic view does not adequately explain the cases where funds may
have expanded or maintained the status quo at times of economic contraction, or actively
managed during the time of plenty. It also does not shed light on the dynamics of
decision making and policy setting within the funds.
The main argument here is that the economic view is insufficient in explaining
operation and specifically evolution of these funds. In other words, the choices states
make regarding the operation and management of sovereign funds can be based on
reasons other than monetary stability. Sovereign wealth funds are technically a part of the
state's political apparatus and can be used for reasons related to the domestic political and
socioeconomic structure of the country. At the same time, these funds are significant
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financial actors. Alternative theoretical perspectives can provide explanation for the
operation, evolution and development of different goals by SWFs. These alternative
views combine economics with political science, and while they may not be mutually
exclusive, they can enhance our understanding of the operation and evolution of
sovereign funds.
In this section, I will first briefly discuss the economic view of the operation of
the SWFs. Subsequently, I will provide alternative explanations derived from the
mainstream theories in international political economy and international relations. These
alternative arguments not only can offer a more comprehensive explanation of the
operation of these funds, but also speak to the issue of the evolution and transformation
of sovereign funds' objectives over time.
Each of these alternative theoretical perspectives looks at the state from a
different angle. The first alternative explanation draws upon the most prominent theory in
international relations, i.e., realism. The second focuses solely on the state in its role as an
independent economic agent and an entrepreneur. The third uses the dynamics of the
relationship between the state and the domestic structure on the one hand and the external
forces of the global political economy on the other hand to explain the state's
management of sovereign funds.

ECONOMIC VIEW
Both the economic view and conventional wisdom contend that the creation of
SWFs is a result of rapid accumulation of foreign reserves. In fact the global reserves
have been increasing steadily since the 1990s. Between 2001 and 2007, global reserves
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almost tripled from $2.1 trillion to $6.2 trillion, with the developing countries accounting
for more than 80 percent of those reserves.1 Current account surplus was the main drive
behind the accumulation of reserves. This is especially the case of commodity or oil
exporting countries, e.g., China, Singapore, Venezuela and the Middle Eastern states. For
a few other countries, the capital account played a more important role in building up the
reserves. For instance, India, Mexico, and Colombia sought large external financing.
Some analysts have attributed the creation of sovereign funds to the accumulation
of international reserves "in excess of what may be needed for intervention or balance-ofpayment purposes." Some others have viewed this phenomenon in terms of widening of
global current account imbalances due to shifts in global savings and investment patterns,
and, more specifically, the rapid growth of the foreign exchange reserves of non-Western
countries:
As foreign exchange reserves have grown, many monetary authorities
have concluded that these reserves are well in excess of their immediate
needs and offer sufficient protection against sudden capital outflows. Thus,
they have opted to "ring-fence" a portion of their foreign exchange
reserves for other purposes, allocating a significant share to sovereign
wealth funds. 4
In the case of the SWFs of developing countries, some scholars believe that:
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The growth of these funds are part of larger process of accumulation of
foreign exchange assets by developing countries, which also includes the
large accumulation of foreign exchange reserves during the boom that
these countries have experienced over most of the current decades,
reflecting both booming exports (due in part to high commodity,
particularly mineral prices) and pro-cyclical capital flows.5
Interestingly, the majority of states that have established sovereign funds are
resource-abundant, with the main resources being oil and gas. Therefore, many have
concluded there must be a direct connection between the creation of SWFs and the price
of oil.6 The idea is intuitive and straight forward: an increase in oil prices means an
increase in the value of the country's main export (oil), and a subsequent windfall of
foreign currency (US dollars). At the McKinsey Global Institute, creation of sovereign
funds is explained within this context of high oil prices and the windfall of petro-dollars:
"[m]ost oil-exporting countries have set up state-owned investment funds, often called
sovereign wealth funds, to invest oil surpluses in global financial assets."7
Recent booms in international commodity prices have also enabled other
commodity-exporting countries like Chile (copper), Kiribati (phosphate), and Botswana
(diamonds and minerals) to accumulate foreign exchange as a result of the build-up in
their balance of payments. There are also a number of non-commodity exporting
countries across Southeast Asia and Oceania, including Singapore, Indonesia, China,
South Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Australia and New Zealand that have managed to
5
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accumulate foreign reserves over time. These countries share a number of characteristics,
including an abundant labor force coupled with lower wages than that of the western
countries, as well as established merchant marine facilities. These countries have also
been major hubs for international trade, specifically, assembly and production of hightech goods that are exported back to the industrial world. Many of these Southeast Asian
countries have managed to accumulate foreign reserves over time.
There is no doubt that the availability of resources (in this case foreign reserves or
balance of payments surplus) determines a state's ability to create a sovereign fund in the
first place. For many resource-exporting countries, the state's international financial
status has been directly dependent on the global price of their main export.
Proponents of the economic view also contend that the main purpose of the SWFs
is to provide financial stabilization or smoothing effect on the domestic economy.
Truman from the Peterson Institute for International Economics refers to this objective as
fiscal treatment, saying: "Fiscal Treatment is central to a SWF's role in the macroeconomic stability of the country."8 From the economic standpoint, sovereign funds are
saving or stabilization funds, i.e., a vehicle for the store of national wealth and protection
against unfavorable changes in international reserves.
In other words, sovereign funds can absorb the impact of external economic
shocks or neutralize pressures on exchange rates due to the inflow of foreign exchange.
These shocks are usually related to pro-cyclical changes in both the price and volume of
exports:
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SWFs —especially stabilization funds— can help shield an economy
against volatility in markets of critical value for an economy, such as oil or
other commodities. In this case, the fund serves as a liquidity pool which
is replenished at times of favorable commodity price conditions or reserve
inflows, and which can be drawn upon in cases of low asset prices or
shortage of reserves.9
SWFs can absorb excess liquidity or foreign exchange at times of high export
revenues. These reserves can be redistributed back to the economy when there is a
shortage of foreign exchange. These funds can also be used to neutralize the impact of
unexpected changes in national consumption longitudinally, although little explanation is
offered with respect to the redistribution mechanism. SWFs can "smooth the country's
inter-temporal consumption, in ways similar to individuals who save both for their
retirement and to leave an inheritance to their children."10
Other terms used to describe the purpose of SWFs include store of wealth in the
case of resource-exporting countries, fiscal stabilization, and self-insurance against procyclical capital inflow (Griffith-Jones and Ocampo 2008), foreign exchange sterilization
and stand alone investment in excess of the "optimal" reserve levels (Kimmitt 2008).
Almost all of these goals are just reiteration of same ideas, i.e., income (or consumption)
smoothing and protection against fiscal or foreign exchange volatility.
As discussed earlier, the economic view provides a clear-cut economic
explanation for the creation of sovereign funds in terms of the accumulation of foreign
reserves or surpluses in the balance of payments. By viewing the creation of SWFs solely
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in terms of absorbing economic shocks or smoothing inter-generational income and
consumption, economists, however, close the door to other possible motives (political or
social) that had led the states to establish such funds. Moreover, why SWFs develop
multiple goals and how they balance these goals against each other are other questions
where the economic argument falls short.
Traditionally, excess reserves were invested in other states' treasury bills or other
low-risk financial instruments. SWFs, however, have entered equity and even real-estate
markets whose risk is higher than benchmark risk-free bonds such as the US treasury bills.
The key point is that existence of excess reserves or balance of payments surpluses does
not adequately explain this level of risk-taking on the part of states. The theoretical
literature on international political economy and international relations can provide
valuable alternative explanations for SWFs' motives, as well as the multiplicity of goals
and the dynamics of investment decision making within these funds.
As mentioned earlier, the economic view has limited application in explaining the
functioning of SWFs and examining the evolution and transformation of the funds'
objectives overtime. A particular characteristic of sovereign funds, which has been a
source of concern for many, is their ownership by sovereign states. This calls for a much
broader approach than that provided by economics alone to explain the behavior of SWFs.
In this section, I will provide three alternative explanations that enhance our
understanding of the creation, evolution, and various objectives of these funds.
The first view starts with the classical concept of power in international relations
theory. It also draws upon the notion of power put forward by contemporary political
scientists. States pursue policies that maximize their power, in all areas, including
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economics and commerce. In other words, the logic of economic statecraft prescribes
accumulation and expansion of national wealth, in this case, financial assets. Additionally,
not only the volume of wealth stored by states matters, but so does their form and
location. Having stakes in other states' economies or in certain industries can also be a
source of power. Sovereign funds, with their overseas investments, can serve as a vehicle
for the accumulation of national wealth (financial assets) and its expansion beyond the
geographical borders of one's state.
The second alternative theoretical perspective views states as capitalist economic
agents or, more precisely, as entrepreneurs. Although states' assets may have grown over
time, so has the opportunity cost of holding idle reserves, especially in the light of global
inflation and the downward pressure on US dollar. A rational economic agent and
entrepreneur will seek alternatives to better utilize available resources and maximize
economic profit. Similarly, as capitalist entrepreneurs, investor states have attempted to
take advantage of the existing conditions and invest their money in areas that they expect
to yield higher returns.
Finally, the third theoretical view ties the state's management of national assets to
the domestic structure of the country, arguing that sovereign funds are a means of
compensating the society for structural deficiencies (economic, political or both). There
are a number of arguments that speak to the necessity of domestic compensation, i.e.,
embedded liberalism and a new compromise, small states and domestic adjustments to
external forces, and the resource curse argument. These three arguments, with some
overlap, can explain how SWFs manage national financial assets for domestic
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compensation and how they provide resources for redistribution of wealth among those
who incur costs.

ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
Much of the recent debate on SWFs has derived from one of the most prominent
perspectives in international relations theory, i.e., realism, with its focus on the concept of
power. Political elites, especially in the United States, have been overwhelmingly
concerned with the realist view and the potential for manipulation of economic and
financial power by states that have employed SWFs to acquire stakes in various
economic sectors overseas.
At the core of realism lies the notion of power, its sources and forms. A strain of
realists including Thucydides and the mercantilists draw a close linkage between power
and security concerns on the one hand and economic affairs on the other hand.
Thucydides considered wealth to be an important source of military power, as he wrote:
"war is a matter not so much of arms as of money, which makes arms of use."11
Mercantilists believed that a state's power depended on the amount of gold and silver it
could accumulate in the public treasury. This wealth would enable the state to build up its
military.
Although physical resources and capabilities—including the stock of arms, wealth,
population and land—have traditionally been the main underpinning of national strength,
the contemporary idea of power goes far beyond such capabilities. In the 1970s and
1980s, scholars began to return to a "realist conception of the relationship of economics
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and politics that had disappeared from postwar American writings."12 The postwar
instability of economic systems due to global changes—including the emergence of new
transnational actors like the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
increased competition between the United States, Japan and Europe, the relative decline
of the American hegemony, and the debt crises of Southeast Asian countries— forced
realists to "confront the fact that economic issues were of central importance and could
no longer be relegated to the category of "low politics"."13
Strange identified the structure of production as one of the facets of power and
defined it as "the sum of all arrangements determining what is produced, by whom and
for whom, by what method and on what terms." 14 She argued that the production
structure is what creates wealth in a political economy, which is also a source of power.
She also asserted that there is a connection between the locus of power in the society and
the production structure, and that when the structure of production changes, significant
changes may follow in the distribution of social and political power. But perhaps the high
point of Strange's argument is where she maintains:
In the international political economy, power is held by those who can
offer or deny security, and by those who manage creation of wealth... The
power to create credit implies the power to allow or to deny other people
the possibility of spending today and paying back tomorrow, the power to
let them exercise purchasing power and thus influence markets for
production, and also the power to manage and mismanage the currency in
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which credit is denominated, thus affecting rates of exchange with credit
denominated in other currencies.15
The study of economic statecraft has a long but still relevant tradition. Economic
statecraft was in fact a critical component of United States foreign policy and grand
strategy with respect to the containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The
scholarly literature on economic engagement as an instrument of statecraft has no better
starting point than Hirschman's 1945 work, National Power and the Structure of Foreign
Trade. Hirschman developed a systematic framework for analysis of the relationship
between trade and political power, and highlighted the importance of unequal trade
relationships. Although Hirschman did not view the pursuit of power a necessary
outcome of unbalanced economic relations, he argued that there is always a possibility
that a government will use an unequal relationship as a source of power.16
For Baldwin, economic statecraft is the use of economic instruments by a
government to influence the behavior of another state. He argued that economic statecraft
can serve as a means of communicating intentions to friends and foes alike. Economic
statecraft operates on multiple levels and is often an effective means of achieving foreign
policy goals.17 This definition of economic statecraft has been mainly used in connection
with economic sanctions or incentives, but in the context of contemporary global political
economy it may be extended to SWFs as well. In fact, SWFs can serve as both a foreign
policy tool and a precautionary reserve in the face of potential sanctions.
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Additionally, in a world of highly interdependent financial markets, a state's
power can extend well beyond its geographical border. For instance, Haskel argues that,
in a world of highly interdependent political economies, an estimate of a state's power
depends not only on the resources under its control but on the access that others have to
18
its resources.

SWFs, by their very nature, create such interdependencies and access to

other states' resources. From the recipient states' point of view, giving up significant
stakes in industries or economic sectors to other states would mean relinquishing a part of
their power to a foreign power.
SWFs also give rise to a variation in one of the prominent debates in international
relations today, i.e., the security dilemma. States that create funds may do so for
precautionary purposes, including protection against international market volatility and
provisions in the event of sanctions. However, their choice of defensive tools (funds with
overseas investment) can be perceived by other states (mainly the recipients) as a method
of creating interdependencies that could be used in the exercise of power.19
As mentioned earlier, a number of states that are recipients of SWFs' investment,
mainly the United States, have expressed concern about the intention of such funds.
These recipient states argue that the SWFs might have a hidden agenda, and that by
acquiring significant stakes in different industries and economic sectors, they expose the
recipient state to national security risks. If this is true, then we would expect the
sovereign funds to have high risk tolerance with respect to market forces, acquire stakes
18

Barbara Haskel, "Access to Society: A Neglected Dimension of Power," International Organization 34,
no. 1 (1980).
19
There is a vast literature on offensive or defensive realism. Theoretical discussion on these two strains of
realism is outside the scope of the current research. Suffice to say that with change in time and sources of
power, the fundamental issue of security dilemma (here more of an economic or financial nature) still
remains the same.

32
in politically sensitive industries, and to continue to acquire stakes in such sectors even
during market downturns.

STATE'S CAPITALIST ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Schumpeter's classic description of entrepreneurship as "a fundamental impulse
that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion"

provides an appropriate starting

point for the study of states as entrepreneurs. A number of states have recently been
found to act as international investors, driven by risk and profit calculations. Sovereign
fund investment can be viewed as a modern form of state entrepreneurship, for the
purpose of extracting profit from global opportunities.
Kirzner argues that the entire role of an entrepreneur lies in its alertness to
unnoticed opportunities and in the ability to subsequently exploit those opportunities. In
other words, entrepreneurship not only involves identification of opportunities but also
extracting profit from those opportunities. Moreover, entrepreneurship involves planning,
")

learning, and innovation.

1
In fact, state entrepreneurship entails the same concepts

(identifying, learning, and innovation) and goals (profit maximization and risk
minimization) as private sector entrepreneurship. There are a number of authors—both
economists and political scientists—that have highlighted the role of states as
entrepreneurs. Eisinger, for instance, referred to America as an entrepreneurial state that
"performs roles much like those of Schumpeter's figure... The difference between
Schumpeter's entrepreneur and the entrepreneurial state is that the latter seeks to identify
20
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market opportunities not for its own exclusive gain but on behalf of private actors whose
pursuit of those opportunities may serve public ends."22
Yu applied the very same concept of entrepreneurship to four Southeast Asian
newly industrializing economies (NIEs), and showed that "governments can act as
entrepreneurs and, through learning and innovation, can alter the given resource
situation."

He further distinguished between "directive entrepreneurial intervention" (as

in the cases of South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) and "facilitative entrepreneurial
intervention" (as in the case of Hong Kong), and argued that with the active
entrepreneurial intervention of governments, these NIEs became what the World Bank
has referred to as the East Asian "miracle."24 Other political scientists like Wade support
this view and believe that the governments of East Asian countries intervened in the
economy extensively, in the capacity of an entrepreneur, and promoted the development
of industries, some of which became highly competitive internationally.
The concept of state entrepreneurship is also embodied in the creation of stateowned enterprises (SOEs). Where markets failed, government stepped in as economic
agents. Toninelli argues that the creation of SOEs and the "increased role of the state in
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the economy as the manager-entrepreneur of scarce resources is a phenomenon with deep
roots in the modern age."

He identified, among other things, social goals, including full

employment, as well as market failure as reasons for the creation of public enterprises.
In a sense, SWFs are a metamorphosis of state-run businesses.

The

opportunities in the contemporary global political economy are different from those in the
past. Domestic economies, modes of trade, and global governance have evolved. States
have learned from their past entrepreneurial experience. The liberalization of financial
markets and technological advancements have made the real-time flow of information
and capital among states possible. All these changes call for a new entrepreneurial
paradigm. As Cerny rightly puts it, "[d]omestic sources of inputs and domestic markets
*

•
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for products are too small to be economically efficient..."
Entrepreneur states have learned not only about new opportunities but about new
instruments as well. They have become more creative in managing their resources to
make profit. As rational economic agents, they conduct a cost-benefit analysis with
respect to the holding of assets, which include both natural resources and financial
instruments. They have also become more sophisticated in their methods of dealing with
structural uncertainty. They tend to incorporate inter-temporal variables more
systematically into their political decisions. One recent example of such calculations by a
state is the case of Saudi Arabia. The country is more aware than ever of the fact that oil
is an exhaustible, non-renewable energy source, meaning that the country's foreign assets
26
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will not grow indefinitely. The Saudis established a small fund called Public Investment
Fund, in 2008, with an estimated asset value of $5.6 billion, while the state still controls
massive official foreign assets that are expected to grow to about $500 billion by the end
of 2008.28
According to Saudi American Bank (SAMBA), "[essentially the Kingdom faces
a choice between extracting or preserving oil reserves. Amongst the many complex and
interlinked factors influencing this choice is the rate of return available on reinvesting the
90

proceeds of extracted oil."

In other words, the Saudis are conducting an inter-temporal

cost-benefit analysis, as a part of assets and risk management. They can extract oil today
and invest the proceeds in a well-diversified portfolio with a long-term stream of profits,
or they can preserve the oil and extract it gradually over time. The latter scenario would
be an option if the expected net present value of the invested portfolio is less than the
expected net present value of the stream of oil revenues.
While making such decisions is more complicated by the reality of intervening
factors, e.g., domestic politics, policy dynamics within the OPEC, and the dynamics of
the global political economy, nevertheless, this kind of analysis is crucial to state
entrepreneurship. Learning, in addition to analysis and planning, is another
entrepreneurial quality. The SAMBA report also indicated that the country had looked
into other states' experiences. It had learned from the Norwegian case that extracting oil
and transforming it into a well-diversified international portfolio of equities can help
increase the return on the assets and minimize risks.
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Cases like those discussed above show that it is possible for states to act as an
independent entrepreneur to increase earnings and manage financial risks. States define
and assess their assets, identify opportunities (both domestic and global) and take
advantage of those opportunities. In this respect, they learn not only from other states'
experience but also from the private sector regarding the best ways to utilize resources
and modern (high-tech) tools available to them. States have also realized the increasing
intangibility of value. Some have established the institutions of virtual states and learned
how to use advanced technology, and focus on "creative and management services, [and]
designing new products."
Entrepreneurship not only involves identification of opportunities but also
extracting profit from those opportunities. Moreover, entrepreneurship involves planning,
learning, and innovation, and many states, including those with SWFs have been shown
to possess those qualities and to act accordingly, i.e., maximize their earnings while
managing financial risks.

DOMESTIC COMPENSATION
The domestic compensation argument can also provide an explanation as to why
some states have chosen to establish SWFs. States have different motives for providing
compensation and the methods, scale and the beneficiaries of compensation are not the
same for all states. The embedded liberal order in western states has inflicted social costs
upon society; small states are vulnerable to changes in the global political economy; and
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resource-abundant states face the problem of domestic political legitimacy and depletion
of non-renewable resources.
Each of these states on their path to modernization has experienced one or several
types of domestic problems. According to Huntington, these problems are due to an
asynchrony of changes in social structure and mobilization of new groups into politics on
the one hand and the rate of development of domestic political institutions on the other.
This asynchronisms can create economic, social and political inequalities, deficiencies,
instability or disorder.31 Sovereign funds are one way of tackling the internal instability
and inequalities.
Historically, states have developed various methods of domestic compensation.
For instance, in the post-World War II era, when classical liberalism rose to become once
again the dominant political ideology, states stepped in to minimize the deleterious
impact of economic liberalism on their societies by providing safety nets and
redistribution mechanisms. Some of the small European states accommodated both the
logic of market and the power of the state through democratic corporatism and creating a
balance between external forces, domestic political institutions and interest groups. Other
states—for instance, those endowed with abundant natural resources—were not, however,
as successful in managing the domestic political and economic structure as the others.
The vast majority of states with SWFs, as well as those with reserve or
stabilization funds have experienced one or more domestic structural problems at some
point in time. For instance, countries of Southeast Asia, such as Singapore, Malaysia,
Hong Kong and South Korea, though once portrayed as economic miracles, went through
economic hardship and political turmoil as a result of economic liberalism, imposed upon
31
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them in part, and perhaps, by international institutions.

Many small states that have had

or that are currently having trouble adjusting to external economic forces while pursuing
open economic policies—such as Norway, Australia, New Zealand, Algeria, Ireland, or
Bolivia—have already either established funds or are considering creating them. Many
resource-abundant states with poor management of domestic political and economic
structures have also established SWFs. The largest of such funds are in the Middle East.
Others have been established by Chile, Russia, Iran, and Venezuela.
While the main goal of this research is to distinguish between the various goals of
SWFs with respect to overseas investment—hence the need to look at various arguments
from the domestic compensation perspective—we should note that there are important
conceptual differences between the various types of domestic compensation. The
domestic compensation argument can reflect three reasons for wealth redistribution from
the standpoint of domestic politics. First, political leaders may need to provide
compensation to their constituencies (or voters) in order to ensure the continuity of their
governments; second, the governments may need resources in order to manage
macroeconomic deficiencies including redressing the fiscal deficit; and third, the
governments may find it necessary to diversify the industrial base of the domestic
economy. These different arguments are grouped under the domestic compensation
perspective; however, the type of compensation in the first instance is more likely to be
corrupt, while managing macroeconomic deficiencies or diversifying the industrial base
arguably involves the more legitimate goal of providing public goods. A concern related
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to the politics of domestic compensation is that the less transparent funds may be engaged
in corrupt compensation practices.
There are a number of theoretical discussions in international political economy
(IPE) that speak to domestic compensation as a means of dealing with domestic
inequality and political instability. I will discuss three major arguments here.

Embedded Liberalism and a New Compromise
The conviction that a liberal international economic order is the best choice for
the functioning of economies has a history that goes back as far as the seventeenth
century. Market rationality and its authority were dominant up until the twentieth century.
After the First World War states focused their attention on the domestic structure and
realized that they needed to align their economic policy with domestic social policy.
Nevertheless, liberal ideas remained dominant during the interwar period, mainly because
the hegemon (United States) was opposed to the transformation of the state's role with
respect to the mediation between markets and society.
Liberalism was restored in the postwar period in a grand domestic bargain:
"societies were asked to embrace the change and dislocation attending international
liberalization, but the state promised to cushion those effects by means of its newly
acquired domestic economic and social policy roles."34 Liberalism and domestic stability
were combined with a set of social objectives, while international financial markets
offered states an additional mechanism to soften volatilities and change. Ruggie refers to
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this mediation between market and society as the "embedded liberalism compromise," an
economic order that was a function of social variables, with the role of state redefined as
being the safeguarding of society from downward pressure on wages, low productivity,
and growing foreign competition, and at the same time, instituting self-regulating
markets.

In other words, the success of post-war economic liberalization was made

possible by a "compact between state and society to mediate its deleterious domestic
effects."36
Barriers to trade and capital flow were torn down, as a result of both dominant
liberal ideas and shifts in domestic politics. According to Milner and Kubota, political
leaders may also have lowered trade barriers or pursued international economic
liberalization policies as a strategy for building domestic political support. Groups that
gained from these policies tended to be powerful supporters of the leaders: "democratic
political competition meant that leaders were likely to liberalize trade to appeal to these
-5 "7

new groups to ensure their political survival."
Notwithstanding the powerful forces favoring it, the postwar compromise did not
last long. Technological advancements, global economic integration, and the proliferation
of multinational firms, with their commitment to free trade and strong laissez-faire
policies, diminished the state's capacity to employ traditional policy instruments for the
protection of society against widening inequality and the deleterious effects of
competition. Moreover, the expansion of social safety nets was slowed down as a result
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of increasing budget deficits. The costs became too high for even the most advanced
social democratic and welfare states.
Geddes maintains that economic liberalization can be very costly, especially for
"fragile, uninstitutionalized new democracies ... [where] its costs make it unpopular and
TO

hence politically suicidal to elected officials."

Ruggie refers to economic insecurity as

one of the
direct effects of widespread liberalization, while indirectly liberalism
has
•
on
undermined the ability of states to live up to the postwar domestic compact.

What is

needed, according to Ruggie, is a:
New embedded liberalism compromise, a new formula for combining the
twin desires of international and domestic stability, one that is appropriate
for an international context in which the organization of production and
exchange has become globalized, and a domestic context in which past
modalities of state intervention lack efficacy or legitimacy.40
I would argue that the accumulation of assets, and the efficient management and
redistribution of those assets over time is one way of achieving Ruggie's goal. In this
struggle, both sovereign states and local governments have recognized the importance of
an instrument to compensate those domestic groups that bear costs in order to maintain
domestic political support. For instance, Alberta's Heritage Fund of Canada, the Alaska
Permanent Fund, and the Alabama Trust Fund were established to manage state assets
and distribute them back to society. At the national level, the SWFs of Chile (Pension
Reserve and Social and Economic Stabilization Fund), China (Social Security Fund), and
38
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Norway (Government Pension Fund-Global) are examples of other funds that could serve
as the vehicles for Ruggie's new compromise.

Small States: Internal Adjustments to External Forces
The second perspective within the domestic compensation argument draws upon
the issue of smallness and discussions on the problems unique to small states. The term
"small" is often used in an economic context to refer to the "inability of a country to
affect its own terms of trade, i.e., the world prices of its import and export."41 In an
international relations context, small states are generally weak states with very little or no
influence on the dynamics of global politics.
Smallness is an issue because "[b]y their very nature, small states are exposed to
economic, political and environmental forces which may greatly amplify the fluctuations
in their growth with disproportionate impact relative to larger countries."42 Large
industrial states have the option of exporting or avoiding costs of economic change in
times of hardship. They can exercise power over parts, at least, of the international
environment or their societies. Still, as Katzenstein puts it, "[i]n the global economy the
odds are stacked against small and dependent states."43 Sovereign funds can provide
some means of protection against the problem of "smallness."
In small states, domestic resources are oftentimes constrained by a small land area,
poor natural resources, a limited supply of labor, or a combination of all these factors.
UNCTAD has also classified small states based on their domestic economic structure.
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According to this typology, small states has one or more of these characteristics: depend
heavily on income from workers' remittances from abroad, rely heavily on the export of
natural resources or the services sector (notably tourism and financial services), or have
diversified economies with a large manufacturing sector, often including textile.44
A broader body of research on small states is that of Armstrong et al., who have
compiled a list of 105 small entities (see Appendix B), 64 of which are sovereign states.45
Five of the eight small states in the Middle East and North Africa in this list—i.e.,
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates—have established SWFs.
Other small states identified by Armstrong et al. as having established such funds are
Trinidad and Tobago, Botswana, and Singapore.
In another attempt to quantify the concept of smallness and vulnerability,
Briguglio has compiled a vulnerability index based on the four main sources of
vulnerability: the size of the country, its distance to other states, susceptibility to natural
disasters, and environmental vulnerability.46 His list of 38 states (see Appendix C)
contains six countries that have established SWFs 47
States, in general, have developed various ways of adjusting to external forces.
"Liberal countries such as the United States rely on macroeconomic policies and market
solutions.... statist countries such as Japan preempt the costs of change through policies
A

that pursue the structural transformation of their economies."
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political and economic structures, society and culture, as well as the dynamics between
these components, may explain the differences in the ways that states deal with the
challenges imposed on them by the global political economy.
For instance, the Japanese after the Second World War realized that protectionism
was not an option for them. Instead, they needed to initiate a process of domestic
industrial adjustments. Therefore, they focused on the long-term exploitation of markets
both at home and abroad. Specifically, the Japanese government played a critical role in
anticipating structural changes in markets and supported businesses accordingly, with the
goal of enabling them to become highly competitive in particular industries.
Large states' way of dealing with external forces could not be copied by small
states, who therefore had to develop their own methods. Small European states, for
instance, realized that openness was critical to their economic and political well-being.
These states were very dependent on world markets, so, as was the case with Japan,
protectionism was not a plausible choice. But unlike Japan, states like Norway, Sweden,
Denmark, Belgium and Austria lacked the ability to transform specific sectors of their
economy in such a way that they would become highly competitive. These states
therefore followed a democratic corporatist industrial adjustment strategy that combined
the ideology of social partnership, centralized interest groups, and political bargaining
between the state, interest groups, and political parties.
Perhaps one of the best and most relevant examples of policy tools used to
balance long-term political stability and legitimacy with economic flexibility is the
Norwegian Petroleum Fund (Oljefondet), which was established in 1990 and later
changed to the Government Pension Fund-Global of Norway in 2006. Although called a
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"pension fund," the funding source of this SWF is largely the oil-sector surplus and taxes
on oil companies. The goal of this fund is to generate a long-term stream of revenue,
subject to low-to-medium risk, in order to fund national pensions after 2015. It also has a
set of ethical guidelines according to which investment decisions are made. These
guidelines prohibit investment in areas that could have a potential for "violations of
fundamental humanitarian principles, serious violations of human rights, gross corruption
or severe environmental damage"49 and thus creating tensions among domestic interest
groups and social coalitions.
In small states, leaders and political elites had to allow the impact of external
market forces on domestic economies, including rapid changes in technology and global
competition, while adjusting domestic economic and social policies to accommodate the
imposed changes. Small states managed to maintain or increase the domestic economic
efficiency required for the maintenance of their political legitimacy by relying on their
domestic political institutions and social coalitions. Katzenstein maintains:
Successful strategy of adjustment practiced by the small European states
bridges the divergent requirement of international competitiveness and
political preference. These states adjust to economic change through a
carefully calibrated balance of economic flexibility and political
stability.50
In summary, small states are unable to influence the various political and
economic forces of the international global economy. Additionally, they have neither the
power to change the terms of trade at which they are trading with the world, nor the
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privilege of seigniorage. This means that small states are unable to avoid the unfavorable
conditions imposed upon them by external forces. These negative impacts on the
domestic structure of the society, interest groups, and modes of production can adversely
affect the political legitimacy of the ruling party. States have taken various paths in order
to shield themselves from the global forces that can undermine their domestic political
legitimacy. Where possible, states have transformed the structure of their economy or
society. In the absence of such flexibility, defensive measures such as reserve funds and
redistributive mechanisms are available options. This view may provide an explanation as
to why a number of small states have established SWFs.

Resource Curse
A third view that falls under the domestic compensation argument is the resource
curse argument. The majority of scholars, especially in developmental economics,
contend that the resource curse argument can be used to explain why countries that export
minimally processed natural resources—including petroleum and minerals— usually do
not perform as well as resource-poor countries. Another issue with these countries is that
such resources are, in almost all cases, non-renewable.
One way of compensating for the loss of the natural resources that are a part of
national wealth is through the efficient management of the proceeds from their export.
SWFs can certainly provide the vehicle for the preservation of the value of nonrenewable resources. Interestingly, the list of states with sovereign wealth funds shows a
good number of resource-abundant states, including the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait,
Qatar, Oman, Russia, Iran, and Kazakhstan.

Mineral-exporting countries account for one-fifth of all developing countries. In
his research, Nankani looked at the developing world's largest mineral-exporting
countries for the period 1960 to 1976 and found that the per capita growth of mineralexporting countries' GDP was half that of a control group of non-mineral-exporting
countries.51 Auty and Mikesell provided data that showed that hard-mineral exporters as a
group have had the lowest rate of growth among the developing countries over the 19701993 period, which was characterized by sharp fluctuations in both oil and metal prices.
Their findings confirmed other statistical studies that showed that resource-abundant
states generally had lower rates of growth than resource-poor countries over the past
three decades.
A more comprehensive study by Sachs and Warner that covered the period 1970
to 1990 showed that countries with a high ratio of natural resource export to GDP tended
to grow slowly. The relationship still even held true after controlling for variables
important to economic growth. The study also showed that the growth rate of the six oil
economies of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates was
negative over the period of the study.53
The riddle of resource abundance and poorly-performing economies remains
unresolved. Nevertheless, scholars have provided several economic and political
explanations for the existence of resource curse. For instance, dependency theorists like
Prebisch have argued that the terms of trade for natural resource exporters deteriorate
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overtime, contributing to the widening of the economic gap between the industrialized
world and the resource-exporting countries.54 Nurske has pointed to the fluctuations in
international commodity prices and noted that these fluctuations can easily impact the
domestic economies of states that rely heavily on commodity exports.55
According to Ross, the terms of trade for most primary commodities has
deteriorated since the early 1980s. He attributed this decline drop to "the rising volume of
commodity exports, a symptom of the debt crises and structural adjustment programs of
the 1980s; the collapse of international commodity agreements; and, after 1989, the fall
of the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union."56
Some political economy scholars attribute the poor performance of resourceabundant states to the rent-seeking behavior of the governments of natural resourceexporting states.57 These scholars observe that the resource-abundant states rely mostly
on the revenues from the export of natural resources rather than on domestic sources, i.e.,
taxes. An inefficient or underdeveloped taxation system means that states do not have to
rely on their constituencies, and therefore face little social pressure to change their
policies, since their low taxes discourage opposition groups from mobilizing around
economic issues.58
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A country's natural resource sector can be managed efficiently to contribute to
economic growth if the external disturbances that lead to volatility in governments'
domestic expenditures and exchange rates are overcome. Some scholars have prescribed
the creation of reserve or stabilization funds as a means to tackle the resource curse. Auty
and Mikesell maintain: "Since mineral reserves are depleted in the process of production,
an important element in sustainability is for the country to save and reinvest a sufficient
portion of the minerals rent to compensate for the loss of net income from the depleted
mineral resources."59 They further argue:
A combination of appropriate monetary and fiscal policies and the
establishment of a mineral reserve stabilization fund (MRSF) can modify
the effects of these external disturbances in a manner that will avoid
impairment to long-run sustainability. Governments can avoid sharp
reductions in expenditures by accumulating funds in periods of rising
income, and using these funds to maintain expenditures when revenue
declines.60
Many of the SWFs mentioned in this research come from resource-abundant
states. Within this group of states, the majority rely heavily on the export of petroleum,
while others rely on minerals. The resource curse argument provides an explanation as to
why such states have created sovereign funds.
As mentioned earlier in this section, the domestic compensation argument is a
conceptual umbrella for a number of views that are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, some
of the states that have established SWFs fit into a combination of these views discussed
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earlier. For instance, United Arab Emirates is both small and resource-abundant; Norway
is a small and economically liberal country; and Singapore is small, economically liberal
and highly interdependent with global economy. These states, especially in the face of
global economic uncertainty, need to provide some sort of compensation domestically in
order to maintain their political legitimacy. SWFs can provide a vehicle for the
preservation and management of the state resources required for carrying out such a
mission.
In this chapter, I first discussed the pure economic explanation for the creation of
sovereign funds. I argued that the economic view is not, by itself, sufficient to explain
either the formation or the evolution of SWFs. I provided three alternative theoretical
perspectives to explain why states may have created these funds. The alternative
perspectives can also help identify the different stages in the evolution of SWFs and their
goals. The first alternative theoretical view was based on the notion of economic
statecraft as a source of power. States create SWFs to accumulate and increase their
power. They invest overseas in order to create interdependencies that make the recipient
states vulnerable in the sectors in which the investment was made.
The state entrepreneurship argument views states as economic creatures that are
driven solely by cost-benefit analysis. They have created SWFs because they have
learned from their own as well as other states' experience how to identify and exploit
profitable opportunities. They have discovered what Cerny calls the "infrastructure of the
infrastructure," i.e., the financialization of states' core processes.61 Their domestic
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markets are too small to be economically efficient and profitable. Therefore, investment
is flowed in to states with well-established and functioning markets.
The domestic compensation perspective argues that states, in order to maintain
their domestic political legitimacy, need to compensate their constituencies, whether the
general public in democratic states or the few elites that support the state in nondemocratic countries. Various reasons exist for doing so: liberalism and economic
openness can hurt certain domestic groups; small states are unable to control external
economic influences over their society and domestic economy; or they are inefficient in
managing their abundant and non-renewable resources. In the next chapter, I will define
SWFs and compare and contrast some of the world's largest funds. Subsequently, I will
then present a typology based on which I select four case studies.
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CHAPTER III
TYPOLOGY, CASE SELECTION, AND METHODOLOGY

SWFs are not new, but they have risen to prominence in the past few years. SWFs
are another manifestation of states' intervention in the economy, but, perhaps for the first
time, in the capacity of direct investors. SWFs are indeed an intriguing laboratory of
"state capitalism," especially at this time of decentralized market triumph.

1

These funds

manage large financial assets across borders. The complication of dealing with SWFs is
twofold. On the one hand, ownership by the governments has made it difficult to apply
the conventional economic models and theories to SWFs. On the other hand, the
economic nature of investment has made the application of international relations theory
to these funds more difficult.
Economists generally view the creation of these funds as a result of the
accumulation of excess reserves. Nevertheless, many funds were created for reasons
other than the mere availability of excess reserves, one of them being the perceived need
for certain financial precautions, such as protecting the domestic economy against global
market volatility or financial crises. In other cases, portfolio diversification and return
maximization may be the immediate goal. One would expect the precautionary funds to
be conservative and their investment characterized by lower risk-tolerance and a
relatively long-term horizon, while speculative funds would be expected to have higher
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tolerance for market volatility and risk in the short run. The motives of other funds might
be multiple, or their objectives may change over time.
The question as to whether SWFs pose a threat to the recipient countries in terms
of sovereignty, national security, or financial stability is one that has attracted
considerable attention, especially in the United States since 2007 and, to a lesser extent,
in Europe. Although the question is frequently asked, it may be the wrong question if the
goal is to best identify the underlying motives of these funds. Instead, we should focus on
the more fundamental questions of why SWFs were created in the first place, what the
various goals are, and how the state balances these goals in order to understand their
agenda and decision making, and to predict their behavior. A better understanding of the
functioning of SWFs also enables the international community to better address the issues
pertaining to these funds and to tailor appropriate codes of conduct.
Transparency is a critical issue. In the absence of some minimum level of
transparency, one cannot easily determine the immediate goal of the fund. Recipient
states will continue to be concerned about the funds' motives, simply because they do not
have as much information as they expected. At the same time and from the SWF ownerstate's perspective, without some minimum level of transparency, there is no guarantee
that national assets or public money is being invested efficiently with respect to the
purpose of the fund, be it precautionary or speculative. Additionally, continuous
transparency, including audits, is needed in order to assess the performance of the fund
over time.
In periods of financial hardship, such as is being currently experienced around the
world, SWFs could potentially provide rescue packages for key financial institutions,
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industries, or companies. Whether and why this has happened or not are interesting
questions. However, a more thoughtful observer may ask why states have acted as
capitalist investors in the first place. Questions as to how "state capitalism" affects the
national and global economy, whether state intervention in the economy is in conflict
with foreign policy, and what challenges both investor and recipient states face will
surely continue to be asked. This research attempts to shed some light on a fairly recent
view of states as investors by closely examining a number of SWFs.

RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
The political economy literature contains numerous debates and discussions on
the role of the state in the economy. These roles include entrepreneur and conflict
manager (Chang and Rowthorn 1995)2, economic institution builder (Van Arkadie 1995)3,
or the authority to pool risks and improve allocative efficiency (Barr 1992)4. However,
while most of these discussions emphasize the role of the state in economic development,
the international political economy literature still lacks a suitable framework for the study
of states as "investors".
This research views the SWFs within a larger socioeconomic and political context,
which is different from the developmental states argument or excess reserve
accumulation. The ultimate questions one might ask are why states have established
sovereign funds and what investor states seek to accomplish. SWFs have varying goals,

2

Ha-Joon Chang and Robert Rowthorn, "Role of the State in Economic Change: Entrepreneurship and
Conflict Management," in The Role of the State in Economic Change, ed. Ha-Joon Chang and Robert
Rowthorn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
3
Brian Van Arkadie, "The State and Economic Change in Africa," in The Role of the State in Economic
Change, ed. Ha-Joon Chang and Robert Rowthorn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
4
Nicholas Barr, "Economic Theory and the Welfare State: A Survey and Interpretation," Journal of
Economic Literature 30, no. 2 (1992).
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ranging from meeting future public pension obligations, to insulating the domestic
economy from international market volatility, and achieving a more efficient
management of national financial assets, for instance, through investment diversification.
Fortunately, there is a whole host of literature in international political economy within
which one can study the SWFs objectives.
Later in this research, I will apply the theoretical perspectives, reviewed in the
previous chapter, to selected cases in order to determine which theoretical framework
best explains the creation and functioning of the selected funds. Identifying this
framework can help predict what SWFs really attempt to achieve and what the
consequences of their investment behavior would be. In doing so, this research also
addresses two understudied yet critical areas, i.e., lack of transparency and lack of
systematic methodology for the study of SWFs.
Interestingly, and despite the recent prominence of SWFs, there has been very
little in-depth investigation or academic research on some of these funds individually.
Information on investment plans and transactions is published sporadically in market
news from around the world. International institutions (mainly the IMF) and government
and banking industry have also conducted research, but they have done so only on a
general level, treating all SWFs the same. This research attempts to fill this gap by
closely examining the selected funds, and to provide a foundation for future micro-level
research on other funds.
Additionally, the current research will study the selected funds longitudinally—
i.e., it will explore the formation and "evolution" of different goals over time. While a
particular goal might be of great importance at some point, it might subsequently lose its
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prominence as a result of changes in institutional or external factors, such as changes in a
state's priorities or shifts in the global economy. SWFs' goals can also be multiple, in
which case the critical question to ask is how the owner states balance their various goals
against each other. Cautious generalization and careful conclusions drawn from the
results of this research can also provide a basis for policy prescription at both the national
(the recipient as well as the owner of the sovereign fund) and international (international
organizations) levels.

DEFINITION OF SWF
The year 2007 saw efforts by many policymakers and researchers to define the
emerging phenomenon of SWFs. In June, the US Treasury stated, "there is no universally
accepted definition of an SWF... The term 'SWF' means a government investment
vehicle which is funded by foreign exchange assets, and which manages those assets
separately from the official reserves at central banks." Later in November, Truman from
the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a Washington-based think tank, and a
and a former Director of the Division of International Finance at the Federal Reserve
Board introduced SWFs to the United States House Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs as "separate pools of international assets owned and managed by
governments to achieve a variety of economic and financial objectives."5
OECD defines SWFs as "government-owned investment vehicles that are funded
by foreign exchange assets." Morgan Stanley assigns five characteristics to SWFs: being
sovereign, and having high foreign currency exposure, no explicit liabilities, high risk
5

The United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Testimony of Edwin M.
Truman, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics, November 14, 2007.
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tolerance, and a long-term investment horizon.6 For this research, I define SWFs as funds
that are owned by the sovereign states governments or major sub-national governments,
that have no monetary or financial regulatory function, and their investment criteria
include provisions for overseas investment.
This definition includes, for instance, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), a
sub-national fund of United Arab Emirates with one of the world's largest assets and
overseas investments, as well as Government Pension Fund-Global of Norway, but
excludes Saudi Arabia Monetary Authority (SAMA), which sets the country's overall
monetary policy and regulates commercial banks, and exchange dealers.

TYPOLOGY OF SWF
There are a number of meaningful criteria for categorizing the SWFs. These
criteria include their size and scale, sources of financing, degree of transparency, and
objectives (stated or implied). In this section, I will first discuss each of these criteria
(including their different measures) separately. Then I will combine two of these criteria
at a time and compare the funds. This typology provides a basis for the final choice of
case studies.

Scale
One can assess the size of these funds in several ways. The simplest would be to
evaluate the volume of each fund in absolute terms. However, the absolute values would
not tell us anything about the significance of these funds on the global scale, or compared
to the size of the owner state's economy. A meaningful way of capturing the scale of a
6

"Sovereign Wealth Funds-a Work Agenda," 37-38.

fund is to look at its size relative to the size of the economy or the GDP. Table 1 provides
a comparison of top six funds based on domestic scale (fund size as a percentage of the
2006 GDP). Alternatively, we can express the size of the fund relative to the total market
capitalization of a major stock exchange such as New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or
London Stock Exchange (LSE). Table 2 provides the data on top six SWFs based on a
global scale (fund size expressed as a percentage of the market capitalization of major
stock exchanges).
Depending on the purpose of the research, either of the above measures can be
used. If the focus of the research is the domestic economy and SWFs are being treated as
a dependent variable, the first measure will provide an indication of the domestic scale
and performance of the external sector of the economy, in terms of accumulation of
excess reserves. The second measure will be useful when the focus is on the impact of
SWFs on international finance where SWFs are treated as an independent variable.
Interestingly enough, while a fund may be among the largest on the domestic
scale, its size on the global scale may be negligible, and vice versa. For instance, the fund
of Brunei is the second largest on the domestic scale. However, on a global scale this
fund amounts to only about 0.8 percent of the LSE or 0.2 percent of the NYSE market
capitalization. This comparison highlights the small size of the domestic economy
compared to the global financial markets.

TABLE 1 Top six SWFs on domestic scale (percent)
ADIA (UAE)

521

BIA (Brunei)

309

KIA (Kuwait)

269

GIC (Singapore)

169

QIA (Qatar)

158

GPF-Global (Norway)

103

Source: Lyons, "State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds

TABLE 2 Top six SWFs on global scale (percent)
London SE

NYSE

ADIA (UAE)

23.1

5.7

GPF-Global (Norway)

10.0

2.5

GIC (Singapore)

5.7

1.4

KIA (Kuwait)

5.6

1.4

CIC (China)

5.3

1.3

Stabilization Fund (Russia)

3.4

0.8

Sources: Lyons, "State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds."
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Sources of Funding
SWFs accumulate foreign assets. The majority of the funds are financed directly
through the proceeds from the commodity exports, with the main commodity typically
being petroleum and gas. Chile is one of few non-petroleum exporting states, with its
Pension Reserve and Social and Economic Stabilization Fund financed through the
export of copper. For some others, financing comes through the foreign exchange
reserves already held by various official organizations such as the central bank or the
ministry of economy or finance. In the case of Malaysia and Taiwan, the funds are
partially financed through debt and in case of Singapore, in the form share holdings in
government-owned companies. Table 3 shows the immediate source of funding for funds
with assets larger than $100 billion.

TABLE 3 Sources of funding for SWFs with assets larger than $100 billion
Commodity

Non-Commodity

ADIA (UAE)

GIC (Singapore)

GPF-Global (Norway)

CIC (China)

KIA (Kuwait)

Temasek (Singapore)

Stabilization Fund (Russia)
Sources: Lyons, "State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds" and "Sovereign
Wealth Fund Institute." http://swfinstitute.org/.
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Transparency
Assessing transparency can be very subjective. For example, Standard Chartered
Bank and Oxford Analytica, in a joint report on SWFs, categorized the world's twenty
largest funds according to their level of transparency, which was rated as either "very
low," "low," "medium," or "high."7 Nevertheless, their criteria for assigning these labels
are not clear. Seemingly, funds that "provide detailed information on their size, returns
achieved and their portfolio composition"—such as, of Norway, Singapore (Temasek),
United States (Alaska), Malaysia, Canada (Alberta) and Azerbaijan—are categorized as
highly transparent.8 However, they provide no further details regarding the basis on
which the other funds are categorized.
A more systematic measure of transparency is perhaps the Linaburg-Maduell
Transparency Index, developed at the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute by Carl Linaburg
and Michael Maduell. The L-M Transparency Index rates the SWFs on a one-to-ten scale
based on the essential principles of transparency established by Linaburg and Maduell.
Table 4 presents these criteria.

7
8

Lyons, "State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds."
Ibid., 7.
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TABLE 4 L-M Transparency Index criteria
+1

History including reason for creation, origins of wealth, and government
ownership structure

+1

Up-to-date independently audited annual reports

+1

Ownership of company holdings, and geographic locations of holdings

+1

Total portfolio market value, returns, and management compensation

+1

Guidelines for ethical standards, investment policies, and enforcer of guidelines

+1

Clear strategies and objectives

+1

If applicable, subsidiaries and contact information

+1

If applicable, the fund identifies external managers

+1

Fund manages its own web site

+1

Main office location address and contact information such as telephone and fax

Source: "Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute." http://swfinstitute.org/.

It should be noted that the concept of transparency is susceptible to change.
Therefore the transparency ratings can change as funds release additional information,
voluntarily or under the pressure from international organizations. Table 5 shows the
seven most transparent SWFs according to the L-M Transparency Index, as of February
2009. It should be noted that these ratings may change from time to time. For instance,
Temasek Holdings of Singapore initially received an eight in 2008 and early 2009, but
was upgraded to ten (fully transparent) in late 2009.
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TABLE 5 Seven most transparent SWFs, as of February 2009
L-M Transparency Index
GPF-Global (Norway)

10

Permanent Reserve Fund (Alaska)

10

KIC (South Korea)

9

Temasek Holdings (Singapore

8

GIC (Singapore)

6

KIA (Kuwait)

6

Alberta Heritage Saving Trust Fund (Canada)

6

Source: "Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute." http://swfinstitute.org/.

Objectives
SWFs were created to serve various purposes. Some of these funds, such as those
of Russia and Iran, were created as stabilization funds with the primary objective of
insulating and protecting the domestic economy against fluctuations in global commodity
prices, or as a backup in the event of sanctions. Such countries are highly dependent on
commodity exports and may have already been exposed to sharp changes in global
commodity prices, and therefore have experienced dramatic changes in their balance of
payments. Stabilization funds could help smooth out short- and medium-term balance of
payments fluctuations.
A small number of SWFs are pension funds (or pension reserves) with the
purpose of providing the public with pension income in the future. In other words, such
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funds act as long-term reserves for meeting future national pension obligations.
Government Pension Fund-Global of Norway is a good example. Loss of income due to
the depletion of non-renewable energy resources was the reason that a number of states
established a fund for future generations. For instance, the Kuwait Investment Authority
(KIA) and Permanent Reserve Fund of Alaska aim at achieving a long-term return to
provide an alternative source of income to the income that currently flows from oil
reserves for their future generations.9 Socio-economic development and the restructuring
and promotion of domestic industries are the reasons behind the inception of other funds,
such as those of South Korea, Malaysia and Chile.
All the above objectives are, more or less, precautionary in nature, and the funds
may pursue one or more of them at any given time. There are, on the other hand, a
number of other states—including the United Arab Emirates, China, and Singapore—that
may be concerned about the opportunity cost of holding idle assets and therefore seek to
achieve high returns. One would expect such funds to have a portfolio which is focused
more on riskier assets. To reiterate, the objectives of SWFs may be multiple, either
overlapping or changing over time. This is, for instance, the case of the Botswana and
Russia funds, which have evolved from stabilization funds (short-term need) to saving or
pension funds (long-term need).10 I will discuss the multiplicity of SWFs goals and their
evolution in greater detail in the course of each case study.
As a preliminary step, and based on general indications of objectives available
from various sources, I have categorized the funds according to general perception of
whether such funds are precautionary or speculative in nature. Precautionary funds are

9

Ibid."
"Sovereign Wealth Funds-A Work Agenda," (International Monetary Fund, 2008), 6.

10
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those with the immediate objects of protecting the domestic economy against
international market fluctuations, supporting economic sectors or industries, or meeting
future national obligations such as public pensions. Speculative funds, on the other hand,
have a higher risk tolerance and their immediate objective would be to increase or
maximize return on assets. Table 6 provides a summary of the perceived objectives for
funds with assets larger than $100 billion.

TABLE 6 Perceived objectives of SWFs with assets larger than $100 billion
Precautionary

Speculative

GPF-Global (Norway)

ADIA (UAE)

GIC (Singapore)

CIC (China)

KIA (Kuwait)

Temasek (Singapore)

Stabilization Fund (Russia)
Sources: Standard Chartered Bank and Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute
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Combined Criteria
In this section, I will combine two of the criteria discussed above at a time and
compare the funds in each category. The sample population consists of the world's twenty
largest funds that share the characteristics of being owned by the governments of the
sovereign states, or major sub-national governments, having provisions for overseas
investments, and having no regulatory function.
Figure 1 compares funds based on the sources of funding, i.e., commodity (mainly
petroleum) vs. non-commodity (including transfers from foreign exchange reserves and
debt)—and the funds' domestic scale, measured in terms of the size of total assets as a
percentage of GDP in 2006. Figure 2 compares funds based on the combined categories
of objectives, i.e. precautionary vs. speculative, and the size of the fund relative to NYSE
market capitalization. Figure 3 combines the transparency index with the funds'
objectives. The last figure (Figure 4) presents groups of funds categorized according to
both their source of funding and their objectives.
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FIGURE 1 Source of funding and relative domestic scale (size/GDP2006)
BIA, Brunei

T3
O
S
S
o
U
e
o

£

309%

GIC, Singapore
Temasek, Singapore
KN BHD, Malaysia
CIC, China

169%
r

/ y y / / A 85%

3 12%
Q 8%

NSF, Taiwan

4%

KIC, S Korea

2%

ADIA, UAE

1521%
1269%

KIA, Kuwait
158%

QIA, Qatar
103%

GPF-Global, Norway

TJ
O
a
s

o
O

SGRF, Oman

16%

NF, Kazakhstan

• 16%

SF, Russia

14%

NDF (Fonden), Venezuela

11%

E&S SF, Chile

18%

Istithmar, UAE

7%

DIC, UAE 14%
AHSTF, Canada

1%

PRF, Alaska

0%

Sources: Lyons, "State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds" and "Sovereign
Wealth Fund Institute." http://swfinstitute.org/.

68
FIGURE 2 Objectives and relative global scale (percentage of NYSE capitalization)
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FIGURE 3 Objectives and transparency (L-M Transparency Index in August 2009)
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FIGURE 4 Source of funding and initial perception of objectives
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SELECTION OF CASE STUDIES
Earlier in this section, I identified a number of different criteria based on which
one can categorize SWFs. These criteria included total asset value; size of the fund
relative to the domestic economy, or global financial markets; sources of funding; degree
of transparency; and general perception of objectives. Two of these criteria, i.e., degree of
transparency and objectives, have been the source of much debate among financiers,
politicians, and academics recently. In order to choose the final candidates for case
studies, I have combined these two critical criteria in figure 5 for the same top twenty
funds discussed and compared earlier.
There are few points that I should mention regarding this categorization and
diagram. First, I have modified the L-M Transparency Index, discussed earlier, and have
transformed it into a dichotomous variable. The L-M index rates the SWFs on a one-toten scale according to the essential principles of transparency presented by Linaburg and
Maduell.11 Although this index provides a good starting point for measuring transparency,
some of the criteria—e.g., availability of address and phone number of the fund and the
maintenance of the fund's webpage—are too simplistic. Of the ten transparency criteria
indicated by Linaburg and Maduell, only six—including the reasons for the establishment
of the fund , the issuing of annual reports, and the market value of the portfolio—are
sufficiently meaningful to merit inclusion in an index. For the purpose of this research,
and to correct for simplistic criteria, I have categorized funds with an L-M Transparency
Index of 6 and above as "transparent" and those with a rating of 5 and below as "opaque."
Second, I have taken a strict approach with respect to the assessment of the
objectives. Funds whose objective (whether explicitly stated or not) is either saving for
11

See Table 4 for more details.
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the future—including meeting future public pension obligations, preserving the value of
non-renewable energy resources for future generations, or long-term developmental
goals— or for balance of payments stabilization are considered "precautionary." Funds
with no clear agenda or those with an immediate focus on the current value of the fund
and the maximization of its returns—including those with investment diversification,
return maximization goals, or focus on equity markets—are considered "speculative."
The selection of final case studies consists of four SWFs, with each fund
representing a quadrant in figure 5. Each quadrant in figure 5 contains a number of funds,
any one of which might be a candidate for the final selection. In order to ensure a sound
combination of case studies, I have selected the case in accordance with the following
criteria. First, the size of the fund matters, particularly when compared with other funds
or assessed in connection with the market capitalization of a major stock exchange like
the NYSE or LSE. The assumption is that, the larger the fund, the greater its potential
impact on global financial markets, and, in turn, its importance in global studies. Second,
a good selection of cases should be geographically diverse. Therefore, though there is a
high concentration of SWFs in the Middle East and East Asia, I have chosen funds that
are geographically diverse. Third, I chose to exclude unique or special cases such as
China and Chile in order to facilitate the generalization of findings.
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FIGURE 5 Combined criteria: transparency and objectives
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Taking all of the above considerations into account, I have chosen four case
studies from figure 5 that achieve a reasonable balance between geographical diversity,
age, and size: the SWFs of Norway, United Arab Emirates (ADIA), Singapore (Temasek),
and Russia. The Government Pension Fund-Global (GPF-Global) of Norway is one of
the most transparent funds, with a precautionary agenda, as well as a clear investment
strategy. This fund is held by a well-established democracy with an inherently open
economy in Europe. It can serve as a benchmark for assessing other funds in a number of
areas, including performance, governance, and transparency. The GPF-Global has the
largest assets in its class of transparent-precautionary funds. It can also serve as a good
example for other funds and for current and future efforts in formulating codes of conduct
and global governance.
In the class of transparent-speculative funds, I have chosen Temasek of Singapore,
which also is representative of East Asian economies. Although categorized as
transparent, its L-M Transparency Index was below that of Norwegian fund. However, in
terms of assets, Temasek is much larger than Alberta Heritage Fund, the other fund in
this class. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) of United Arab Emirates is also
one of the most interesting cases. This fund manages the world's largest pool of assets,
both in absolute and relative terms. At the same time, it is one of the low-transparency
funds. This fund has already acquired stakes in financial institutions and other industries
both in the region and in Europe.
Russia has the largest fund in the class of non-transparent and precautionary funds.
The Russian fund also represents another characteristic—and, perhaps, a complication—
to the case selection, in that while the other selected sovereign funds are a few decades
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old, the Russian fund, which was established in 2004, represents a class of emerging
SWFs. Only recently, in February 2008, the Stabilization Fund was split into two funds,
one managing official reserves, while the other became the official sovereign wealth fund,
referred to as "National Wealth Fund." Although the Russian fund does not have much
overseas investments at the moment, partial ownership of, or even expressions of interest
in the infrastructure sectors of other countries (such as Germany) have raised concerns.

METHODOLOGY
There are three points that I wish to highlight. First, as I have indicated, some of
the theoretical perspectives discussed in the previous chapter are not mutually exclusive.
For instance, the pure economic explanation for the creation of sovereign funds (wealth
smoothing) shares some feature with the domestic compensation argument (resource
curse or Dutch Disease argument). Therefore, it is not possible, nor is it the purpose of
this research, to either refute a theory or suggest a single theory to explain the creation
and evolution of SWFs.
Second, as mentioned earlier, the purpose of a fund may change over time. For
instance, the agenda of a fund which was set in the 1950s or 1970s may be less relevant
today, for two main reasons. One is that, over time, countries undergo structural changes
in their modes of production, society, and in some cases, their political system.
Globalization has also made domestic transformation inevitable. The other reason is that
the shape and nature of a country's interdependency with the outside world changes as a
result of political and economic changes on both the global and domestic levels.
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Therefore, the proper approach would be to look at the SWFs longitudinally, and not
merely at a single point in time.
Third, all of the theoretical perspectives discussed in the previous chapter can be
applied to a fund, depending on the period being considered. In other words, we should
expect governments to tap into their SWFs, at times of economic contraction or financial
crisis, in order to finance their balance of payments, and budget deficit in order to boost
the national consumption and avoid recession. Many states such as Norway and Russia,
introduced economic stimulus plans when faced with the global economic downturn.
They increased government expenditures, which was partially financed through their
SWFs. At times of economic prosperity, on the other hand, we should expect the
governments to adopt a higher risk-taking threshold. They may become aggressive
capitalist entrepreneurs with the goal of achieving the highest return or they may invest
(or divest) in areas and industries as they see fit, based on their political agenda or foreign
policy goals, if any. Good examples are the Norwegian fund that, on various occasions,
has divested from industries that were involved in human rights violations, and the Abu
Dhabi fund that had to forego an investment opportunity that, despite being economically
12

sound and profitable, was religiously unacceptable.
What this behavior tells us is that SWFs are theoretically progressive. More
importantly, while various funds may show similar behavior at times of economic
contraction, it is the times of prosperity that can really tell us what the differences are
between the various funds. Therefore, in order to ascertain the main differences between
12

In 1999, ADIA passed on an opportunity to participate in the $310m buyout of Champagne makers
Mumm and Pierr-Jouet. The business was sold for $505m to Allied Domecq in 2001. For further
information see Emily Thornton and Stanley Reed, "A Power Player Emerges in the Gulf," BusinessWeek,
no. 4089 (2008).
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the funds, more attention should be paid to periods of normal or booming economic
activity.
The study of funds during times of international political crises compared to
periods of stability may also shed some lights on conditions under which states are more
likely to use their funds as a means of foreign policy. The idea is that investor states may
pursue opportunities for economic statecraft during the times of political crisis, while
during times of international political stability commercial motives are more likely to
prevail. Although this approach may provide us with an opportunity to examine the
behavior of SWFs during the times of political crisis (versus political stability) and
explore potential factors that increase the likelihood of states pursuing economic
statecraft through their funds, it does not allow us to test the behavior of investor states
against other theoretical perspectives.
The main thrust of the research is to distinguish between the pure economic
motives (specifically, balance of payments corrections) and alternative IPE perspectives.
Dividing the periods of study between times of economic austerity versus abundance—
instead of political crisis versus stability—is more relevant for this study for two main
reasons. First, the choice of times of economic austerity versus economic abundance is
the scenario under which investor states would most likely use their funds for pure
economic purposes. Additionally, since the investor states maintained an overall balance
of payment surplus during the life of their SWFs, the study cannot determine specifically
whether states will use SWFs to redress balance of payments deficits. However, if
economic motives drive SWFs, one would expect to observe this behavior during times
of economic crisis rather than during political crises. By focusing on times of austerity
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and abundance, the study's research design favors the conventional economic explanation.
For this reason, a finding of non-economic motives during times of economic crisis
would be compelling evidence in support of IPE perspectives.
In the following chapters (case studies), I will first discuss the circumstances
under which the SWFs were established. I will then discuss their current situation in
terms of their operations and management. By doing so, I will establish the period of
study for each fund. The period of study will be different in each case as Norway, Abu
Dhabi, Singapore, and Russia established their funds at different times. Then I will
review periods of economic downturn. Specifically, I will look at the country's foreign
account, or oil prices, and other recession-related data specific to that country. In all cases,
the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis provided the most suitable, and somewhat
comparable situation, for the study of funds under economic hardship. I will discuss the
behavior of the fund during the economic downturn and test the hypothesis that SWFs are
sources for fiscal corrections during economic slowdowns. This assertion is in line with
the economic view which is expected to apply mainly to periods of economic contraction.
If, however, a fund does not act as expected, i.e., does not provide financial resources
during times of economic contraction, we would know immediately that the fund has
other—possibly non-commercial—purposes that economic on its agenda.
Subsequently, I will focus on periods of normal activity or economic expansion.
The hypothesis is that during such times, states (or funds) are not financially constrained
and therefore are free to utilize the funds' resources in a way that reflects the true goals of
the funds. It is during these periods that we can distinguish the true purpose of the funds
and observe how states balance various goals. In particular, we should be able to see
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whether a fund's investment decision making is motivated primarily by non-economic
factors (economic statecraft) or by profit-loss calculations (state entrepreneurship or
domestic compensation). In the case of non-political motives, characteristics such as the
risk profile of the fund's portfolio, the existence of a well-established income
redistribution mechanism, the size of the state, and resource-dependency can help us
determine which of the two goals (state entrepreneurship or domestic compensation) are
being pursued.
In order to determine which of the three theoretical perspectives prevails in
explaining different stages during the life of a SWF, I introduce a number of key markers
(see Appendix D) that fall within each theoretical framework discussed in the previous
chapters. The realist explains the creation of SWFs in terms of state's power calculation.
If SWFs were created for conduct of economic statecraft, then one should be able to
observe certain key markers or behavior. For instance, there should be a close link
between the management of the fund and the incumbent administration.13 Political elites
in the owner states of SWFs may also refer to the fund as foreign policy tool or means of
power. Such statements are also indication of purpose of the funds.
The investment structure (portfolio) of the fund itself can also provide more
insights into the reasons for its creation and operation. If the fund's portfolio consists of
investment in sensitive or controversial industries such as defense, or in consistentlyunprofitable areas, then one should look for reasons other than commercial for the
operation of the SWF.

13

The key here is the relationship between the fund's manager and the government. Where the fund itself is
located (in terms of state's administrative structure) may not be as important since the fund can be formally
within a specific administration or ministry but operate under minimal supervision or have independent
decision making.

States that have historically intervened in the economy—especially at times when
domestic markets lacked efficient economic actors—or have established state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), are more likely to have established sovereign funds. SWFs, as a
manifestation of state entrepreneurship, are expected to manage national wealth
efficiently, and so we would expect them to act somewhat similar to private financial
institutions, i.e., manage the portfolio actively and sophisticatedly, optimize risk and
profit, and respond to global market movement.14 The management of SWFs with an
entrepreneurial approach is expected to be delegated to professional fund managers or
independent investment experts. A portfolio that contains more risky assets (equities)
than low-risk fixed-income instruments (bonds or treasury bills) also indicates a higher
risk tolerance (and therefore possibility for higher returns) compared to conservative or
precautionary funds. For entrepreneurial states, this is an ongoing and dynamic process
that involves continuous learning, adaptation, and sometimes speculations.
As mentioned earlier, the three theoretical perspectives may share traits.
Therefore, some of these markers can be applied to multiple perspectives. For instance,
states whose SWF is aimed at domestic compensation, may still have independent or
external managers. However, if a country is small, open, or resource-abundant—and in
general, vulnerable to external shocks—it is more likely that it has established a SWF for
domestic compensation purpose. Additionally, if the SWF account is integrated into the
national budget and is drawn upon on various occasion, for instance for pension
payments or financing government expenditures, it well may be the case that the SWFs'
assets are used for domestic purposes.

14

States with entrepreneurial skills and spirit allow their SWFs to engage in sophisticated, and sometimes
complex, transactions such as mergers and acquisitions, and indirect investments.
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Two additional markers can also help identify SWFs that were created for
domestic compensation purposes. The first marker—mainly applicable to developed and
open democracies—is the existence of an efficient domestic redistribution mechanism
that can funnel the proceedings from SWFs investment abroad to the society. The other
marker that is more applicable to non-democratic states is the lack of an efficient system
of taxation. Inefficient or non-existing taxation system means that the government has to
rely on external sources of income for budgetary purposes. Additionally, SWFs aimed at
domestic compensation plans, most probably, have a more conservative portfolio with
longer-term investment horizon compared to entrepreneurial funds.
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CHAPTER IV
GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND-GLOBAL, NORWAY

The Government Pension Fund-Global (GPF-Global) of Norway is one of the
world's largest SWFs, with total assets under management of 2,549 billion krone1
(approximately $454.5 billion) as of the end of September 2009. The GPF-Global is one
of the most transparent funds. The history of the fund dates back to more than two
decades ago, and as it will be shown, over its lifetime, the fund's operations have been
consistent with various theoretical perspectives at different points in time. At the
beginning, the fund's mission was to provide necessary resources for meeting the
government's future pension obligations. The GPF-Global has provided financial support
to the government at times of economic contraction, or large budget deficits.
In normal times, however, the investment decisions of the GPF-Global were made
according to a set of non-economic guidelines, which are expressions of the Norwegian
national political consensus. As will be discussed, the purely economic view is not a
relevant framework for explaining active ownership motivated by the ideal of sociallyresponsible investment, or sanctioning investment in areas that are in contradiction to the
fund's Ethical Guidelines. In fact, the Norwegian foreign policy agenda, encapsulated in
the Guidelines, determines where investments (or divestments) would be made.
In this chapter, I will first start with a discussion of the economic and political
circumstances that have led to the creation of the GPF-Global. I will show that the
creation of the fund was preceded by an external economic shock (first oil crisis), a

'"Government Pension Fund-Global, First Quarter 2009," (Oslo: Norges Bank Investment Management
2009).

massive current account deficit, and the recognition that the existing funding structure for
future public pension obligations was inadequate. Second, I will discuss the current
status of the fund and present an overview of the fund's current portfolio and performance.
Third, I will identify periods of economic hardship or financial crises and discuss
the role (if any) played by the Norwegian SWF in smoothing the external shocks to the
economy or easing the pressures on national budget or balance of payments. The
hypothesis is that GPF-Global function at times of economic contraction more according
to the economic idea (sterilizing external financial shocks or smoothing domestic wealth
or consumption). Fourth, I will focus on the period of normal activity and discuss the
evolution of the fund's functions and goals. The hypothesis is that, in the absence of
financial constraints, the fund's investment decisions and management will reflect the
actual, and perhaps non-expressed, agenda of the fund. For instance, as it will be shown,
GPF-Global started to incorporate non-commercial, and somewhat political, factors into
its decision making as early as 2004 with the involvement in an oil company in Africa
and the related disputes.
Finally, as discussed in the previous chapter, a SWF may have several goals on its
agenda. This case study identifies various objectives of the GPF-Global. The conclusion
of this chapter contains a discussion of the various potential objectives of the GPF-Global
and how the Norwegian government balances these goals against each other.

CREATION OF GPF-GLOBAL
The history of the GPF-Global as well as its source of funding is closely related to
the petroleum sector. Therefore, a brief history of the Norwegian petroleum industry is
relevant. In 1963, Norway proclaimed its sovereignty over the continental shelf and
begun the exploration and exploitation of submarine natural resources. The Statoil (the
state oil company) was established in 1972. Only a year later, and before the country
could extract profit from the petroleum sector, Norway was hit by the first oil crisis.
Gasoline was rationed, car-free days were introduced, and Norway's King Olav took the
tram. The Statfjord field was discovered in the North Sea in 1974, but production from
this field started only in 1979 and the Statoil became the sole operator of the field in
1981.2
The second oil crisis created a recession in most developed countries, but not in
Norway—an oil exporter—that had focused on the petroleum sector. Heavy reliance on
oil, however, had its own downside. Norway gradually lost its international market
competitiveness and experienced de-industrialization, a phenomenon commonly known
as Dutch Disease. In the early 1980s, while liberalization and privatization were
occurring in many other countries, the conservative government of Norway continued to
heavily regulate the economy, going so far as to have the Storting (the Parliament) setting
the interest rates at a much lower rate than the market level.3 When oil prices fell
dramatically in December 1985, the artificially-produced economic prosperity of the mid-

2

"The Norwegian Oil History," Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (Oljedirektoratet),
http://www.npd.no/English/Om+OD/Nyttig/01je-ABC/Norsk+oljehistorie/70_tallet.htm.
3
Ola Grytten, "The Economic History of Norway," in EH.Net Encyclopedia, ed. Robert Whaples (2008).

1980s could no longer be sustained, and Norway experienced a huge deficit.4 Norway
managed to correct the current account deficit after almost three years. Since 1989,
Norway has continuously sustained a current account surplus. The current account
surplus has been more than 12 percent of the GDP, reaching 16.4 percent in 2006, the
highest point in the past decade.5 Today, Norway is the world's fourth-largest exporter of
oil (after Saudi Arabia, Russia, and Iran) and third-largest exporter of gas (after Russia
and Canada).6
It took Norway almost two decades to realize that the oil reserves are not
available infinitely. For long, it was believed that the oil and gas reserves in the
Norwegian shelf were be depleted as early as 2015.

It was only in June 2009 that Royal

Dutch Shell, Europe's largest petroleum company, announced that it had made a natural
gas discovery 360 kilometers (224 miles) offshore Bronnoysund in the northern
Norwegian Sea.8
On June 22, 1990, the Storting passed the Government Petroleum Fund Act in
order to support the long-term management of proceeds from the oil revenues. The
Oljefondet (the Petroleum Fund) was established the same year; however, the first net
transfer to the fund took place only in 1996. Between 1998 and 2002, equities and nongovernment bonds were also added to the fund's portfolio. On December 21, 2005, the
Storting passed the Government Pension Fund Act to "support central government saving
to finance the National Insurance Scheme's expenditure on pensions and long-term

4

Average crude oil price fell about 48 percent from $27 in 1985 to $14 per barrel in 1986. The current
account balance that had a $3 billion surplus in 1985 experienced a deficit of $4.5 billion in 1986.
5
"External Trade with Commodities," Statistics Norway, http://www.ssb.no.
6
"The World Fact Book," CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/docs/rankorderguide.html.
7
"OLF the Norwegian Oil Industry Association," http://www.olf.no/about-olf/category292.html.
8
Marianne Stigset, "Shell Gas Find in Norway May Be Biggest in 12 Years," Bloomberg, June 19, 2009.
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consideration in the application of petroleum revenues."9 As a result, the Government
Petroleum Fund Act of 1990 was repealed. On January 1, 2006, the Government Pension
Fund was established, indicating its mission as supporting a "broader pension reform,
highlighting also the fund's role in facilitating government savings necessary to meet the
rapid rise in public pension expenditures in the coming years."10 The GPF-Global was in
fact one of two funds that were created under the umbrella of the Government Pension
Fund for the management of the latter's foreign assets.
The other fund was the Government Pension Fund-Norway (GPN-Norway),
which managed the domestic assets of the Government Pension Fund. Under the 2005
Act, the responsibility of managing both GPF-Global and GPF-Norway rests with the
Ministry of Finance. The operational management of the GPF-Global has, however, been
delegated to Norges Bank (the Norwegian Central Bank), while Folketrygdfondet11 has
been managing the daily operations of the GPF-Norway.12 The GPF-Global accounted for
95 percent of the overall value of the Government Pension Fund at the end of the first
half of 2008, while the GPF-Norway accounting for the remaining 5 percent.

Figure 6

presents a timeline of the administrative evolution of the fund.

9

"Provisions on the Management of the Government Pension Fund," (Ministry of Finance, Government of
Norway), 7.
10
"Background Note: Norway's Position in Relation to the International Debate on Sovereign Wealth
Funds," (Asset Management Department, The Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2007), 7.
11
Folketrygdfondet is a company by special statute, with the Norwegian state as the sole owner. It manages
the Government Pension Fund-Norway, with assets under it management of 113 billion krone at the end of
2007. For more information see http://www.ftf.no/about_ftf.html.
12
The Government Pension Fund-Norway is invested in equities and fixed-income vehicles of Norway (85
percent of the benchmark portfolio), as well as in Denmark, Finland and Sweden (15 percent of the
benchmark portfolio).
13
"Chapter 5: The Management of the Government Pension Fund," in National Budget 2009 (Ministry of
Finance, Government of Norway), 4.
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FIGURE 6 Timeline of the evolution of the Norwegian SWF
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Both GPF-Global and GPF-Norway's major objective is to generate a higher
return than the benchmark over time, within the defined risk margin, with the goal of
"safeguarding the basis of future welfare, including national pension."14 Norges Bank and
Folketrygdfondet exploit their defined risk margin by investing in securities that fall
outside of the scope of the benchmark portfolio and investing other portions of the fund
in certain securities set by the benchmark portfolio, in order to achieve returns in excess
of the returns on benchmark portfolio.15
Although the GPF-Global is the official sovereign wealth fund of Norway, the
period of study here will not be confined to the short period of 2006 and after. On the
other hand, 1990 would not be the most appropriate starting point, as until 1996 the
Oljefondet existed only on paper. Between 1996 and 1998, when it received some of the
petroleum sector income, Oljefondet was more of a saving fund. It was only after 1998
that equities and non-government bonds were gradually added to the portfolio of the fund.
Therefore, 1998 is a more relevant starting point. Where the fund stands today is the
focus of the next section.
14
15

Norges Bank website (www.norges-bank.no).
"Chapter 5: The Management of the Government Pension Fund," 3.

GPF-GLOBAL, TODAY
The petroleum sector and activities related to this industry are the main source of
funding of the GPF-Global. Other sources of cash flow are the fund's own return on
investment and the net result of financial transactions associated with the petroleum
sector. The detail of the cash flow of the GPF-Global is presented in Appendix E.
The Norwegian Ministry of Finance acts as the owner of the fund and reports on
all matters related to the fund's performance to the Norwegian Storting. The operational
management of the fund is delegated by the Ministry of Finance to the Norges Bank,
specifically, to its Investment Management arm or NBIM.16 A management agreement
defines the relationship between the Ministry of Finance (as the delegating authority) and
the Norges Bank (as the operational manager).17
The GPF-Global is managed partially by the Norges Bank and partially by
external managers. However, the key management strategy is dictated by the Ministry of
Finance. The Ministry of Finance sets the long-term investment strategy by defining the
structure of the "benchmark portfolio," in accordance with the general consensus in the
Storting, with regard to objective of high-return subject to moderate-risk. "The long
investment horizon of the fund means that the portions invested in various asset classes
and geographical regions can be determined on the basis of the assessment of expected
long-term returns and risks."18

16

NBIM is one of 4 wings of the Norges Bank with three main areas of responsibilities including managing
the foreign currency portfolio of the GPF-Global (on behalf of the Ministry of Finance), managing the
foreign currency portfolio of the Government Petroleum Insurance fund (on behalf of the Ministry of
Petroleum and Energy), and managing Norges Bank's long-term portfolio of foreign exchange reserves.
Source: Norges Bank website (http://www.norges-bank.no/templates/article
49384.aspx).
17
"Government Pension Fund-Global," Norges Bank, http://www.norges-bank.no/.
18
"Chapter 5: The Management of the Government Pension Fund," 2.
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Norges Bank has to follow the benchmark portfolio closely, although it has been
given some leeway. The Ministry of Finance has established the limits within which the
expected return on the actual investment can deviate from the expected return on the
benchmark portfolio. 19 The structure of the benchmark portfolio determines 90 to 95
percent of the actual portfolio return.
In January 1998, when the Oljefondet started to invest in the equity market,
Norges Bank hired the first external manager. The first active equity mandates were set in
December the same year. For fixed-income mandates, external managers were hired in
April 2000 and after.

The external managers were selected by looking at characteristics

such as their information advantage, portfolio composition, and portfolio implementation
methods. Norges Bank has continued to hire external managers as of December 31, 2007.
The list of external managers is presented in Appendix F. The amount of assets managed
by the external managers as a proportion of total fund assets was 11 percent as of June
2008 (the lowest level since equities were introduced in 1998), and rose to 13.5 percent
by the end of September 2008.
The GPF-Global may be considered to be a role model with respect to
transparency and information disclosure. The management of the fund is characterized by
a high degree of transparency, information disclosure, and professionalism. At the
international level, the GPF-Global actively participated in the International Working
Group, sponsored by the IMF in May 2008, and contributed to the preparation of a set of

19

The Ministry of Finance uses the 'expected tracking error' (ETE) as a risk measure to manage the market
risk of the fund. The ETE is defined as the expected value of the standard deviation of the difference
between the annual return on actual investment and annual return on the benchmark portfolio. The Ministry
has limited the ETE to 1.5 percentage point, meaning that in two out of three years, the fund's return should
not deviate from the return on the benchmark portfolio by more than 1.5 percentage points.
20
"Government Pension Fund-Global."
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voluntary guidelines referred to as the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices
(GAPP), also known as the Santiago Principles.21
At the national level, Norges Bank (as GPF-Global manger) is required to report
the results of its performance to the Ministry of Finance on a quarterly basis. In each
Quarterly Report, Norges Bank provides an overall market review, a discussion of
portfolio adjustments and changes in its market value, and associated risk and return
figures. The report also provides updates on other issues, including those pertaining to
corporate governance and the exercise of ownership rights, socially-responsible
investments, and sustainable development (such as environmental protection and fight
against child labor). The quarterly and annual reports are available to the public through
the Norges Bank website.
The Ministry of Finance also uses Mercer Investment Consulting, a consulting
firm, to verify the performance of Norges Bank in a more detailed and technical manner.
The GPF-Global is also subject to audits by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) or
Riksrevisjonen.

This office has agreed with Norges Bank to follow the audit approach

employed by the Norges Bank Auditing Department. In 2007, the Ministry of Finance
announced that it would hold a public hearing on amendments to the accounting and
auditing clauses of the Central Bank Act to enhance controls and supervisions. The
Ministry has also maintained that the increased complexity of the management of the
21

Santiago Principles or Generally Accepted Principles and Practices (GAPP) for Sovereign Wealth Funds
are the product of the International Working Group (I WG) of SWFs, which was established on May 1 2008
The IWG was tasked to prepare a set of voluntary principles that would promote a better understanding of
the issues related to SWFs, including their institutional framework, governance and transparency. The IWG
presented the Santiago Principles, a set of 24 voluntary principles, to the IMF on October 11, 2008.
22
The Office of the Auditor General (OAG) or Riksrevisjonen is the Norwegian state's auditor, under and
reporting to the Storting. The OAG conducts financial audits, performance audits, and corporate control
(for more information on OGA see: http://www.riksrevisjonen.no/en/). OAG has served as an external
auditor for organizations such as the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE) in 2006.
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GPF-Global, together with the increase in its assets, calls for measures beyond those
designated by the internal audit department or support from the auditing firm Deloitte,
which has been within the framework of the Central Bank Act.
Section Two of the Regulations on Management of the GPF-Global defines the
administrative and management framework of the fund. The fund is placed on a separate
account, denominated in Norwegian krone, with the Norges Bank. The capital is then
invested in Norges Bank's name in financial instruments and cash deposits denominated
in foreign currency. Norges Bank "shall seek to achieve the highest possible return on the
investments in foreign currency within the investment limits set out in these regulations
and guidelines issued under these regulations."24
The fund's capital is invested in non-Norwegian financial instruments, since
investment in securities by Norwegian enterprises (i.e., those with head offices in
Norway) is not permitted.

These instruments fall into two major categories: equities and

fixed-income instruments. According to the early regulations on the management of the
GPF-Global, the proportion of equity instruments could vary between 30 to 50 percent,
while that of fixed-income instruments could vary between 50 to 70 percent.

Financial

instruments in the portfolio may included derivatives, commodity-based contracts, and
fund units. Table 7 shows the allowed distribution of equity and fixed-income
instruments by region.
23

Specifically, the Ministry of Finance aims to hold a public hearing with regard to these proposed Central
Bank Act amendments: 1) Replace the Central Bank audit arrangement by an arrangement whereby the
Supervisory Council appoints an external auditor for Norges Bank; 2) Establish legal authority for
regulations regarding the accounting principles Norges Bank should observe; 3) Define the scope of the
audit and the content of the auditors' report. For more information see "Chapter 5: The Management of the
Government Pension Fund," 10.
24
"Chapter 2: Regulations on Management of the Government Pension Fund-Global," in Provisions on the
Management of the Government Pension Fund (Ministry of Finance, Government of Norway), Section 2.
25
Folketrygdfondet (as the operational manager of GPF-Norway) manages domestic investments.
26
"Chapter 2: Regulations on Management of the Government Pension Fund-Global," Section 4.
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TABLE 7 Allowed regional distribution of financial instruments (percent)
Equity instruments

Fixed-income instruments

Europe

40-60

50-70

Americas and Africa

25-45

25-45

Asia and Oceania

5-25

0-15

Source: Section 4, Regulations on Management of the GPF-Global, Ministry of Finance

The most important strategic investment decision is made by the Ministry of
Finance itself, which is setting the benchmark portfolio. The benchmark portfolio, in fact,
controls the distribution of investment among various classes of assets and currencies, as
well as geographical locations. Figure 7 shows the geographical distribution of the
equities and fixed-income instruments in the benchmark portfolio.
In the recent benchmark portfolio, equities account for 60 percent and are
composed of stocks, money market instruments, and derivatives, included in the
Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) All-World equity indices (large- and mediumsize companies).27 Fifty percent of the equities are invested in European countries,
including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Thirty-Five
27

The FTSE All-World Index Series is the Large/Mid Cap aggregate of 2,700 stocks from the FTSE Global
Equity Index Series. It covers 90-95percent of the investable market capitalization. The series is divided
into Developed and Emerging segments, giving investors the opportunity to develop their own investible
universe. The modular nature of the series provides maximum breadth of options for structuring portfolios
with indices calculated at regional, national and sector level. For more information see "FTSE,"
http://www.ftse.com/index.jsp.
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percent of equity portfolio of FTSE All-World equities is invested in Brazil, Canada,
Mexico, South Africa, and the United States. The remaining 15 percent equities are
invested in countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including Australia, Hong Kong, Japan,
New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.

FIGURE 7 Geographical distribution of benchmark portfolio
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Fixed-income instruments or bonds account for 40 percent of the benchmark
portfolio. Sixty percent of the fixed-income instruments consist of Lehman Global
Aggregate (LGA) 28 and Lehman Global Real (LGR) in Europe, plus domestic
government bonds included in Lehman Swiss Franc Aggregate. This portion of the fixedincome instruments is invested in 21 different countries and denominated in Euro, Pound
90
Sterling, Swiss franc, Swedish krona and Danish krone.

Thirty-five percent of the

fixed-income instruments are invested in similar bonds in the United States and Canada,
and the remaining five percent in domestic government bonds in Australia, Japan, New
Zealand, and Singapore. Table 8 shows the geographical distribution of the actual
portfolio as of end the first quarter 2009. Table 9 provides the list of the ten largest equity
and bond holdings of GPF-Global as of March 31, 2009.

TABLE 8 Geographical distribution of "actual portfolio" as of March 31, 2009
Equity instruments

Fixed-income instruments

Europe

49.9%

60.0%

Americas

35.2%

35.1%

Asia and Oceania

15.3%

4.9%

Source: Government Pension Fund-Global, First Quarter 2009
28

The Global Aggregate Index provides a broad-based measure of the global investment-grade fixed-rate
debt markets. The Global Aggregate Index contains three major components: the US Aggregate Index
($300 million), the Pan-European Aggregate Index (€300 million), and the Asian-Pacific Aggregate Index
(¥ 35 billion). Source: Lehman Brothers, Global Aggregate Index Fact Sheet.
29
Norges Bank website and Section 1.2, Guidelines for the Management of the GPF-Global, Ministry of
Finance.

TABLE 9 Largest GPF-Global holdings as of March 31, 2009 (million krone)
EQUITIES
Royal Dutch Shell pic (Netherlands)

14,550

Nestle SA (Switzerland)

14,043

BP pic (UK)

13,221

TOTAL SA (France)

11,874

Exxon Mobile Corp. (US)

11,057

Roche Holding AG (Switzerland)

10,470

Vodafone Group pic (UK)

10,375

Telefonica SA (Spain)

9,550

Novartis AG (Switzerland)

8,961

Glaxo SmithKline pic (UK)

8,226

FIXED-INCOME INSTRUMENTS
United States

85,083

Federal Republic of Germany

81,251

UK Government

78,770

Fannie Mae

75,961

Italian Republic

72,046

French Republic

48,161

Japanese Government

45,723

European Investment Bank

43,417

Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (Germany)

31,279

Bank of Scotland pic (UK)

23,505

Source: Government Pension Fund-Global, First Quarter 2009
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Table 10 also shows the evolution of the quarterly market value of the fund and
its components together with the changes in the percentage allocation of the underlying
asset classes. The return on the fund's overall portfolio in the third quarter of 2008 fell to
-7.68 percent, the lowest point in the fund's history. This was 1.84 percent below the
benchmark portfolio return.

The poor performance of both equities and fixed-income

instrument contributed to this overall negative performance.
The fixed-income assets were primarily affected by the United States sub-prime
mortgage crisis and the poor performance of the European and inflation-linked bonds.
The equity section of the portfolio was also severely damaged by the losses in the United
States banking sector.31 Table 11 also provides quarterly data on the fund's return by asset
class, as well as a comparison with the benchmark portfolio. It should be noted that
excess return—i.e., the difference between the actual portfolio return and the benchmark
portfolio return—is calculated in krone. As can be seen, the proportion of equities in the
portfolio increased from 40 percent in 2007 to 60 percent in 2009, and the corresponding
proportion of fixed-income instruments dropped from 60 percent to 40 percent.

30

"Government Pension Fund-Global, Third Quarter 2008," (Oslo: Norges Bank Investment Management
2008).
31
Ibid.

TABLE 10 Evolution of the "actual portfolio" as of June 30, 2009
Ql
2007
Market value (billions of krone)

Q2
2007

Q3
2007

Q4
2007

Ql
2008

Q2
2008

Q3
2008

Q4
2008

Ql
2009

Q2
2009

Equities

753

819

878

958

935

1,031

1,123

1,129

1,091

1,438

Fixed-income assets

1,124

1,120

1,054

1,061

1,011

961

997

1,146

985

948

Total fund

1,876

1,939

1,932

2,019

1,946

1,992

2,120

2,275

2,076

2,385

Allocation of assets (percent)
Equities/fond

40.14

42.24

45.45

47.45

48.05

51.76

52.97

49.6

52.6

60.3

Fixed-income/fund

59.91

57.76

54.55

52.55

51.95

48.24

47.03

50.4

47.4

39.7

Sources: Government Pension Fund-Global Second Quarter 2008, Third Quarter 2008, and Second Quarter 2009 Reports

TABLE 11 Quarterly portfolio and excess return as of June 30, 2009 (percent)
Qi
2007

Q2
2007

Q3
2007

Q4
2007

Qi
2008

Q2
2008

Q3
2008

Q4
2008

Qi
2009

Q2
2009

Return in Foreign Currency
Equity portfolio

2.59

7.40

-0.30

-2.77

-12.67

-1.60

-13.12

-20.58

-8.84

19.49

Fixed-income portfolio

0.74

-1.19

2.10

1.30

0.87

-1.72

-1.19

1.55

-0.88

5.07

Total fund

1.48

2.23

1.15

-0.64

-5.62

-1.87

-7.68

-10.30

-4.81

12.67

Benchmark portfolio

1.39

1.93

1.33

-0.20

-4.79

-2.10

-5.97

-8.62

-4.48

10.60

1.04

4.86

-5.57

-1.59

-14.71

-1.90

-5.84

-8.41

-14.46

19.69

Fixed-income portfolio

-0.78

-3.53

-3.29

2.53

-1.49

-2.02

7.08

17.12

-6.99

5.25

Total fund

-0.05

-0.19

-4.20

0.56

-7.83

-2.17

0.06

3.45

-10.67

12.86

Benchmark portfolio

-0.15

-0.49

-4.03

1.01

-7.02

-2.41

1.90

5.38

-10.36

10.78

Excess Return

0.09

0.30

-0.17

-0.45

-0.81

0.24

-1.84

-1.93

-0.14

1.08

Return in Norwegian krone
Equity portfolio

Sources: Government Pension Fund-Global Second Quarter 2008, Third Quarter 2008, and Second Quarter 2009 Reports

TIMES OF HARDSHIP AND GPF-GLOBAL
Since the creation of Oljefondet in 1990, there have been only two events that
may have had a negative impact on the balance of payments of Norway. In 1998, average
crude oil prices dropped by about 32 percent. The current account balance of Norway did
not, however, experience a deficit, and only dropped sharply from $10 billion in 1997 to
only $6 million in 1998.32 Norway managed to sustain its overall balance of payments
status through the capital account that offset the downward pressure on the current
account. The Oljefondet, at the time, did not seem to have played much of a role in easing
the economic pressure. It is not clear why this did not happen; the government may have
decided that it was not necessary to use the petroleum money, or the fund may not have
had resources sufficient to support the national economy, especially since the first net
transfer to the fund took place only in 1996.
Unfortunately there is very little information about the balance and cash flow of
the Oljefondet between 1990 and 2006. Therefore, any conclusions would be only
speculations. Drawing conclusions about the behavior of the GPF-Global, which was
established in 2006, during periods of low oil prices is in fact impossible since the price
of oil has exhibited an upward trend since 2006 (see figure 8). Infrequent drops in oil
prices are not, however, the only external factor threatening the Norwegian current
account. There is another kind of crisis that both the Norwegian and global economy are
exposed to—a financial crisis. Since 1990, the only financial crisis that has had a
significant impact on the Norwegian economy is the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis.

32

International Monetary Fund., "IFS CD-ROM." (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2009).
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The crisis began in summer of 2007 with a fall in the value of securities backed
by US sub-prime mortgages. During 2008, many large financial institutions went
bankrupt or were sold to other financial institutions. Major financial institutions such as
Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch were already in trouble. By the end of
the year, the problem had developed beyond that of a purely financial crisis, as a crisis of
confidence in the financial system and a global economic downturn took hold.
Governments of many industrial countries, including the United States, Germany, and
Japan, were forced to immediately inject money into their economies or introduce
economic stimulus programs to boost employment and maintain the domestic
consumption level.
The global recession did not leave Norway unaffected. On the national
(macroeconomic) level, the Norwegian mainland GDP33 had shrunken already by 0.8
percent by the end of the fourth quarter 2008, and the first quarter 2009 figures showed a
further one percent decline. The total GDP also shrank by 0.4 percent in the first quarter
2009.34 In late 2008, Jens Stoltenberg, the Norwegian prime minister, said that his
government would soon announce more spending measures designed to boost the
domestic economy.35 The government announced a 20 billion krone ($2.89 billion)
stimulus package that consisted of 16.75 billion krone in increased government spending
with a focus on infrastructure and 3.25 billion kroner in tax relief for the business
sector.36 In January 2009 the government proposed amendments to the 2009 budget. In

33

Mainland GDP refers to the GPD that excludes oil, gas, and shipping industries. Norway authorities
believe mainland GDP to be a better indicator of the economic well-being because while the petroleum
sector constitutes 25 percent of the economic growth, it only employs about one percent of the Norwegian
labor force
34
"Norway Enters Recession: Offical Data," Agence France Presse, May 19, 2009.
35
"Norway SWF Takes Domestic View," Thomson Merger News, December 31, 2008.
36
Elizabeth Cowley, "Oil-Rich Norway Sets Stimulus Plan " Wall Street Journal Europe, January 27, 2009.

February, it was confirmed that, in the face of the global financial crisis, the Norwegian
government needed more financial resources in order to boost employment and protect
generous welfare-state policies. Stoltenberg, in a speech to the Confederation of
Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) said:
To counter the effects of the financial crisis, I am letting you know that in
2009 we will use much more of the oil income than is justified by the
expected returns from the pension fund... There will be extensive
measures aimed at employment and welfare focused in a number of
different sectors. Norway will through these measures rank among the
•

-37

European countries doing the most to counter the crisis.
In May 2009, the government revised the national budget for 2009 and introduced
the most expansionary fiscal policy in 30 years. The initial fiscal stimulus package of 0.7
percent was increased to three percent of the non-oil GDP, and the government
announced that it planned to spend 130 billion krone ($20 billion) from oil revenues to
tackle the global financial downturn.38 This reflected a drastic increase in the use of oil
income, which was 9.5 billion krone in 2009. Subsequently, the projections for domestic
economic variables were revised. Table 12 summarizes key economic variables in 2006
prices. The proposal indicated the use of 39 billion krone in excess of the estimated return
on the GPF-Global.
The GPF-Global itself was hit by the financial crisis. The fund's return for the
third quarter of 2008 fell to -7.68 percent in the international currency basket. This rate,
the lowest in the fund's history, was mainly a result of the downturn in equity markets.
37
38

"Norway to Dip into Oil Fund Due to Financial Crisis," Agence France Presse, January 7, 2009.
"Norway Enters Recession: Offical Data."
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The negative impact of the movements in the equity markets on the value of the fund was,
however, offset by the weaker krone. Therefore, the market value of the fund increased
from 1,992 billion krone at the end of the second quarter to 2,120 billion krone at the end
of the third quarter of 2008.39

TABLE 12 Selected economic variables, 2008 actual and 2009 projections
2008
(billion krone)

2008
(percent)

2009
(percent)

Private Consumption

992.3

1.5

0.0

Gross Fixed Investment

527.2

3.3

-6.3

Gross Domestic Product

2,537.9

2.0

-1.9

Mainland GDP

1,842.5

2.4

-1.0

18.4

9.8

Current Account (as a percentage of GDP)
Sources: Statistics Norway and Ministry of Finance

GPF-Global had even prepared for the bankruptcy filing by Lehman Brothers, in
which the fund owned a 0.27 percent equity share and 4.38 percent worth of fixedincome securities (about $840 million of stocks and bonds). Norges Bank spokeswoman,

39

"Government Pension Fund-Global, Third Quarter 2008."

104
Siv Meisingseth, told the media: "[t]his is a very serious situation which we are
monitoring closely... But it is also a situation we have been prepared for."40
The United States mortgage market had a direct and negative impact on the GPFGlobal's performance. The fund held stakes in both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
According to Yngve Slyngstad, the fund's Chief, the total exposure amounted to 88
billion krone (about $13.36 billion). Although the amount was relatively small (less than
0.4 percent of the fund portfolio), it was significant since the fund had considered this
investment "the second most secure investment in the United States."41 Later, in
November 2008, and in the face of losses due to weak equity markets, Finance Minister
Halvorsen said: "[t]his will be a hard year for the fund... this will be a year of losses,
especially in the equity markets.. .Because we are very long term investors, we are not
panicking, even if this is going to be a year of losses."42
As mentioned earlier, the GPF-Global is fully integrated into the national budget.
The fiscal policy guidelines that Norway put in place in 2001 stipulated increasing use of
the oil revenues. The government was permitted to develop a non-oil budget deficit of
four percent (equal to the expected real return on the GPF-Global) over time. However,
the guidelines had provisions for an active fiscal policy, when necessary, to counter
economic volatility.43
One such event was the 2008 financial crisis, when the government had to revise
the 2009 budget and propose further expansionary measures. Table 13 shows the

40

Wojciech Moskwa and Camilla Knudsen, "Norway's Wealth Fund Says Was Prepared for Lehman,"
Reuters, September 15, 2008.
41
Nina Berglund, "Oil Fund Takes 'Minor' Hit from U.S. Mortgage Crisis," Aftenposten, August 26, 2008.
42
"Norway's Oil Fund Faces Losses in 2008," Reuters, November 10, 2008.
43
"Press Release 48/2009: Revised National Budget 2009: Continued Expansionary Policies," (Ministry of
Finance, Norway, 2009).

Norwegian government budget for 2007 and 2008 as well as the projected 2009 figures,
along with the amount of the transfers required from the GPF-Global. The table shows
that the non-oil budget deficit grew by almost a factor of 10 from 2008 to 2009, and the
2009 transfer from the GPF-Global was about 14 times that required in 2008.

TABLE 13 Fiscal budget balance and GPF-Global (billion krone)
2007

2008

2009

-1.3

-11.8

-117.6

Transfer from GPF-Global

2.8

8.4

117.6

Fiscal Budget Balance

1.5

-3.4

0.0

Non-oil budget

Source: Ministry of Finance

In summary, it is somewhat difficult to draw definitive conclusions about the role
and behavior of the Norwegian fund in times of economic hardship. The relatively brief
existence of the GPF-Global does not offer data sufficient to test the changes in
investment behavior or fund contributions to the national budget in times of global
financial crises. Even if we extend the period of study by changing the starting point to
the date on which the Oljefondet (the original petroleum fund) was established, we may
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still not be able to reach, definitive conclusions, because actual transfers to the fund
started only in 1996, and since then there have been very few financial crises.
With all that being said, an examination of certain historical events preceding the
creation of the fund can provide us with a better understanding of the context within
which the fund was established. The original fund was created out of necessity and
foresight, for inter-generational wealth smoothing purposes, and for the preservation of
non-renewable resources. Over the course of almost 10 years, the fund evolved,
developing a new structure with a more sophisticated agenda. Hit by the recent mortgage
crisis and facing the risk of recession, the government of Norway revived the wealth
smoothing thesis and tapped into the GPF-Global in order to maintain a balance budget.
Conventional wisdom is that if the country is ever in need (e.g., financial distress,
liquidity shortage, etc.), the GPF-Global can be a source of relief for the government and
the economy; recent events confirm this. What we do not know much about, however, is
how the fund might be used during a time of normal economic activity or prosperity,
when the economy is not financially constrained, nor threatened by external economic
shocks. The following section discusses the GPF-Global structure and investment
performance, at normal economic times, when the country is free from financial crises or
economic contraction.

GPF-GLOBAL IN TIMES OF ABUNDANCE
GPF-Global has undergone several operational changes. As mentioned earlier, the
major operational goal of the fund is to maximize returns on portfolio, subject to
moderate risk, and in doing so, GPF-Global has to follow the general structure of the
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benchmark portfolio set by the Ministry of Finance. The structure and weighting of the
benchmark portfolio is, however, not constant; it is reviewed regularly and may be
adjusted periodically as a result of changes in the market value of securities in the
portfolio, or global market developments. Traditionally, 40 percent of the portfolio was
made up of equities. Starting in 2007, the allocation of assets to equities has been
increasing gradually to the target 60 percent.44 With a higher equity share in the portfolio,
the GPF-Global is more exposed to global market volatility and risks, but, at the same
time, has a potentially higher return.
Another initiative by the Ministry of Finance was raising the topic of inclusion of
real estate assets in the benchmark portfolio of the GPF-Global in 2007. The Ministry
proposed to the Storting that up to five percent of the capital of the fund be invested in
real estate over time, with a corresponding decrease in the proportion of bonds. The
Ministry outsourced the task of preparing a report, on how to formulate real estate
investment strategy, to Partners Group AG, a Swiss company.
Another significant change in the GPF-Global's investment strategy is related to
the limits on the holding of voting shares in a single company. Initially, the fund could
hold no more than five percent of a company's voting share. In June 2008, the Storting
approved an increase in the limit to 10 percent 45 As of September 30, 2008, however, the
fund's largest ownership interests with voting power in an individual company were
approximately six percent.46

44

"Government Pension Fund-Global, Second Quarter 2008," (Oslo: Norges Bank Investment
Management, 2008).
45
Initially, Ingve Slyndstad, the fund's Chief, had asked the government to allow up to 15 percent
investment in individual companies. But the Storting agreed on 10 percent limit, which includes the 5
percent planned investment in real estate. For more information see John Acher and Wojciech Moskwa,
"Norway Oil Fund Big Buyer of Stocks, Eyes New Deals," Reuters, May 29, 2008.).
46
"Government Pension Fund-Global, Third Quarter 2008."
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Perhaps, the most significant development in the history of the fund is the
introduction of the Ethical Guidelines by the Ministry of Finance. This is of paramount
importance as the Guidelines set limitations of non-economic nature on the investment
decision making of the fund. The Guidelines were officially issued in December 2005
pursuant to the regulations pertaining to the management of GPF-Global, dated
November 19, 2004. The Ethical Guidelines are based on two main principles. First,
GPF-Global should manage a reasonable portion of the petroleum wealth in such a way
as to generate a sound return over a long period and preserve the petroleum wealth for the
benefit of future generations.47 Second, the GPF-Global should not invest in areas or
instruments that bear the risk of the fund contributing to "unethical acts or omissions,
such as violation of fundamental humanitarian principles, serious violation of human
•

•

HO

rights, gross corruption or severe environmental damages."
In 2008, the government conducted an evaluation of the Ethical Guidelines. The
object of this evaluation was to "maintain broad-based [domestic] political support for the
guidelines, as well as to gather any feedback that may contribute to strengthening the
profile of the fund as a socially responsible investor."49 As a part of this evaluation, the
Ministry of Finance organized an international conference in Oslo, in January 2008,
under the rubric of "Investing for the Future." Participants, who included academic
figures, financial institutions, NGOs, and corporations, discussed the challenges of
incorporating social and environmental factors into investment calculations and decision
making processes.

47
48
49

The Ministry of Finance does not elaborate on how much the reasonable portion is.
"The Ethical Guidelines."
"Chapter 5: The Management of the Government Pension Fund," 11.
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The Ministry of Finance also held a public hearing on June 18, 2008, during
which issues such as the need for changes or adjustments to existing policy measures,
exercise of ownership rights, and the exclusion of companies from the GPF-Global were
discussed. The Ministry also raised the question of whether "a minor part of the fund
should be earmarked for special investment purposes, for example, within environmental
technology or in developing countries."50 The idea of a separate environmental fund was,
however, abandoned later.
In complying with the Ethical Guidelines, Norges Bank (as the manager of GPFGlobal) has two basic measures at its disposal. First, the Norges Bank can exercise its
"ownership rights" to safeguard the GPF-Global's long-term financial interests. In doing
so, Norges Bank follows its own internal guidelines by taking into account the United
Nations' Global Compact51 and the OECD Guidelines for Corporate Governance52 and
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.

Norges Bank may occasionally delegate the

exercise of ownership rights to external managers. During 2008, Norges Bank held shares
in about 7,000 companies around the world. It also participated in 6,857 general meetings
and voted in 6,143 of them.54

50

Ibid.
The UN Global Compact is a strategic policy initiative for businesses that are committed to aligning their
operations and strategies with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labor,
environment and anti-corruption.
52
The OECD principles for corporate governance are intended to assist both OECD and non-OECD
governments to evaluate and improve the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate
governance in their countries, and to provide guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, investors,
corporations, and other parties.
53
The OECD Guidelines for Multinationals are a set of voluntary recommendations to multinational
enterprises in major business ethics areas, including employment and industrial relations, human rights,
environment, information disclosure, combating bribery, consumer interests, science and technology,
competition, and taxation. For more information see
http://www.oecd.Org/department/0,3355, en_2649_34889_l_l_l_l_l,00.html.
54
"Government Pension Fund-Global, Second Quarter 2008."
51
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One example of the exercise of ownership rights is the filing of a law suit in a
Maryland Court in 2008 by GPF-Global seeking to delay a 23-December meeting by
Constellation shareholders to vote for the takeover of their company by MidAmerican
Energy Company, a unit of Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway Incorporated.55 GPFGlobal held 4.8 percent shares in Constellation at the time. The GPF-Global's head of
corporate governance, Anne Kvam, stated: "[i]n our opinion, the MidAmerican
agreement undervalues Constellation, and we expect the board to work for a solution that
offers the highest value... We are one of the biggest shareholders and take these
necessary steps in order to safeguard our financial interests...1,56 As a result of this
involvement, MidAmerican Energy failed in its three-month long pursuit of Constellation
on December 17, when Constellation agreed to sell half of its business to French energy
€7

'

giant Electricite de France.

Norges Bank, in its quarterly reports, publishes updates on

its performance with regard to voting at general meetings, as well as its dialogues with
large energy and multinational companies on various issues, including the environment
and child labor.
The Norges Bank's second measure in complying with the Ethical Guidelines is
the "negative screening and exclusion" of certain companies from the fund's investment
universe. This task is accomplished through the Council on Ethics. The Council was
established on December 19, 2004 for the purpose of providing evaluations of various
investment opportunities, and determining whether they are consistent with the fund's
55

MidAmerican offered $4.7 billion to take over the Constellation in September 2008. This move was
backed by the Constellation's board. However, in December 2008, Electricite de France said it would offer
$4.5 billion for half of the Constellation's nuclear assets and would give the company the option to sell up
to $2 billion more of its nuclear assets.
56
Wojciech Moskwa, "Norway SWF Seeks to Block Buffett on Constellation," Reuters, December 17,
2008.
57
Colin Barr, "Constellation Loss a Win for Buffett," CNNMoney.com, December 17, 2008.
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ethical principles. The Council consists of five highly-educated members with
backgrounds in environmental science, law, economics, and human rights, and it collects
CO

information independently and at its own discretion.

In addition to an annual activities

report, the Council makes recommendations to the Ministry of Finance, who in turn make
decisions regarding the negative screening or exclusion of companies from the universe
of possible investments. Upon a request from the Ministry, the Council also investigates
whether an investment may violate Norway's obligations under international laws.
For example, the fund became indirectly involved in a power play involving
foreign states and ethical issues in late 2004. At the time, approximately 337 million
krone of the GPF-Global (which was still referred to as the Oljefondet) was invested in
stocks and bonds of Kerr-McGee Corporation. The company, through its one of
subsidiaries, Kerr-McGee du Maroc Ltd., had entered into an agreement with the stateowned Moroccan oil company (ONAREP) for oil exploration on the continental shelf,
offshore Western Sahara. The area was a Moroccan-occupied territory, a situation that
had made it the object of UN condemnations.
In December 2004 the exile government of the Saharawi Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR) and the Western Sahara Support Committee requested the Norwegian
Ministry of Finance to exclude Kerr-McGee Corporation from GPF-Global's investment
portfolio, on the grounds that Kerr-McGee, through its exploration activities, could
enable Morocco to exploit the petroleum resources of the area. The Council regarded this
58

The members of the Council on Ethics are: Andreas F0llesdal, Ph.D. (Professor at the Norwegian Center
for Human Rights at the University of Oslo), Gro Nystuen as Chair of the Council (Associate Professor and
Dr. Juris at the Norwegian Center for Human Rights at the University of Oslo), Bjern 0stbo (Director
Corporate Finance at First Securities and Managing Director of First's Bergen Office), Anne Lill Gade
(Product Safety Manager at Jotun A/S), and Professor Ola Mestad (Dr. Juris and Professor at the Center for
European Law, University of Oslo). For more information on Council members see:
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/sub/Styrer-rad-utvalg/ethics_council/Councils-Activities/CouncilMembers.html?id=434895.
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as a serious violation of fundamental ethical norms, since it could strengthen Morocco's
sovereignty claims and thereby contribute to the undermining of the UN peace process.59
The company was excluded from the portfolio in 2005, a decision that was revoked only
after a review in 2006 and the suspension of the Kerr-McGee operation in the disputed
areas.60
Negative screening of companies also includes those that either "produce
weapons that through their normal use violate fundamental humanitarian principles; or
sell weapons or military material to states mentioned in Clause 3.2 of the supplementary
guidelines for the management of the fund."61 Additionally, companies whose activities
create an unacceptable risk for the fund by contributing to any or a combination of the
following items are excluded from the fund's investment universe:
•

serious or systematic human rights violations, such as murder, torture, deprivation
of liberty, forced labor, the worst forms of child labor and other forms of child
exploitation

•

serious violation of individuals' rights in situations of war or conflict

•

severe environmental damages

•

gross corruption

•

other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms
Once a company is excluded from the investment universe, it will remain so until

a regular review of excluded companies by the Council on Ethics establishes that the

59

"Press Release 38/2005: Company Excluded from the Government Petroleum Fund," (Ministry of
Finance, Norway, 2005).
60
"Press Release 62/2006: KerrMcGee Corporation Is Again Included in the Government Pension FundGlobal," (Ministry of Finance, Norway, 2006).
61
"The Ethical Guidelines."
62
Ibid.

113
grounds for exclusion no longer exist. The Council will use the new information and
recommend that the Ministry of Finance revoke the decision. The decision is then
communicated to the Norges Bank immediately. Norges Bank, on request from the
Ministry of Finance, may convey to the companies the reason for the Ministry's decision.
Appendix G contains the list of excluded companies.
Negative screening and compliance with the Ethical Guidelines in general is taken
very seriously by government officials. In an interview, Finance Minister Halvorsen
stated that while Norway would prefer not to exclude companies, it would not shirk its
responsibility to exclude companies that commit violations of ethical precepts, such as
human rights abuses, environmental pollution, and corruption.63 The Ministry of Finance
is also of the opinion that the negative screening should include both the producers and
sellers of weapons and military materiel. For instance, the Ethical Guidelines ban
investment in companies that sell weapons to Burma, in order to "prevent contributing to
human rights violations as the result of the Burmese regime's systematic repression of its
own population... Such a formulation of the new measure is also well aligned with, for
example, US and UK prohibition on the export of weapons and military material to
Burma." 64 In 2008, Clause 4.4 of the Ethical Guidelines was revised to include
companies that:
•

Produce weapons that through their normal use violate fundamental humanitarian
principles; or

•

Sell weapons or military material to states mentioned in Clause 3.2. of the
supplementary guidelines for the management of the fund.

63

"Interview Norway's Halvorsen: Oil Fund to Grow in Tandem with Ethical Footprint," Forbes, April 13,
2007.
64
"Chapter 5: The Management of the Government Pension Fund," 16.
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In 2009, the Ministry of Finance excluded five companies from the fund's
portfolio on ethical grounds.65 Earlier, in December 2008, Norway hosted a conference
that agreed on a new international ban on cluster munitions. As a result, Textron (US), in
which GPF-Global held shares valued at 249 million krone at the end of July 2008, was
excluded due to production of cluster munitions. The Finance Minister Halvorsen,
confirmed that "[t]he company produces cluster weapons, which are banned pursuant to
the Convention on Cluster Munitions."66 Additionally, the world's largest gold mining
company, Barrick Gold (Canada), was also excluded from the fund's portfolio in January
2009. The fund held shares in the company valued at 1.25 billion krone at the end of July
2008. The decision was made on the grounds of environmental damage.67 The Ministry
of Finance has also asked the Council on Ethics to review the companies in which GPFGlobal holds shares that operate in the Palestinian territories. At the end of 2007, the fund
owned equities in 12 Israeli companies and the bonds of three Israeli issuers. In early
January 2009, after the Israel's attack on the Gaza Strip, Finance Minister Halvorsen
asked the Council on Ethics to investigate whether the actions by companies in which the
fund holds securities and which operate in the Palestinian territories are in compliance
with the Ethical Guidelines. The finance minster stressed:
In the light of increased conflict level in the Palestinian areas, I will ask
the Council on Ethics for an account of council's work on matters related
to companies that have operations in these areas... Investment in
companies that contribute to an occupation against international law or

65

These companies included Barrick Gold, Textron, Dongfeng Motor, Elbit System and Norilsk Nickel.
For the complete list of excluded companies see Appendix G.
66
"Norway Oil Fund Expels Two Companies," Reuters, January 30, 2009.
67
Ibid.
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oppression in occupied areas could be affected by both of these
considerations [human rights abuses and violation of individuals' rights].68
Gro Nystuen, Head of the Council on Ethics, also reported that the Council had
already begun re-reviewing the fund's investment in bonds issued by the state-owned
Israel Electric Corporation (IEC), which supplies electricity to the Gaza Strip. He added,
"[w]e are looking at all companies that might have activities in violation of the ethical
guidelines, regardless of whether they are Israeli or operating in Israel."69 The IEC went
under the Council's review as early as April 2008, when it allegedly restricted power
supply to the Gaza Strip. At the time, the Council on Ethics could not recommend
70

excluding the IEC on the ground of a limited reduction in supply.
Germany's Siemens AG, in which GPF-Global held shares valued at 6.3 billion
krone (1.34 percent of the voting shares) as of December 2008, was also put under
observation for four years on grounds of gross and systematic corruption. According to
Finance Minister Halvorsen, in the event that new cases of gross corruption were
uncovered, the company would be excluded from the fund's portfolio.71 In another case,
on March 13, 2009, the Ministry of Finance excluded Dongfeng Motor Group, a Chinese
company, from the GPF-Global investment universe. The company had been under close
observation since 2008 for its sale of trucks to Burma. The council report indicated that
the trucks were produced or adapted to military purposes and were therefore considered

68
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John Acher, "Norway Oil Fund's Israel Holdings under Scrutiny," Reuters, January 6, 2009.
70
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Marianne Stigset, "Norway Bans Dongfeng from Oil Fund; Siemens on Watch," Bloomberg, March 13,
2009.
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military equipment. Finance Minister Halvorsen stated: "We cannot finance companies
that support the military dictatorship in Burma through the sale of military materials."72
Norwegian officials have continually publicly endorsed the adherence to the
Ethical Guidelines. In June 2008, during a public hearing and seminar organized by the
Ministry of Finance, issues including the exercise of ownership rights and exclusion of
companies from the GPF-Global were discussed. There Finance Minister Halverson
indicated that although banning an entire state is unlikely, she was open to discussing the
matter during the ongoing review of the fund's Ethical Guidelines.
The realm of the Norwegian socially-responsible investment has also involved
issues such as the global environment and child labor. Norges Bank has continuously
engaged with companies regarding their lobbying on legislation related to climate change.
In June 2008, the United States Senate considered a major bill on the regulation of
greenhouse gases. Although the bill did not come up for preliminary debate, Norges Bank
held meetings with senior executives or high-level officers at six companies and
aggressively pursued its environmental concerns during the second quarter of 2008.74 In
June 2009, the Norges Bank officially added the climate change, water management, and
children's rights to its ethical agenda.75
Norges Bank also arranged a meeting in India to engage multinational companies
active in cotton and vegetable seed production in order to develop industry standards with
regard to child labor. Norges Bank plans to formulate a definition for child labor and
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develop standards for monitoring and reporting child labor in the region.76 On June 12,
2009—the Word Day against Child Labor—four companies77 in which GPF-Global holds
equities announced that they will collaborate to fight against the use of child labor in seed
production.78

BENIGN ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
In this section I will review each of the markers introduced in Chapter III and
examine the Norwegian experience in order to identify the various objectives of the fund.
Subsequently, I will attempt to weigh the various goals to determine whether there was a
dominant objective at any point in time. Over the past 60 years, Norway has been a
strong and durable parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy, governed
by a prime minister and a cabinet selected by the Storting (the Parliament). Norway has a
long tradition of political participation by the public, along with respect for civil liberties
and political rights. With a GDP of $276.3 billion, population of 4.65 million, and a per
capita income of $59.5 thousand in 2008, Norway is one of the richest countries in the
world. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Oljefondet (later GPF-Global) was
established for the purpose of preserving the non-renewable energy resources, absorbing
external financial shocks, and providing resources for the payment of the state's future
obligations. As Daniel Gross
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puts it:

"Government Pension Fund-Global, Second Quarter 2008."
These four companies included Monsanto (an international agriculture company), Syngenta (established
after the merger between Novartis and AstraAeneca in November 2000 and became the first international
company focusing exclusively on agribusiness), Bayer and DuPont.
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Norway has pursued a classically Scandinavian solution. It has viewed oil
revenues as a temporary, collectively owned windfall that, instead of
spurring consumption today, can be used to insulate the country from the
storms of the global economy and provide a thick, goose-down cushion for
the distant day when the oil wells run dry.80
As shown earlier in this chapter, when faced with the global financial crisis and
the risk of recession, the government resorted to using the resources of the GPF-Global in
order to expand its rescue package while avoiding large budgetary deficits. The economic
thesis, above all, assumes that the SWF is a precautionary tool and a saving deposit for
rainy days. If so, one would expect the fund to be invested in fixed income instruments,
specifically, government bonds with a relatively minimal risk and a steady return. The
economic thesis fails, however, to explain why the GPF-Global invests a major portion of
its portfolio in equities. It also does not provide insight as to why, despite being profitable,
specific companies or industries have been excluded from the portfolio. Most importantly,
the purely economic view is not a relevant framework for explaining active ownership
motivated by the ideal of socially-responsible investment.
In the context of economic statecraft and the pursuit of power, we need to look at
the relationship between the fund's management and the government, type of investment,
and any statements by political elites about the purpose of the fund. The Ministry of
Finance is regarded as the owner of the GPF-Global. The owner defines the structure of
the benchmark portfolio, in accordance with the consensus in the Storting, and in doing
so determines the main purpose of the fund. The fund is then managed by the investment
management arm of the Norges Bank as well as a number of external managers. Norges
80
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Bank is obliged to follow the benchmark portfolio, but has a defined deviation range.
External managers have been managing only 11 to 14 percent of the portfolio, and their
function has been limited to technical management of their mandates.
The GPF-Global's management is free to act only within the limits set by the
government. The fund managers also do not seem to have any influence over how the
Ministry of Finance builds the benchmark portfolio, nor do they have any say in
decisions regarding the inclusion or exclusion of companies from the portfolio. The
government (Ministry of Finance) has also been including issues such as ethical and
socially-responsible investment, human rights and labor rights, and environmental
protection in the agenda, and the fund management has been obliged to follow these
guidelines. Sanctioning (divestment) of a number of companies in which the fund held
equities is one example of this. The fund's management uses active ownership as a tool to
influence the decision-making process within the commercial companies in which the
fund holds shares. In a sense, the Ministry of Finance uses the GPF-Global's investment
as leverage over companies whose activities contradict the values of the Ministry or the
Council on Ethics (and in a broader sense, Norwegian foreign policy).
Despite all these, there is, however, little evidence showing that this leverage is
being applied at the national level and directly over another state. Moreover, the values
that the GPF-Global adheres to are mostly universally-accepted and internationallyendorsed values mandated by international organizations such as the United Nations or
the OECD. Additionally, the fund has never acquired any stakes in sensitive or
controversial areas such as defense, nor has it invested in commercially irrational areas.
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As discussed earlier, the GPF-Global divested from many companies whose
operations were in conflict with the Ethical Guidelines. The divestment had, however, no
real impact on the company or the equity prices. The Norwegian government clearly
communicates its preferences with respect to what it deems unethical or in contradiction
to the Norwegian foreign policy to the companies or states. Yet, Norway does not
manipulate the operation of those companies through divestment. In all cases, the
Ministry of Finance gave Norges Bank about two months to sell the assets and the
decision to sell was made public only after the sale was complete in order not to affect
the sale price.
Additionally, the amount of shares held in each of these companies was very
small so the divestment of shares, which was done gradually over a two-month period,
would not have negative impact on the company's equity prices or the stock market. For
instance, the GPF-Global equity holdings of Elbit Systems or Dongfeng were less than
0.3 percent at the end of 2008. The fund's holdings in Textron, Barrick Gold, and Rio
Tinto were only about 0.3, 0.6, and 0.1 percent, respectively, at the end of 2007.
Norwegian officials, however, seem to have sent some mixed messages, although
most of the time, they refer to the GPF-Global as a precautionary and fully transparent
investor, with long-term profitability as their goal, and no hidden or political agenda. For
instance, in early 2008, Finance Minister Halvorsen, was quoted as saying that the fund
o1

was "clearly a financial investor and not a strategic investor."

When asked about the

losses GPF-Global incurred as a result of its holding in Lehman Brothers, Halvorsen
maintained: "[w]hen you are an actor in the world markets, as we are through the pension
fund, you have to expect both losses and gains... Even if we sometimes suffer short-term
81
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losses, we also go through long periods of growth. Since we are long-term investors, our
investments pay off, they do not lose value."82 This statement indicates that the GPFGlobal is not a speculative fund with a short-term investment horizon that may expose the
recipient company as well as the host state to market volatility.
Interestingly, in March 2008, Martin Skancke, Director General of the Asset
Management Department of the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, appeared before the
House of Representatives to talk about GPF-Global and investment in the United States.
He maintained:
While individual shareholders may sell their holdings of individual assets
or funds they do not find ethically acceptable, the citizens of Norway have
to accept to be the ultimate owners of the companies that the fund invests
in. To preserve the legitimacy of the fund, it is important that the
ownership in the various companies is acceptable for most citizens. Hence,
the fund avoids investments in companies whose practices constitute an
unacceptable risk that the fund is or will be complicit in what is deemed as
grossly unethical activities.
In his statement, however, Skancke maintained that the fund will be managed
according to democratic principles and in a way that most Norwegian citizens would
have chosen to invest their money, meaning the selection of instruments (equities or
bonds) within the portfolio would reflect the democratic values of Norway, and not
necessary the profitability of an instrument. In fact, the fund was shown to be somewhat
politically oriented. It has, for example, taken sides with regard to issues related to the
82
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Israeli occupation of Gaza Strip and the Moroccan sovereignty claims over the disputed
area of the continental shelf.
The Finance Minister Halvorsen has, on the sidelines of a seminar organized by
the Ministry of Finance in June 2008, clearly stated that "there could not be a large gap
between Norway's foreign policy and the policy of the fund."

She even added: "I would

guess that the conclusion also in the next round will be that we cannot run a separate
foreign policy for states through the pension fund... "85 This clearly indicates that GPFGlobal acts according to the Norwegian foreign policy agenda by including political
considerations in its decision-making. Those considerations are, in fact, the reflections of
the Norwegian national system of political economy.
Norway is an old democratic and pacifist state and highly dependent on the global
economy. It is a model of welfare capitalism, featuring a combination of free markets and
government intervention. Norway has a long history of state intervention in the domestic
economy. Traditionally, the Norwegian government regulated the domestic economy
heavily. Despite international waves of liberalization and privatization, the interest rate
was still set by the Storting as recently as the 1980s. "The level of interest rates was an
important part of the political game for power, and thus, they were set significantly below
the market level."86 Market intervention and control was not limited to the setting of
interest rates and included many other areas. Even today, the Norwegian public sector is
directly involved in the domestic economy, largely through state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), in various organizational forms, in areas such as oil and gas, railroad passenger
transportation, airline and civil aviation, electricity, and telecommunication.
84
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In Norway, state entrepreneurship takes several forms, including portfolio
investment or capital investment, and direct ownership (full or partial) of limited
companies. According to an OECD report, "[a]bout three quarters of all Norwegian
savings are controlled by the State, and state ownership in commercial entities is
extensive both at the central and municipal level... As an illustration, the State's holdings
amount to about 40 per cent of the total value of the companies listed on the Oslo Stock
Exchange."87 This reflects both the history of Norway's industrial development and the
role played by the state. It may also be due in part to the fact that Norway is a model of
the "welfare state", with direct involvement of the government in social and welfare
services.
The state entrepreneurial thesis can also be applied to the GPF-Global. With
extensive experience in managing the economy, the Norwegian government employs the
fund in order to manage the national wealth. As discussed earlier, the share of the equities
in the portfolio was also increased from 40 percent in 2007 to 60 percent in 2009,
suggesting a higher degree of risk tolerance by the government. This shows that the fund
is not being used as a saving or purely precautionary deposit; if that were the case, the
entire portfolio would have been invested in low-risk-low-return bonds. Additionally,
companies or instruments that the GPF-Global has invested in are all highly rated by
reputable rating agencies. This reflects the level of professionalism and the
commercially-oriented investment approach of the fund. Therefore, in certain respects,
the fund behavior can be explained by the state entrepreneurship thesis.
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Lastly, Norway's fund has a number of characteristics that are consistent with the
domestic compensatory purpose. Norway is a small and inherently open state. It has no
influence over the terms of trade at which it is trading with the world and is therefore
vulnerable to fluctuations in global commodity or financial markets. The contemporary
industrial development history of Norway does not include any period of protectionism.
Liberalism has been a main characteristic of both the Norwegian economy and society.
Moreover, Norway is well aware of the limited life of its non-renewable energy resources.
The petroleum reserves are expected to be depleted within a decade, and the state will
face a large public pension obligation as soon as 2012. It has also experienced the
negative impact of reliance on the petroleum sector in the form of lower productivity,
increasing wages, and loss of international competitiveness during the 1980s and 1990s.
On the domestic side, Norway puts a large emphasis on income redistribution and
broader provisions for social services. The long-term profitability agenda of the fund also
implies that there is a need for a sustainable stream of income or financial resources over
time. The need for domestic compensation is of indefinite duration. It can also be
immediate if there is sudden shock to the economy. In either case, the GPF-Global can
provide resources for domestic compensation.
In summary, the GPF-Global is consistent with all theoretical perspectives
discussed earlier (economic statecraft, entrepreneurship, and domestic compensation).
However, looking at the past performance and management of the fund, it seems that
both economic and domestic compensation goals dominate the management of the fund
only at times of large budget or current account deficits. In the absence of large deficits,
or when the assets grow at a rate higher than the rate of the deficit growth, the GPF-
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Global fund is an investor that uses its entrepreneurial competence in line with the
Norwegian foreign policy agenda. The fund's commercial performance is constrained by
a set of non-economic guidelines that are expressions of the national political consensus.
In the case of Norway, the GPF-Global is a tool for pursuing multiple goals including
profitability and socially-responsible investment, with a focus on state's foreign policy
agenda, encapsulated in Ethical Guidelines.
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CHAPTER V
ABU DHABI INVESTMENT AUTHORITY, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

This chapter presents the second case study of SWFs, the Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority (ADIA) of the United Arab Emirates. Although the ADIA has been in
existence since the mid-1970s, only in the past few years has the fund appeared in the
headlines. There is no information about the exact volume of the fund. Many analysts and
market observers believe that the fund is the world largest SWF, with an estimated value
of between $400 billion and $875 billion1 and sometimes even more. Some others,
however, estimate the size of the assets under ADIA's management, in the wake of the
global financial crisis, to be below $300 billion, making ADIA the second largest fund
after the GPF-Global of Norway.
Despite lack of transparency, there is evidence suggesting that the fund's
performance is more in line with state entrepreneurship and domestic compensation
perspectives than economic statecraft thesis. State entrepreneurship provides a relevant
context for the study of ADIA's modest management, while domestic compensation
argument offers some additional insights to the formation and purpose of the fund. The
United Arab Emirates balance of trade was never in deficit, and since 2002, has even
experienced a constant increase in the surplus. Yet, ADIA has been a source of financing
for the Emirates' federal budget on various occasions. At the same time, opacity of the
fund does not necessarily reflect deliberate secrecy. It can be a cultural issue or it may be
a result of the lack of developed organizational procedures or standards similar to those in
well-established western financial entities.
1
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Although ADIA is technically a sub-national fund, it qualifies as a sovereign fund,
for several reasons. First, ADIA is the largest fund of Abu Dhabi, which is the driving
force of the Emirates, both economically and politically. Abu Dhabi is endowed with
most of the United Arab Emirates' natural resources and is the federation's fiscal
heavyweight. Second, ADIA is the Emirate's largest fund, and the Emirates' president is
chairman of the board of directors. And third, ADIA is involved in large investments in
many different areas, in terms of both geographically and industry sectors. Since 2008, it
has focused its attention solely on markets outside of its region.
In this chapter, I will discuss the politico-economic circumstances that existed
prior to the establishment of the fund. Then I will review the current status of the fund
and examine its management structure, internal decision-making process, and some of its
recent investments. Subsequently, I will focus on periods of economic hardship—
specifically, low oil prices and the global financial crisis—that may have had an impact
on the Emirati economy and discuss whether the resources of the fund were used, in any
way, by either Abu Dhabi or the federal government to address the problems. Periods of
normal economic activity or high oil prices, on the other hand, will provide the
opportunity to study the fund in periods when it is not financially constrained. An
examination of the way in which ADIA's assets were used or where they were invested
during these periods provides us with insight into the underlying motives of the fund.
It should be noted that, despite its long history, ADIA remains one of the leasttransparent sovereign funds. The only official source of information is a website that
provides very brief background information on the history, management, and investment
strategy of the fund. At the time that this research was conducted, there was no official

published account of the fund's investments, audit reports, or financial statements
available to the public. Contacts with the fund's public relations department produced
very little information. And the Emirati authorities have been very reserved, or even
silent, regarding the details of the fund's assets or investments. Additionally, detailed data
on international accounts of the United Arab Emirates was not available from major
sources such as the International Financial Statistics or the World Bank. All these have
made ADIA a challenging case for a micro-level analysis of SWFs. The extent of the
current research has been, in some cases, dictated by the availability of data. In the
concluding section, I will discuss the relevant theoretical perspectives that enhance our
understanding of the functioning of the fund, and identify the primary goal of the fund.

CREATION OF ADIA
The history of ADIA dates back to the creation of the federation of seven former
Trucial States in December 1971, known today as the United Arab Emirates. Oil
exploration in the region started in 1930s and was pursued vigorously after World War II
in various parts of the then Trucial States. Oil was discovered for the first time off-shore
Abu Dhabi in August 1958, and in 1962 exportation began, from Das Island. One year
later an on-shore field was discovered in Abu Dhabi, and vast revenues began to pour in
to the emirate. However, Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan A1 Nahyan, Amir of Abu Dhabi at
the time, refused to allow the oil money to be spent, because "[w]hat he feared most was
the disintegration of the social fabric of Abu Dhabi in the face of such an extraordinary
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windfall. ... [H]e honestly believed that maintenance of the status quo was the only way
to save Abu Dhabi."3
Sheikh Shakhbut's resistance to change and development was one of the main
reasons that the Al Nahyan family—who believed that change is both vital and
inevitable— encouraged Sheikh Shakhbut to step down. He was replaced by his younger
brother, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, who brought a great deal of experience and
knowledge about administration to the office. In November 1971, just before the creation
of the United Arab Emirates, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) was
established. Since that time, the Emirate's oil affairs have been conducted mainly through
this state enterprise. In December 1971, Sheikh Zayed, Amir of Abu Dhabi, became the
first president of the United Arab Emirates.
After the creation of United Arab Emirates, the new constitution stipulated that
the rulers of the individual emirates retain control over their respective oil resources.4
The extent of Sheikh Zayed's ambition for the prosperity and development of the
federation was such that he dissolved the Abu Dhabi cabinet in 1973, merged it with that
of the United Arab Emirates, and offered Abu Dhabi's oil revenues to finance
developmental projects in the federation.5 Abu Dhabi was the richest of the seven
emirates in petroleum resources. "By 2000, Abu Dhabi controlled 90 percent of the
country's oil and more than 85 percent of its gas reserves."6
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In the United Arab Emirates, foreign exchange and monetary policies are
conducted by independent bodies, and therefore sovereign funds (including ADIA)
remain outside of the monetary policy arrangement. In 1973, the Emirates established a
currency board to issue the national currency and maintain its parity against foreign
currencies. The Emirates' Central Bank was established in 1981 in order to "direct and
control the monetary, credit and banking policy in accordance with the state's general
policy and in such ways as to help support the national economy and to stabilize the
currency."7
In 1976, ADIA was established by Sheikh Zayed. The sole source of ADIA's
revenue has been the profits from the petroleum sector. The ADNOC transfers its net
profit—which may vary year by year depending on both oil prices and the volume of
exports—to the Abu Dhabi Department of Finance. Subsequently, the Abu Dhabi
Department of Finance allocates one part of ADNOC's net profits to ADIA and the other
part to the emirate's budget. During its early stages, ADIA was a relatively
Q

unsophisticated fund, mainly due to a lack of local talent. According to the ADIA's
newly-launched website, the fund focused on investing in bonds, equities, and real estate
in the country and in the region. Unfortunately, detailed information on the early stages
of the fund is not available, a situation consistent with the relative unavailability of other
official data. In 1986, a decade after its inception, ADIA entered into the commodity
business. Subsequently, in 1989, ADIA started investing in private equities. Inflationindexed bonds were added to ADIA's portfolio in 1998.9
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The administrative structure of the Emirati fund also grew gradually. Between
1988 and 1993, the number of fund employees almost doubled.10 Since the turn of the
century, ADIA has restructured its organization. In 2005, focus shifted to the emerging
markets, and the Emerging Markets department was created. This shift indicated that the
risk appetite of fund managers was increasing, and that maximizing investment return
was becoming a major objective. However, the most significant organizational change
took place in late 2007, when ADIA decided to transfer the local and regional portion of
its investment portfolio to Abu Dhabi Investment Council (ADIC). ADIA divested its
domestic assets for an undisclosed amount to ADIC in 2008.11 With that, the Abu Dhabi
19
Investment Company (ADICo.),

which was established in 1977 and had acted as an

executive arm of ADIA, was placed under the ADIC administration. In the same year,
ADIA diversified its focus to include infrastructure projects by creating an infrastructure
group. Figure 9 provides a timeline of the evolution of the fund.
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FIGURE 9 Timeline of the evolution of ADIA
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According to its website, ADIA is "a globally-diversified institutional investor
with the mission of securing and maintaining the current and future prosperity of the
Emirate of Abu Dhabi. ADIA prudently invests the Emirate's assets through an
investment strategy focused on long-term value creation."

Although there is no official

data on the size the portfolio, ADIA is thought to be one of the world's largest SWFs.
Saudi American Bank (SAMBA) has estimated the size of the portfolio under ADIA's
management at the end of 2007 as being between $335 billion and $875 billion.14 Media
and business analysts' estimates of the size of the fund range from $500 billion to $900
billion.15 However, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, estimates of the size of
the fund were revised drastically. In 2009, two researchers at the Council on Foreign
Relations (CFR) attempted to estimate the size of the Emirati fund. Setser and Ziemba
built a model using oil price data and relevant IMF data, and concluded that the size of
13
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assets managed by ADIA had been overestimated, sometimes by as much as 100 percent.
They estimated the total size of ADIA and ADIC as of December 2008 at $328 billion.16
The Institute of International Finance was also quoted as having estimated the size of
ADIA's assets at about $282 billion at the end of 2008 (from $372 billion at the end of
2007), 17 which would make the fund second in size to the GPF-Global of Norway.
ADIA has also acquired the reputation of being the world's least transparent fund,
with none of its financial reports or information concerning its investment decisionmaking process available to the public. Under pressure from the international community,
ADIA established a website, but it provides very little information about its resources and
operations. This is despite the fact that ADIA has been at the forefront of the
development of the Santiago Principles and an advocate of greater transparency. The lack
of official information about ADIA also means that most of the information about the
fund's operation and performance is acquired indirectly and through secondary sources,
such as the local media, regional commercial or central banks, and international
organizations and think tanks.
Today, ADIA employs more than 1,000 people from 40 countries, with more than
60 percent of its employees coming from outside the United Arab Emirates. On a few
occasions prominent western financial experts were hired to lead various departments in
ADIA. These experts have usually been veterans of major financial companies such as
Morgan Stanley or Goldman Sachs. Lack of local talent has always been an issue for the
fund. In 2008, ADIA announced a new recruitment program to ensure that it has a ready
pipeline of local talent. It selects students in their last year of high school and then
16
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sponsors them through their graduation from university. This scheme attracted 400 high
school applicants in the first year, but only 18 were accepted. The applicants are mostly
sent to universities in the United States. Reportedly, ADIA spends about $10 million on
training annually.18
ADIA is run by a board of directors that has absolute control over all aspects of
the fund's operations. The board of directors consists of 10 members, the majority of
whom come from the powerful and influential family of Al Nahyan. The current
Chairman of ADIA is Sheikh Khalifa bin Sultan Al Nahyan, who is both the ruler of Abu
Dhabi and the president of the United Arab Emirates. He was named president by the
Federal Council shortly after the death of his father, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan,
the engineer of the Emirates' development plan, who died in November 2004. All other
board members are appointed by the ruler's decree. The list of members of the board of
directors as well as its management is presented in Appendix H.
The managing director of ADIA is Sheikh Ahmed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the 12th
son of Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan. He is a graduate of the University of Al-Ain in Abu
Dhabi and joined ADIA as an equity analyst in 1992. He rejected the traditional
investment philosophy of the fund that dated almost two decades earlier, and when the
fund was first conceived, under the direction of a British colonial officer and a local
advisor to the royal family, using British pension funds as a model. A year after Sheikh
Ahmed joined ADIA, the fund's executives decided to peg the fund's holdings to global
economic growth. 19
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Many analysts believe that the average annual return on ADIA's portfolio since
1976 has been about 10 percent.

It is, however, virtually impossible to verify such

information in the absence of official data from ADIA. Until recently, ADIA's senior
officials were not even allowed to be interviewed by the media. This changed in 2008,
when ADIA hired Burson-Marsteller, an American public relations company, and former
91
Morgan Stanley communications specialists

"yy

as resident communications experts.

It has been always difficult to track ADIA's investments. However, since ADIA
was placed in the spotlight a few years ago, information concerning its investments or
divestments can be found through the media. The fund's portfolio is believed to be very
diverse, consisting of fixed-income instruments (bonds), equities, commodities (including
gold), and real estate. According to a Financial Times report, about 80 percent of the
portfolio is managed externally, and 60 percent of that is managed passively through
indexed tracker funds in order to keep the costs of managing the fund down.

ADIA is

said not to take controlling stakes in companies, usually acquiring less than 4.5 percent of
a company.24 There is no official data on the structure of the portfolio. Table 14 shows
one local media source's summary of the structure of ADIA's portfolio.25
In 2008, Sheikh Ahmed bin Zayed A1 Nahyan, managing director of ADIA, gave
an exclusive interview to Business Week, revealing some details of the fund's portfolio,
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22
Remo-Listana, "Wealth Funds in the UAE Lead Way with Transparency."; Barbary and Chin, "Testing
Time, Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Middle East & North Africa and the Global Financial Crisis."
23
England, "ADIA Makes Play for a Native Minority."
24
Remo-Listana, "Wealth Funds in the UAE Lead Way with Transparency."
25
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investment approach, and agenda.

Table 15 shows the composition of the fund's

portfolio, as reported in this interview. Unfortunately, ADIA's authorities have not
disclosed the details of the companies in which the fund holds equities.

TABLE 14 Composition of ADIA's portfolio, based on a local media source (percent)
Equities
of which in emerging markets
Fixed-income instruments

50-60
14
20-25

Real estate

5-8

Private equity *

5-10

Alternatives **

5-10

Source: Remo-Listana, "Wealth Funds in the UAE Lead Way with Transparency."
* Investment in equity funds or direct purchase of equities.
** Includes hedge funds and funds with non-directional strategies

ADIA claims to have the highest governance standards, along with "well defined
policies, processes and systems that ensure robust accountability."27 According to its

26
27

Thornton and Reed, "A Power Player Emerges in the Gulf."
"Abu Dhabi Investment Authority."
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website, the investment decision-making and execution process within ADIA's
organization is well-defined, with financial controls and audits governing the entire
process. Verifying these claims are, however, virtually impossible since none of the
details of these procedures or policies is available to outsiders. There are different
departments and committees within ADIA's organizational structure. The managing body
of the fund also includes specialized committees in various areas, including investment
(consisting of 11 members with a focus on asset allocation), strategy, management, IT,
compensation, audit, and investment guidelines. Appendix I presents the organizational
structure of ADIA.
Since 2008, ADIA has been promoting its image, especially with respect to the
issue of transparency. As mentioned earlier, ADIA has been at the forefront of the
Santiago Principles. Hamed A1 Hurr A1 Suwaidi, Undersecretary of the Abu Dhabi
Department of Finance and one of ADIA's directors, has been one of the most active
participants in the International Working Group of SWFs, chairing the forum leading to
the Santiago Principles. He has been quoted as saying "[i]t's all about trust. ... It's about
collectively doing everything in our power to ensure that trust lies in the heart of
everything we do."28

28

Remo-Listana, "Wealth Funds in the UAE Lead Way with Transparency."

138
TABLE 15 Business Week estimate of ADIA's portfolio (est. $875 billion)
By Asset Class (percent)
Developed markets equities

45-55

Emerging markets equities

8-12

Small-cap equities

1-4

Government bonds

12-18

Non-government bonds

4-8

Alternative investments

5-10

Real Estate

5-10

Private equity

2-8

Infrastructure

0-4

Cash

0-5
By Geography (percent) *

North America

40-55

Europe

23-35

Developed Asia

10-15

Emerging markets

10-15

Source: "Table: Abu Dhabi's Asset Allocation." Business Week, June 6, 2008.
* excludes real estate, private equity, alternatives, infrastructure, and cash.

In an interview with IMF Survey online, Al Suwaidi maintained: "Now that the
principles are a public document, non-implementation or non-compliance will become
clear in a short period of time, especially as some of the principles call for certain
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information to be disclosed. In addition, we are considering the establishment of a
permanent representative body for SWFs."29 Despite all these efforts, ADIA remains
closed to outside enquiries.

Even the L-M Transparency Index for ADIA did not change
o1

over the past few years and remained very low.
Prior to the development of the Santiago Principles, ADIA attempted to address
the concerns about transparency by sending a letter to a number of states and
international institutions. ADIA sent a three-page letter—dated March 12, 2008 and
signed by Abu Dhabi's director for international affairs, Yousef A1 Otaiba— to the
United States secretary of the treasury at the time, Henry Paulson, in order to clarify for
the United States and Europe the intent of Abu-Dhabi's government managed investment
funds. The letter was also sent to the finance ministers of the other G7 states, the IMF, the
World Bank, OECD, and the European Commission.32 In the letter, principles such as
"independent, commercially driven investment decisions" and adherence to "all laws,
regulations, and rules of the countries its funds invest in," were stressed.

TIMES OF HARDSHIP AND ADIA
The central place of the petroleum sector in the United Arab Emirates' economy is
evident. However, looking at only the federal budget can sometimes be misleading since
"the individual emirates tend to exercise great autonomy over spending plans, and

29

"Wealth Funds' Long-Term View May Help Stablize Markets," IMF Survey, October 16,2008.
After several attempts in contacting ADIA's media relations department, the first question I was asked
was whether any of the information I had requested would be made public or not. Subsequent
correspondences remained unanswered.
31
The L-M Transparency Index for ADIA was 'three' as of January 2009. Source: "Sovereign Wealth Fund
Institute," http://swfinstitute.org/.
32
The letter was also published on the Wall Street Journal. See: Yousef A1 Otaiba, "Our Sovereign Wealth
Plans," The Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2008.
30
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emirates have their own budgets."33 Therefore, the volatility in oil markets can not only
have an effect on the overall budget, but it can also impact the individual emirates'
budgets in a different way. In fact the rulers of each emirate retain control over their oil
and gas resources, by provisions of the Constitution. Both the available resources and
their composition change over time and differ from one emirate to another. For instance,
Abu Dhabi has the largest oil and gas resources compared to other emirates. Both the
Emirates and Abu Dhabi economies are dependent on this sector. On the other hand,
Dubai, with less hydrocarbon resources, has diversified its industries and shifted its
emphasis from the petroleum sector to trade, tourism, and services.
The federal government depends largely on grants from Abu Dhabi and Dubai for
the funding of its budget. Table 16 shows the importance of the petroleum sector in both
the United Arab Emirates' and Abu Dhabi's budgets. As the table shows, Abu Dhabi's
reliance on the income from the petroleum sector has been greater than that of the federal
government. The Emirates' current account balance is also quite dependent on the oil and
gas sector. Figure 10 shows that the current account has, for the most part, been
shadowing the price of oil. Although the United Arab Emirates never experienced a
current account deficit, it did experience periods of low oil prices, in the 1990s and early
2000s. The federal budget, on the other hand, has generally experienced deficits in the
period prior to 2003, simply because of loose fiscal policy and large government
expenditures. However, the recent global financial crisis had an adverse effect on the
economy of the United Arab Emirates.

33

Peck, The United Arab Emirates: A Venture in Unity, 116.
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TABLE 16 Federal government finances and Abu Dhabi fiscal operations (Dh billion)
Federal
government
total
revenue

of which Share of oil
from oil & gas sector
of total
& gas
revenue
sector

Abu
Dhabi
fiscal
revenue

of which Share of oil
from oil & gas sector
& gas
of total
sector
revenue

1991

61.8

38.7

63%

52.2

32.3

62%

1992

56.2

37.2

66%

42.0

29.4

70%

1993

48.8

32.0

66%

36.7

24.5

67%

1994

50.0

28.7

57%

38.1

22.7

60%

1995

57.4

32.0

56%

44.2

25.5

58%

1996

65.1

37.0

57%

49.8

30.7

62%

1997

70.5

41.1

58%

53.3

34.3

64%

1998

61.4

25.5

42%

44.6

21.4

48%

1999

54.7

30.1

55%

37.1

25.2

68%

2000

89.7

60.0

67%

69.5

52.6

76%

2001

78.4

51.6

66%

58.9

45.5

77%

2002

79.4

55.0

69%

46.0

36.4

79%

2003

100.0

75.5

76%

61.1

51.8

85%

2004

134.9

99.6

74%

85.6

68.0

79%

2005

203.7

152.8

75%

131.6

104.3

79%

2006

299.0

229.4

77%

194.4

157.1

81%

2007

333.4

234.5

70%

224.0

168.3

75%

Sources: IMF Country Reports 03/67 (years 1991-1998), IMF Country Report 04/174
(year 1999), IMF Country Report 06/256 (years 2000-2001), IMF Country Report 07/348
(year 2002), and IMF Country Report 09/120 (years 2003-2007).
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Whether ADIA has played a smoothing role in the economy of Abu Dhabi or the
Emirates in the face of low oil prices, is obscured by both general lack of information and
the inconsistency of international statistics (both variables and observations). The main
source of data on the United Arab Emirates' economy is the IMF Country Reports.
However, in some cases the same observation takes different values in various country
reports. To correct for this, the latest available report containing the specific observation
was used. Additionally, it seems that, in some cases, the definition of a given variable and
its accounting methodology have changed from one report to the next. This makes the
comparison of the data over time quite difficult. Where inconsistencies could not be
explained, the data was excluded from the research.
Table 17 shows the federal government's consolidated balance of the budget
during two periods for which consistent data was available. Although the budget
methodology has slightly changed over time—which might explain why data is
inconsistent—even the inconsistent data show the same phenomenon, i.e., frequent
(almost continuous) federal budget deficits. This trend continued until 2003. The budget
had surpluses for five consecutive years since then.
There are two interesting points about the consolidated federal budget. First, it
contains an item called "investment income" under the revenue section. There is no data
on exactly what the components of this item are. Figures indicated in the IMF Country
Reports are staff estimates (as is emphasized in the relevant footnote). Only in the 2009
IMF Country Report is there a reference to the "transfer of earnings of sovereign wealth
funds" as a component of the "investment income" item. It is still not clear whether it
includes the transfer of return on investment of all Emirates' wealth funds or only that of
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ADIA. However, since ADIA is the largest Emirates fund, it is reasonable to presume
that most of the "investment income" came from ADIA.

TABLE 17 Consolidated budget (Dh billion)
Overall
balance

Bank
financing

Non-bank
financing *

1993

-15.0

-2.7

17.7

1994

-20.5

2.2

18.3

1995

-21.0

-3.0

24.0

1996

-25.2

2.1

23.1

1997

-9.5

0.6

8.9

2003

8.4

-2.3

-6.1

2004

38.4

-1.8

-36.6

2005

99.3

-16.0

-83.2

2006

171.3

-4.6

-166.8

2007

166.4

-9.5

-156.9

Sources: IMF Country Reports 09/120 (years 2003-2007) and IMF Country Report
98/134 (years 1993-1997)
* This item has taken different names in various reports. For the period 1993-1997, it was
referred to as "exceptional financing"

145
The budget deficit has also been financed through different accounts whose titles
and definitions have changed over time. These account titles include resident or domestic
banks, non-banks, official foreign reserves, privatization receipts, exceptional financing,
etc. ADIA has been mentioned only once as the source of financing for the budget deficit,
in the 1998 IMF Country Report covering the period 1993-1997.34 In that report, only
two accounts were shown under the financing; one was "domestic banks" and the other
"exceptional financing," a title that was never used again. The relevant footnote indicated
that the exceptional financing included "use of investment income and transfers from
ADIA's foreign assets."
Therefore, we can assume that between 1993 and 1997 ADIA has been used to
finance the federal government's expenditures. It is also possible that during the
subsequent years of budget deficit, ADIA's resources (investment income or foreign
assets) were used for the same purpose. Although without accurate information it would
be difficult to prove any systematic role played by ADIA in correcting the budget deficit,
however, the available information—and the fact that the United Arab Emirates' budget
has a low tax base and highly dependent on the oil income—suggest that the role played
by the fund is more compatible with the domestic compensation perspective.
Investment income has been a significant part of the Abu Dhabi budget, although
there is no detailed information about the components of the investment income, but
considering ADIA as the Emirates' largest fund, it is very likely that the major part of the
investment income in Abu Dhabi's budget was driven by ADIA's returns. As shown in
table 18, the investment income included in the total revenue of Abu Dhabi's budget rose

34

This is different from ADIA's return on investment that is likely a revenue item on the budget under the
title "investment income."

from about Dh 34 billion in 2006 to more than Dh 46 billion in 2007, and its share from
the total revenues varied between about 12 percent and 26 percent between 1999 and
2007.

TABLE 18 Abu Dhabi fiscal operations and share of investment income (Dh billion)

Total
Revenue

of which
investment
income *

Share of
investment
income of total
revenue

Overall
balance

1999

37.1

9.7

26.10%

-10.1

2000

69.5

15.1

21.70%

5.8

2001

59

11.6

19.70%

-17.4

2002

46

8.1

17.60%

-20.3

2003

61.1

7.2

11.80%

-8.8

2004

85.6

13.9

16.20%

13.4

2005

131.6

24.6

18.70%

51.7

2006

194.4

33.7

17.30%

120.1

2007

224

46.3

20.70%

102.2

Sources: IMF Country Reports 04/174 (year 1999), IMF Country Report 06/256 (years
2000-2001), IMF Country Report 07/348 (year 2002), and IMF Country Report 09/120
(years 2003-2007).
* IMF staff estimate
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The recent global financial crisis did not leave the United Arab Emirates'
economy unaffected. The Emirates Central Bank had to inject funds into the domestic
banking sector to address the liquidity shortage. In fact, the Central Bank guaranteed the
external liabilities of all Emirati banks. The Central Bank foreign assets, which grew
sharply between 2003 and 2007, mainly due to high oil prices, shrunk by more than onethird, to Dh 201.4 billion, in March 2009.35 Despite the impact of the global financial
crisis, some analysts in the region still believe that the external factors did not have a
major impact on the management of assets of the United Arab Emirates, including those
controlled by the wealth funds. For instance, according to an analyst at the National Bank
of Kuwait, "[significant though these shifts have been, it is important to note that they do
not equate to changes in the UAE's 'income.' Nor do they reflect any change in overall
strategy regarding the country's huge total stock of foreign assets, the bulk of which are
managed not by the CBUAE [Central Bank of United Arab Emirates] but by the Abu
Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA)."36
ADIA, which has a large portion of its portfolio in equities, was hit hard after the
sharp fall of global equity prices. As mentioned earlier, Setser and Ziemba estimated that
the value of the assets under the management of ADIA and ADIC fell by $180 billion in
2008.37 Furthermore, as early as summer 2007, the fund was faced with a problem in its
asset allocation. When the market plunged, the fund became underweighted in American
stocks. One solution was a single-shot investment. In late November 2007, ADIA
decided to buy up to 4.9 percent of Citigroup Inc. bonds at a total value of $7.5 billion,

35

Daniel Kaye, "UAE Money Data Reveals Financial System under Stress," (National Bank of Kuwait,
2009).
36
Ibid., 3.
37
Setser and Ziemba, "GCC Sovereign Funds, Reversal of Fortune."
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with no special right of ownership or control, and no role in the management or
governance of Citigroup.38 The units were convertible at a price of between $31.42 and
$37.24 a share between March 15, 2010 and Sep 15, 2011. But the price of Citigroup
shares did not recover—they fell even further. As early as September 18, 2008, shares of
Citigroup closed at $16.65 per unit, resulting in a loss of $3.53 billion.39 During the
course of this transaction, ADIA was shown to be concerned more about the safety of its
assets rather than any potential influence it could gain in the western markets.
Due to both the market crisis and speculative investment decisions, the value of
the assets under the management of ADIA plunged even further. The Institute of
International Finance was quoted as having estimated the value of ADIA's assets in 2009
at about $282 billion, which made the fund second in size to GPF-Global of Norway on a
global scale.40 In summary, a careful conclusion—in the absence of consistent and
reliable information—is that there is no conclusive evidence that shows ADIA has been
the main source for stabilizing the domestic economy or financing the federal budget
deficit (beyond its return on portfolio, which is already a revenues item in the budget) at
times of economic contraction. Therefore, it is not possible to show that the fund was
used systematically at times of economic hardship, although the economic argument
seemed relevant at times.

38

"Citigroup to Sell 47.5 Billion in Equity Units to Abu Dhabi Investment Authority," The Associated
Press, November 27, 2007.
39
Craig Karmin and Carolyn Cui, "Smart-Money Bets on Street Turn Sour-Big Investors Find Some Big
Losses; 'Stakes on the Cheap'," The Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2008.
40
Nadim Kawach, "UAE's Overseas Invetsmnet Income to Rebound in 2009," Emirates Business 24\7,
April 20, 2009.
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ADIA IN TIMES OF ABUNDANCE
ADIA has come a long way in its efforts to more skillfully manage its assets. It
has entered many different areas, in terms of both geographically and industry sectors. As
mentioned earlier, it took a decade for the managers to start investing in commodities.
Later, in 1989, private equities were added to the portfolio. In 1993, ADIA managers
instituted strict guidelines to peg the fund's holdings to global economic growth. The
decision quickly proved to be strategically critical. ADIA reduced its large positions in
Japanese equities just before the Japanese stock market began a 15-year decline.41 In
1999, inflation-indexed bonds were added, and six year later, emerging markets
instruments were introduced to the portfolio.
Although ADIA does not disclose information about its investments, some of its
transactions, especially the recent and large ones, have made their way into the media.
Since 2007, ADIA has focused on acquiring financial firms, banks, or brokerage houses.
In 2007, ADIA acquired about an eight percent stake in the regional investment bank
EFG-Hermes. The investment bank was established in Egypt in 1984, and its activities
included brokerage, asset management, and investment banking. EFG-Hermes has
established a presence in the markets of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members,
specifically the United Arab Emirates in 2005 and Saudi Arabia in 2007. The position
gave ADIA a seat on the EFG-Hermes Holdings Board of Directors 42

41

Thornton and Reed, "A Power Player Emerges in the Gulf."
"Abu Dhabi Investment Authority Accumulates an 8% Stake in EFG-Hermes Holding," Al Bawaba, May
21,2007.
42
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In the same year, ADIA, in a competition against six other institutional players,
took about a 20 percent stake in the private equity firm Ares Management.43 Ares became
a hot commodity after its managing partner, Tony Ressler, revealed a plan to buy
distressed debt. According to Ressler, ADIA was chosen as it "seemed to care" about
long-term performance rather than short-term gains 44 Other investments by ADIA
included a 10 percent holding in Qatar Telecom, 0.07 percent in Ecopetrol SA
(Colombia), 40 percent in AP Alternative Assets LP (the Netherlands), 38.9 percent in
Banque de Tunisie et des Emirats (Tunisia), 25 percent in Arab International Bank
(Egypt), 20 percent in Union Cement Company (UAE), and holdings in Joint Arab
Investment Corporation (Egypt) and International Capital Trading (UAE).45
Year 2008 was perhaps the busiest year for ADIA. The most significant event in
this year was the Citigroup deal, discussed earlier. As it turned out, the investment did not
turn out to be as profitable as initially expected. However, ADIA continued to invest in
other banks, such as a 27.6 percent stake in Arab Banking Corporation (ABC).46 It also
turned over all its local and regional investment to ADIC and started to focus solely on
foreign markets. ADIA was also active in the real estate sector of the emerging markets
of Oceania. In early 2008, it was reported that ADIA bought 19.9 percent of AMP NZ
Office Trust47 and entered into a partnership agreement with AMP Capital Investors48, in

43

Ares Management is an independent Los Angeles-based investment management firm. Established in
1997, assets under its management are estimated at about $29 billion.
44
Thornton and Reed, "A Power Player Emerges in the Gulf."
45
"Company Profile: Abu Dhabi Investment Authority," Zawya
http://zawya.com/cm/profile.cfm/cid 1000152/.
46
"S&P Reaffirms Rating for Arab Banking Corporation," McClatchy-Tribune Regional News - The
Middle East and North Africa Business Report, June 25, 2008.
47
AMP NZ Office Trust is the New Zealand's largest investor in commercial office property. It has been
listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange since 1997 and has more than 7,000 investors.
48
AMP Capital Investors, based in Australia, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of AMP. It manages about $90
billion worth of assets.
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which each partner would hold 24.9 percent of the Haumi Company Ltd. (previously
taken over by ADIA). Haumi Company Ltd. acquired 50 percent in AMP Capital
Investors for $178.2 million.49
ADIA's investment was not confined to direct portfolio investment. The fund has
acquired stakes in other companies indirectly and through its subsidiaries. In 1984, in a
50-50 joint venture with ADNOC, International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC)
was established. The aim of IPIC was to focus on overseas oil-related acquisitions. Many
of the IPIC board members are executives from ADIA and ADNOC. ADIA and ADNOC
jointly make decisions about acquisitions by IPIC. ADIA analyzes deals based on their
financial merits, while ADNOC reviews its strategic importance with respect to Abu
Dhabi's petroleum sector. 50 In September 2008, IPIC acquired $1.8 billion worth of
convertible bonds of Aabar Investments.51 This was the largest acquisition in the Middle
East during that month. The total volume of mergers and acquisitions was $3.2 billion,
the majority of which took place in Oman and United Arab Emirates.52
ADIA's investment interest has reached many diverse areas. In 2008, it announced
that it was open to investment opportunities in Hong Kong. According to Ronald Arculli,
executive counselor and chairman of the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing, "[t]hey
agree that as a platform for investing on the mainland, Hong Kong is very suitable." He

49

"Abu Dhabi Buys Stake in Anzo," The New Zealand Herald, January 18, 2008.
"Abu Dhabi - the International Petroleum Investment Co," (APS Review Downstream Trends, 2001).
51
Aabar Petroleum Investments Company was established in 2005 focusing on oil and gas. In 2008, the
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bonds purchased in 2008.
52
Nadia Saleem, "Slew of Mergers and Takeovers in Mena Region," gulfnews.com, November 8, 2008.
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hoped that ADIA would establish an office in the city and said that the Hong Kong
government would do anything to be accommodating.53
ADIA also showed an interest in acquiring two shipyards in Poland. It sent a
query to the Polish Treasury and requested that a decision be made on the issue in early
2008. Poland has been under pressure to privatize the shipyards in Szczecin and Gdynia,
especially after the European Commission decided in July 2008 that shipyards had to
return the subsidies they had received since 2004. The Gdansk shipyard was already
privatized and controlled by Ukrainian-held ISD Polska. One of ADIA's directors, Abdul
Aziz Abdullah al Ghurair, stated at the time: "We are interested in investing in Polish
shipyards. ... Poland should as soon as possible give us an offer convincing us of the
benefits that we could gain from such a transaction."54 Despite its importance inside
Poland, none of the deals for the two shipyards55 went through, and ADIA did not submit
any offer 56 for undisclosed reasons.
Deutsche Bahn (DB) was also in discussion with ADIA (and other large investors
in the region) regarding the public offering of one of DB's units. Hartmut Mehdorn, Chief
Executive of DB, had held talks with large investors in the region on the possibility of
listing about 25 percent of the DB Mobility Logistics AG unit in 2008. The offering was,
however, postponed due to the turmoil in the financial markets.57
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The latest interest of ADIA has been the UK electricity distribution network of
Electricite de France, which was offered for sale for about £4 million. In this deal, ADIA
was competing against other interested buyers including Cheung Kong Infrastructure
Holdings Ltd., Borealis Capital Corporation, Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan and CPP
Investment Board, as well as the Scottish & Southern Energy pic, National Grid pic,
Global Infrastructure Partners, and Morgan Stanley that intended to form a consortium to
compete with the others.58
As can be seen, ADIA has entered many areas of business. Occasionally, it has
been forced to drop its interest in an investment opportunity. For instance, in 1999 ADIA
turned down the $310 million buyout of Champagne makers Mumm and Pierr-Jouet.
Ultimately, the business was sold for $505 million to Allied Domecq in 2001.59 Many
believed the decision was based primarily on cultural and religious considerations, as the
business involved alcohol. It also dropped the Polish shipyards deal discussed earlier for
reasons not disclosed to the public. ADIA had also formally registered its interest in
London's Gatwick airport.60 However it dropped out of the deal in January 2009, when it
failed to submit its initial bid by the deadline. It is not clear why such opportunities were
not pursued. But these potential deals provide evidence that ADIA has pursued portfolio
diversification, which emphasizes the entrepreneurial aspect of its management.
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STATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP FOR DOMESTIC COMPENSATION
The United Arab Emirates is a young modern state, established only in the latter
half of the twentieth century by small sheikhdoms. Although the formation of a
government, appointment of its head, and administration (e.g., ministries and the national
budget) take a modern political form, many of the major domestic political processes
adhere to the traditional values of the earlier sheikhdoms. Each emirate retains certain
independence over its territory, resources, and budget. The status of a certain family or
tribe still plays a great role in the running of both the local and federal governments. The
influence and significance of the Al Nahyan family in the leadership of the country is
evident. The formation of the United Arab Emirates itself as a modern state was initiated
under the strong leadership of the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al
Nahyan, in the 1970s. This is what Davidson refers to as a "neopatrimonial model," with
the executive branch entirely dominated by the members of the prominent families:
Indeed, the presidency of the UAE is entirely synonymous with the
traditional rulership of Abu Dhabi, the largest and wealthiest of the
constituent emirates. ... Moreover, with Abu Dhabi being by far the
largest contributor to both the federal budget and the UAE's GDP, this
historical association of the presidency with the ruler of Abu Dhabi has
now been informally accepted by the other emirates.61
Interestingly, both the Emirates' and ADIA's officials have asserted that the fund
is primarily motivated by economic considerations. Even some local analysts strongly
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believe that ADIA is essentially an oil stabilization fund.

ft 9

ADIA, however, remains one

of the most opaque funds. Details of the fund's investments, assets under management,
and decision-making processes remain a secret, despite ADIA's having been at the
forefront of the development of the Santiago Principles for transparency and governance.
Hamad A1 Suwaidi, director of ADIA, and Abu Dhabi Finance Department Secretary,
who also co-chaired the IWG, told Simon Wilson of the IMF Survey: "One of the main
principles of SWFs is to invest on an economic and financial risk-and-return basis. By
law these funds will not be able to get involved in noncommercial activity. ... By their
very nature, sovereign wealth funds have a big stake in stable global financial markets."
In the absence of reliable information, it is difficult to verify whether ADIA's
performance actually conforms to such claims.
In effect, ADIA is managed by the ruler of Abu Dhabi (who is also the president
of the Emirates), and the person who appoints all other board members, most of whom
come from the A1 Nahyan family. In some cases, the day-to-day operations of the fund
are managed by a few western fund managers. For instance, until November 2008, the
asset management in the Equity and Fixed-income Departments at ADIA was headed by
Thomas Connelly, who was previously a senior analyst in the Equity Research
Department at Bear Sterns in New York City.64 Another example is the appointment of
62
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Bill Schwab, a veteran of J.P. Morgan, Deutsche Bank, and Goldman Sachs, as the
Global Head of Real Estate of ADIA in January 2009, making him responsible for the
management of ADIA's global investment strategy in the real estate sector.65 But again,
decisions regarding the major aspects of the fund's operations are ultimately made by the
ruler.
As has been previously mentioned, ADIA does not seem to have played any role
in correcting the balance of payments of the Emirates. The United Arab Emirates has had
a constant balance of trade surplus. Even when oil prices were at their lowest, the current
account balance never showed a deficit. The situation is a bit different when we look at
the government budget. Both the consolidated (federal) and Abu Dhabi budgets have
occasionally experienced deficits due large government expenditures, although high oil
prices in recent years have produced budget surpluses. There is a possibility that the
investment income from ADIA has been used as a revenue source for the consolidated
budget. However, there is no conclusive evidence showing that the fund was used as an
emergency fund for supporting the budget.
Peck explains how the Emirates has tackled the low oil prices of the 1980s,
seemingly without reliance on (or assistance from) ADIA. In fact, the government
decided to reduce the expenditures, instead of sustaining the expected level of revenues
through borrowing. According to Peck, the decline in oil revenue has resulted in "deficits

65

Schwab was with J.P. Morgan as a Managing Director in the European Real Estate Finance division,
responsible for real estate transactions. He was also at the Deutsche Bank for five years as a Director in the
Real Estate Capital Structure and Underwriting department. He was also a Chief Lending Officer in the
Real Estate division at Goldman Sachs. Schwab also held numerous senior posts in real estate and
construction industries. For more information see "Press Release: Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
Appoints Bill Schwab as Global Head of Real Estate," (Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, 2009).

157
in both the federal and Abu Dhabi budgets in 1983—$1.49 billion and $760 million
respectively."66 He further maintained:
The 1984 federal deficit was expected to be reduced by about one-fifth
and Abu Dhabi's by nearly one-half through the practice of holding
spending levels steady. The country's balance of payments has remained in
a surplus situation, though by a smaller margin. ... Partly, the government
has responded to economic downturn by cutting significantly the outlay
for salaries of government personnel. ... The major means of trimming
expenditures to fit reduced revenue is a government slowdown or deferral
of various projects. Several major construction schemes... have been
shelved, at least for now.67
As mentioned earlier, according to the IMF country reports, a source of revenue
on both the consolidated and Abu Dhabi budgets is the item "investment income." It is
likely that this item includes returns on the assets managed by ADIA, meaning that the
return on ADIA's investment has been a regular source of government revenue, and not
necessarily the source of a precautionary fund used only on an ad hoc basis to cope with,
for example, oil price volatility or unexpected external shocks.68 In summary, there is no
evidence showing that ADIA's resources have been used to correct balance of payments
deficit or support the budget only at times of financial crisis or economic contraction. In
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other words, the economic argument is insufficient in explaining the functioning of the
fund.
Despite the fall in the value of the fund due to the global economic downturn,
ADIA continued to acquire stakes in different companies and restructured its
organization to focus solely on foreign markets. Additionally, the emphasis on equities in
the portfolio shows that achieving high returns is a more immediate goal. As Setser and
Ziemba have stated, ADIA is "viewing itself as a pure portfolio manager that seeks (not
always successfully) the highest risk-adjusted return—not a fund that supports domestic
or regional economic development."69
ADIA's management is greatly influenced by domestic politics, as the fund is
under the direct control of the Abu Dhabi's ruler, who is also the United Arab Emirates'
president. The senior management of the fund is also appointed by the ruler. The few
outside technical managers of ADIA are, consequently, not independent in their decisionmaking; they have to align their investment strategy with the guidelines provided by the
board of directors and seek the board's approval before making any changes. The history
of ADIA's operation, however, shows that the fund has consistently invested in industries
that it deemed commercially and financially appropriate, and has avoided sectors that
could have been controversial, domestically or internationally (e.g., alcoholic drinks and
the defense industry). Therefore, although the structure and management of ADIA is
greatly intertwined with political structures and the ruling family, there is no evidence
that the fund was ever used to pursue power through economic means.
In the United Arab Emirates, there is a great emphasis on the role of the
government (local and federal) in running the economy. This is mainly the legacy of the
69
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traditional and patriarchic structure of the society and the significance of the position of
each ruler in running his emirate. This, in the context of the modern state, takes the form
of state involvement in almost all areas. In fact, the major sectors of the economy are run
by or regulated through the state-owned enterprises. For instance, the oil and gas
industries, as well as investments related to this sector, are run by local state enterprises
such as ADNOC or IPIC. Other public enterprises include Abu Dhabi Water and
Electricity Authority (ADWEA), Emirates Telecommunications Corporation (ETC),
Dubai Ports World (global port operator), and Emaar Properties (the developer
responsible for the world's tallest building—Burj Khalifa, formerly known as Burj Dubai).
These state enterprises and their subsidiaries are run by members of the ruling family or
government officials, who, in most cases, hold several positions in other state-owned
companies. Public entrepreneurial intervention through SOEs is an embedded
characteristic of the United Arab Emirates, or in Gilpin's words, a unique feature of its
"national system of political economy."70
As discussed earlier in this chapter, these state enterprises are capable of engaging
in complex acquisitions through their network of sister SOEs or their subsidiaries. The
wide diversity of the portfolio and a greater emphasis on equities also mean both a higher
risk tolerance and openness to new areas and projects, which are key entrepreneurial
characteristics. When most of the countries in the West became concerned about the
agenda and investment approach of SWFs—especially those with little transparency—
ADIA sent a letter to United States officials stressing that the government "will never use
its investments as a foreign policy tool;" instead, the Emirate's sovereign funds "are
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similar to pension funds, combining a strong focus on long-term capital returns" to
finance public services such as health care, infrastructure projects.71 Although this
statement does not match the structure of the portfolio (high equity share), nevertheless, it
shows the concerns on the part of ADIA's official with respect to the West perception of
the fund's agenda.
Interestingly, ADIA became concerned about the security of its own overseas
investments and demanded transparency from the recipient states. In a joint editorial
piece with the then United States secretary of the treasury Henry Paulson and the
Singapore finance minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam, ADIA's director and
undersecretary of finance of Abu Dhabi, Hamad A1 Hurr A1 Suwaidi wrote: "The need to
enhance transparency and maintain an open dialogue is in essence a two-way street.
Recipient countries share responsibility for maintaining an open investment regime that is
transparent, proportional and accountable... ADIA has disclosed its broad asset
allocation and is engaged in an ongoing process to enhance disclosure in all these areas,
T)

including compliance verification."
So far, state entrepreneurship provides the most relevant and applicable context
within which one can study ADIA. At the same time, the domestic compensation
argument can provide some additional insights into the formation and purpose of the fund.
The United Arab Emirates is a small state. It is highly dependent on its oil and gas
resources and, therefore, the price at which it is exporting the commodity. For the small
Gulf economies, "isolation and autarky were never viable options for achieving
71
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prosperity. These countries derive much of their income from exporting hydrocarbon
resources to the world markets and invest considerable sums of these proceeds in
international portfolio and direct investment."73
Additionally, the Emirates' economy is particularly vulnerable to changes in
global economic activity since it consists largely of services (e.g., shipping, banking, and
tourism) that depend on the level of global economic activities. The United Arab
Emirates is also a highly dependent on it natural resource sector. Moreover, as a nondemocratic state, it may be necessary to provide the few influential families with
resources and wealth so as to ensure the continuity of the political system. The domestic
compensation argument is to some extent applicable to ADIA, although it does not
provide a satisfactory explanation for the behavior of the fund.
There is no evidence to show that ADIA has been used as a foreign policy tool by
either the federal government or the emirate of Abu Dhabi. The industries the fund has
acquired stakes in are not politically or security-wise sensitive. Most of the investment
takes the form of portfolio investment. Moreover, the fund's officials are aware of the
created interdependencies and have been concerned about the security of the fund's assets
in the recipient states. The state intervention in the economy is also rooted in the
traditional society of the emirates. Almost all of the main areas of the economy today are
run or regulated by the government. The wide range of financial instruments as well as
the greater emphasis on equities in the portfolio of ADIA shows that the fund's agenda is
focused on generating profit and diversification of assets as a risk management tool. At
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the same time, the fund's resources (or returns) are likely used to provide sources of
income for the federal budget, and therefore used as a social bargain.
Lack of transparency, nevertheless, remains one of the main challenges to the
micro-level study of ADIA. Despite the official's emphasis on the existence of
sophisticated investment procedures and audits within the fund's organization, as well as
numerous statements by the fund's officials affirming the commercial nature of ADIA's
investments, it is very difficult to verify these claims when no information is actually
disclosed. Emirates' authorities may perceive secrecy as an entrepreneurial tactic for the
success of the fund. As Barbary and Chin put it, "money and mystery are a potent mix,
and this enabled ADIA to attract some of the best asset managers in the business... This
has been critical to its success."74 Lack of transparency and disclosure may also be a
cultural issue or simply indicate underdeveloped standards and procedures.
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CHAPTER VI
TEMASEK HOLDINGS, SINGAPORE

The third SWF case study looks at Temasek1 Holdings. Temasek, which was
established more than 35 years ago, has a number of characteristics that make it unique in
a number of ways. Unlike the majority of SWFs, which are funded by excess foreign
reserves or proceeds from the export of the abundant resource (typically oil) and make
only foreign portfolio investment, Temasek was endowed with a portfolio of companies
that was placed under its management by the Singapore Ministry of Finance. And, while
other government agencies manage the extensive surpluses generated by the budget
sector or the balance of payments, Temasek manages the government's stakes in various
companies at home and abroad. Another interesting feature of Temasek is the unique
nature of the relationship between its management and the President of Singapore. The
president is, in fact, the financial guardian of Singapore assets whose concurrence is
needed for appointment or removal of the Board of Directors of Temasek. Furthermore,
Temasek is the only SWF that has issued bonds to finance its business.
Today, Temasek is the biggest shareholder in half of Singapore's ten largest (by
market value) publicly traded companies.2 Many of its foreign investments have been
made through a sophisticated network of fully-owned subsidiaries or joint ventures. As
will be discussed, Temasek has acted mainly as the entrepreneurial arm of the
government. It has facilitated the process of privatization and actively managed the state's

1
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equities in various business areas, ranging from banking and finance to manufacturing
and technology, with very little, if any, cash position or risk-free assets.
Although, Temasek is categorized as a transparent fund and has published annual
reviews disclosing its group financials since 2006, it nonetheless is not very open to
foreign enquiries. There is little information that may be obtained about the management
and performance of Temasek during the period between its inception and the turn of the
century. Additionally, the relationship between the fund and the national budget is not
entirely clear, as the relationship between its board of directors, the management of its
portfolio companies, and the government remains unclear. Temasek has nonetheless been
sensitive to public opinion, and has used every opportunity to respond to misperceptions
held by outsiders, including the public as well as policy makers.
As will be discussed, there is no evidence indicating that the fund, which is
relatively illiquid and reflects an above-average tolerance for risk, was established or has
ever been used as a precautionary means for coping with external financial shocks or
domestic liquidity shortages. There is certainly a need for domestic compensation
mechanisms or precautionary saving deposits in a small and highly interdependent (and
therefore vulnerable) state like Singapore; however, Temasek was not intended to serve
such purposes.

CREATION OF TEMASEK
The creation of Temasek is closely linked to the history and structure of the
Singapore economy and the role of the state in economic development. The core of the
Singapore economic system was formed in response to numerous political and economic
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challenges. Singapore, in its modern form, is (like the United Arab Emirates) a young
state. Before independence, Singapore was a part of the British Empire. In 1942 it fell to
Japan but was recaptured in 1945 by the British. Singapore became a part of the
Federation of Malaysia3 in September 1963. Regional political tensions, and specifically
the growing tension with the Malay leaders, forced Singapore to declare independence on
August 9, 1965. Since then, the People Actions Party (PAP) has been in control of the
government and has remained the dominant political party in Singapore.
Not too long after independence, the British abandoned their naval base in 1968
due to the high costs of maintaining the facility. This meant a massive job loss for the
local people, whose lives depended on the British facility. In a process generally
described by Toynbee's "challenge and response" 4 framework, the economy of Singapore
was shaped mainly in reaction to a series of misfortunes in the early years of
independence. Between 1966 and 1973, "Singapore was in its 'heroic' phase of growth,
moving along at the impressive rate of 12.3 percent a year."5 Although economic growth
rate fell afterwards, it still remained well above the growth rate of the industrial states.
Immediately after independence, the government realized that the strategy of import
substitution was not viable since the domestic market was too small. Therefore, tariffs
and quotas were reduced, and an export promotion strategy was adopted in the late 1960s.
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The government also recognized the need for both physical infrastructure and the
institutions required for economic growth and therefore took the lead, especially in
economic areas, where the private sector was absent. It even set up enterprises in
competition with the private sector. According to Lim et al.:
Besides being the exclusive provider of infrastructure and social services,
as are many other governments, the Singapore government engaged in
direct production. The main reason for doing so in the 1960s was to build
large, high-risk enterprises, such as the National Iron and Steel Mills and
Jurong Shipyard. The government also set up state-owned companies to
take over some functions from public agencies that had grown too rapidly
with a view of safeguarding institutional efficiency and flexibility. ...By
the early 1980s the government owned close to 450 companies in a wide
range of manufacturing and service industries... 6
The government, and specifically the Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Goh Keng Swee,
believed that there was no choice but to ensure that government investments were
commercially sound and sustainable. Dr. Goh Keng Swee, who is also referred to as the
architect of Singapore's modernization and economic development, believed that the task
of managing various economic entities should be in the hands of managers other than the
government bureaucrats. He asserts his view clearly by saying: "One of the tragic
illusions that many countries of the Third World entertain is the notion that politicians
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and civil servants can successfully perform entrepreneurial functions. It is curious that, in
the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the belief persists."7
Temasek Holdings was established on June 25, 1974 by the government of
Singapore to take over the ownership and management of 35 government-linked
companies (GLCs) whose shares were held by the Singapore Ministry of Finance. "The
objective was to find a way to better manage the portfolio of companies and investments
accumulated by the Ministry of Finance in the first decade of nation building since
1965." The establishment of Temasek is unique in the sense that, unlike most of the
SWFs, it was not funded by foreign reserves or balance of trade surpluses. Instead,
Temasek received its initial endowment of S$345 million ($134 million) in the form of
company stock from the Ministry of Finance.
In fact, in the 1970s and early 1980s, Singapore's current account balance was
constantly in deficit. Figure 11 shows Singapore's balance of payments status for the
years 1972-2007. The deficit was mostly corrected through the financial account. Yet,
between 1972 and 1975, with the exception of 1973, the balance of payments was in
deficit. In the early 1990s and concurrent with the global waves of liberalization, the
government of Singapore transferred additional state-owned companies to Temasek. The
fund took over companies such as SingTel (telecommunications), Port of Singapore
Authority (PSA) International (the world's second largest port operators), and SingPower
(power generation).
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FIGURE 11 Singapore balance of payments ($ billion)
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Temasek has been governed under the Singapore Companies Act, which requires
that directors have the fiduciary duty of acting in the best interest of the shareholders. In
accordance with Chapter 50 of the Act, Temasek Holdings is considered an exempt
company and is therefore not required to publish audited statutory consolidated financial
statements.9 In 1991, the Singapore Constitution was revised and Temasek was
designated as a Fifth Schedule Company. The revision also granted the President of
9
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According to the Chapter 50 of the Singapore Companies Act, an exempt company has no more than 20
shareholders, none of which are corporate, and is not required to file its audited financial statements with
the public registry.

169
Singapore more roles than his previous ceremonial role. The President (now appointed by
popular vote instead of the Parliament, for a period of six years) became the "fiscal
guardian" of Temasek and other Fifth Schedule companies,10 which meant that the
President's approval was required for spending past reserves, including those
accumulated by Temasek and other Fifth Schedule companies. The President could also
veto the budget if he believed that it put the past reserves at risk. 11 This also meant that
the government could not withdraw from the assets under the management of Temasek or
other Fifth Schedule companies for its own purpose. Many believed that it was very
important for the President to have "an independent and direct electoral mandate in order
19
to be in a position to legitimately overrule the will of Parliament (government)."
It took Temasek almost 28 years to issue its Charter. The Charter, issued on July 3, 2002,
stated that Temasek "holds and manages the Singapore Government's investment in
companies, for the long term benefit of Singapore,"13 with a focus on value (profit)
creation and the maximization of customer fulfillment and shareholder (Ministry of
Finance) returns. The Charter refers to the various types of businesses that are managed
by Temasek. These include companies that are critical to Singapore's security or
economic welfare, natural monopolies (e.g., water, power, gas, and airport operations),
and businesses that have a potential for becoming internationalized.14 In 2009, the
10
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Charter was revised and re-written, and corporate citizenship was added to Temasek's
responsibilities, while key concepts such as the maximization of shareholder value, active
investment, and consistent value creation remained unchanged.

TEMASEK, TODAY
The first annual report, called the Temasek Review, was published in 2006, and
stated that the mission of the fund was to create and maximize long-term shareholder
value as an active investor and shareholder of successful enterprises."15 Today, Temasek
Holdings employs about 380 people from 24 countries in more than ten different offices
around the globe.16 As of March 31, 2009, the portfolio under its management amounted
to $S130 billion ($86 billion) and has delivered an annual compounded total shareholder
return of 16 percent since its inception in 1974.17 The sources of financing for Temasek
are dividends from the portfolio companies, proceeds from divestment, and the
occasional transfer of new companies by the Ministry of Finance. Temasek has a
corporate credit rating of AAA and Aaa by Standard and Poor's and Moody's respectively.
Temasek is led by a nine-member Board of Directors, a management team, and
several Board committees. It also benefits from the insight and advice of both
international and advisory panels that consist of business leaders from around the world.
The Board of Directors is currently constituted of nine members, who also serve as board
members or are on the management team of other companies affiliated with Temasek.
Appendix J presents a list of the Board of Directors with a brief description of their
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business affiliations. The Board has been chaired by S Dhanabalan since September 1996.
He is a former cabinet member (1978-1994) and has been the chairman of a number of
companies, including DBS Group and Singapore Airlines, in which Temasek has 28
percent and 54 percent stakes respectively.
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Executive Director of Temasek is Ho
Ching, the wife of the current Singapore prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong. She has been
the Executive Director since May 2002 and the CEO since January 2004. Ho Ching held
positions in the defense industries and was the president and CEO of the Singapore
Technologies Group before joining Temasek. In early 2009, Temasek was set to name
1 ft
Charles "Chip" Goodyear as the first foreign national CEO of the fund.

This was

viewed as a step toward greater transparency and professionalism. However, on July 20,
2009, Temasek unexpectedly announced that the plan for the leadership transfer would
not proceed, due to "differences regarding certain strategic issues that could not be
resolved."19
Goodyear reportedly was expected to change the fund's strategy and shift the
focus from financial investments to natural resources.20 There were reports that
Goodyear was trying to instill a greater degree of discipline and that he "had fired people
for showing up late to internal meetings and had prohibited them from typing messages
on their BlackBerry's during meetings."21 Temasek officials offered very little
explanation for this decision, but indicated that the search for a well-qualified CEO
would continue.
18

Charles Goodyear is the U.S. born former head of BHP Billiton (Australian mining company). He joined
the Temasek's Board of Directors on February 1, 2009, and was to replace Ho Ching in October 2009.
19
"Temasek and Transparency-Ii," The Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2009.
20
John Burton, "Temasek and US's Goodyear Part Ways," Financial Times, July 22, 2009.
21
Fiona Chan, "Goodyear Rumors 'Far from the Truth'," AsiaOne, August 1, 2009.

172
According to the Temasek Review, the Board of Directors and the management
team are responsible for business decisions related to investment or divestment. The fund
asserts that neither the President of Singapore nor the Ministry of Finance gets involved
in the operations of Temasek, while the former safeguards the assets under management
of Temasek from the latter's potential withdrawal for budgetary purposes. The Board of
Directors provides the overall policy direction to the ten-member management team. The
management of Temasek claims that it complies with the local rules and regulations
pertaining to its investment or operation and has no involvement in the day-to-day
operations of the portfolio companies. It gets involved only in the capacity of a
shareholder exercising its rights and voting at shareholders' meetings.
One of the interesting features of Temasek is the unique nature of the relationship
between the fund's Board of Directors and management on the one hand and the
President of Singapore on the other hand. As mentioned earlier, after the revision of the
Constitution in 1991, the President's role changed from a ceremonial one to one of a
financial guardian of Singapore's assets (including past reserves). The appointment or
removal of Board members by the Ministry of Finance (the sole shareholder of the fund)
is subject to the President's concurrence.
Additionally, the President is responsible for fiscal discipline and protecting the
accumulated national reserves. Any profits or assets built up during a previous
government term are considered past reserves, and are considered untouchable once a
new government is in power. Any deficit or negative reserves should be corrected using
the reserves accumulated within the current government term. In other words, the
government can run a deficit only if it has already built up surpluses during its five-year
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term. In order to draw on the past reserves, approval of both the President and the
99

Parliament must be obtained.

This also indicates that Temasek assets cannot be used for

balance of payments corrections.
Due to its exempt status, information about Temasek Holdings, including its
financial statements between 1974 and 2000, is not available. The information for
financial years 2002 to 2004 is included in the first Temasek Review, issued in 2006.
Temasek was, however, subject, as a company, to financial audits and has received
international ratings. The consolidated financial statements of Temasek Holdings have,
since at least financial year 2001, been examined by two major accounting and auditing
firms, PricewaterhouseCoopers and KPMG, whose auditors' reports contained
unqualified opinions.
There is a wide spectrum of industries that Temasek Holdings invests in. These
include banking and financial services, transportation, infrastructure, real estate,
telecommunications, and energy. Temasek manages its portfolio of different companies
by exercising its shareholder rights to influence the general direction of the companies,
allegedly without getting involved in the day-to-day business operations and decisions.
Over the past few years, the composition of the portfolio in terms of its exposure to
geographical areas and markets has changed. As table 19 shows, with the exception of
financial year 2008-09 (and that a reflection of the global financial crisis), the market
value of the portfolio has grown steadily. The geographical focus of the portfolio has also
shifted from domestic and OECD markets to regional and emerging markets. Appendix K
22

The President can also veto the government budget if he is of the opinion that such budget entails the risk
of using past reserves.
23
For financial years 2001-02 to 2006-07, PriceWaterHouseCoopers conducted the audit. KPMG audited
the consolidated financial statements for the financial years 2007-08 and 2008-09.
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shows the major holdings of Temasek as of March 31, 2009. Since 2004, emphasis on the
domestic market has been lessened, and the focus shifted to North Asia, Latin America
and other regions. The portfolio structure is divided almost equally between emerging
markets, with their higher risks, and developed countries, with their slower growth rates
and lower risks. The Chairman of the Board of Directors, S. Dhanabalan, has clearly
indicated the fund's approach with respect to risk, saying: "[A]s Asia continues to make
progress, it will continue to de-risk. We are comfortable to maintain an overweight in
Asia... ,"24
Table 20 shows the changes in the portfolio by sector since financial year 2004.
As can be seen, a large portion of the portfolio is constituted of companies active in the
financial sector, telecommunication, and media. However, over time, the emphasis has
shifted from telecommunication (as well as the infrastructure sector) to financial services
and new areas such as life science and consumers. After the financial crises triggered by
the recent financial crisis, Temasek reduced its exposure to the financial services sector.
During financial year 2008-09, Temasek took advantage of lower asset prices and
strengthened its portfolio position in real estate, transportation, and logistics.
Another distinctive feature of Temasek is the issuance of bonds in order to
finance its operations. Initially, the information on the bond holdings of the fund was not
available to certain people. The bonds webpage initially showed a disclaimer page that
restricted access to and use of the bond information to residents of the United States. In
October 2009 Temasek removed the restriction, and information about bond issues
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became available to the public.25 In September 2005, Temasek issued $1.75 billion worth
of 10-year bonds with a coupon rate of 4.5 percent. In late October 2009, Temasek took
advantage of low interest rates and raised another $1.5 billion through its wholly-owned
subsidiary Temasek Financial Ltd. in order to "provide the net proceeds from the offering
to Temasek and its subsidiary companies to fund their ordinary course of business."26 The
second series of the 10-year bonds carried a 4.3 percent coupon and was jointly put on
the market by Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., and Morgan Stanley.

25

This temporary restriction were most likely due to the fact that Temasek was planning to issues a second
series of bond in late October 2009.
26
Ditas Lopez, "Temasek Looks to Tap U.S. Bond Markets," The Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2009,
C2.

TABLE 19 Temasek portfolio by market value and geographical distribution (financial year ending 31 March)
2003-04

2004-05

2005-06

2006-07

2007-08

2008-09

90

103

129

164

185

130

Singapore

52

49

44

38

33

31

North Asia (China, Taiwan, Korea)

6

8

19

24

22

27

ASEAN

9

9

12

12

12

9

South Asia (India, Pakistan)

1

2

3

4

7

7

OECD

32

30

20

20

23

22

Latin America and Others *

0

2

2

2

3

4

Market Value (S$ billion)
Geography (percent)

Sources: Temasek Reviews 2006, Temasek Review 2008, and Temasek Review 2009
* Mexico is classified under OECD in 2004 and later included in Latin America and Others

TABLE 20 Temasek portfolio by sector (percent-financial year ending 31 March)
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Financial Services

21

21

35

38

40

33

Telecommunication and Media

36

33

26

23

24

26

Transportation and Logistics

14

17

13

12

10

13

Infrastructure, Engineering & Technology

10

10

9

8

8

7

Real Estate

6

8

7

9

7

9

Energy and Resources

7

8

6

6

5

5

Others

6

3

4

4

6

7

Sources: Temasek Review 2006, Temasek Review 2008, and Temasek Review 2009
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TIMES OF HARDSHIP AND TEMASEK
As a small, open economy, Singapore has been vulnerable to adverse international
economic developments. In fact, the country has already endured a number of
international crises. The first oil crisis induced a recession in 1974 and 1975, and resulted
in shrinkage of the export sector and mass layoffs of workers in this sector. During the
1985-86 recession, which was due in part to high wages in the exports sector and the
reduced demand for electronic products, the Singapore dollar also came under speculative
pressures. Since then, the government has reduced emphasis on high tech. During the
East Asian financial crisis of 1997, which began with the floating of the Thai baht,
Singapore first used the exchange policy, allowing a gradual 20 percent depreciation in
the Singapore dollar, to fight the recession. Later, as the crisis dragged into 1998,
Singapore focused on wage controls and cost-cutting initiatives to maintain the health of
its economy.
Lack of information regarding the operations of Temasek during the
aforementioned crises makes it almost impossible to draw any conclusions about the role
that Temasek played, if any in helping the ailing economy. Much of Singapore's success
in managing the crises is due to the effective monetary and exchange rate policy, as well
as wage and cost controls, rather than fiscal policy. In this process, Temasek has relied on
domestic institutions such as the Central Provident Fund (CPF) or the Government
Investment Corporation (GIC).

Temasek did not seem to play a major role during the

past crises either, a perception that is supported by the fact that its investment income was
excluded from the government budget. The recent mortgage crisis provides an
27

The CPF is financed by payroll contributions, which are invested in government securities. This
arrangement allows the members to withdraw funds for items such as housing, retirement, and medical
expenses. The GIC is the government's fund manager for official reserves.
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opportunity, however limited, to examine the role that Temasek may have played in the
government's efforts to cope with the crisis. But before doing that, an overview of the
relationship between Temasek and the government budget is necessary.
As mentioned earlier, Temasek is a holding company that manages a portfolio of
state-owned companies for the government. In other words, it manages shares owned by
the government. During the early years of Temasek, most of the portfolio was constituted
of domestic companies. Later, as the burden of helping GLC become internationally
competitive was reduced, Temasek expanded its operations (portfolio under management)
to include overseas companies, mainly through portfolio investment, also through
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) or joint ventures.
The government is entitled to dividends from owned companies. Temasek's
dividends are based on its net profit and the realized capital gains and losses from its
investments. Up until the year 2000, Singapore's focus was on fiscal discipline and
sustainability, which they achieved by excluding the use of investment income. The
government used the "operating revenue", which did not include investment income. The
only sources of revenue were taxes and fees. "In 2000, Singapore's budget concepts were
revised and parts of net investment income derived from investments of past surpluses
were now treated for budgetary purposes. This was an implicit recognition of the tight
fiscal realities."28
In January 2001 and in response to fiscal contractions, the Constitutional
Amendment Bill was passed. The Bill allowed the government to use up to 50 percent of
the Net Investment Income (Nil). As a result, income (dividends) from companies
managed by Temasek, as well as investment income from GIC and Monetary Authority
28
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of Singapore (MAS), were included as a revenue item in the budget as Net Investment
Income Contribution (NIIC).29
Singapore's economy contracted after the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis.
Similar to some other governments that introduced rescue packages and adopted
expansionary policies, and in light of the increasing future government expenditures,
Singapore passed another amendment to the Constitution in January 2008, which
introduced the concept of "long-term expected returns" and permitted the government to
use up to 50 percent of these returns. The critical issue is that Temasek was excluded
from the new arrangement—i.e., access to the long-term expected returns (effective
January 1, 2009) was limited to the MAS, which manages the official reserves of
Singapore, as well as GIC.
Interestingly, in adapting this concept, the Ministry of Finance drew upon the
Norwegian experience and Norway's inclusion of the expected real return on the
Government Pension Fund-Global of Norway in the budget in the aftermath of the recent
n
crisis (see Chapter III).

The Minister for Finance, Tharman Shanmugaratnam provided

a number of reasons for this decision:
The nature of Temasek's investment strategy... involves taking
concentrated stakes in companies, including direct investments. Like other
such investors, this strategy entails higher risks, with the expectation of
higher returns... this approach makes it more difficult for us to project a

29

Nil refers to the dividends, interest and other income received from investing reserves, as well as interest
received from loans, after deducting management and administration expenses. NIIC is a part of Nil that is
taken into the budget to augment the Government's revenues. For more information see "Budget Highlights,
Financial Year 2009: Keeping Jobs, Building for the Future," (Singapore Ministry of Finance, 2009).
30
"Second Reading Speech for Constitution of Republic of Singapore (Amendment) Bill 2008,"
(Singapore Ministry of Finance 2008).
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long-term expected rate of return on Temasek's portfolio to a reasonable
degree of certainty... Temasek's investment strategy is still evolving,
having begun a major effort to diversify its investments geographically
and sectorally in 2002. Temasek today operates very differently from the
way it was operating six years ago, and its strategy will continue to evolve
in response to the investment climate. ... It will therefore be prudent to
leave Temasek out of the new framework.31
The statement clearly shows that Temasek's focus is on maximizing returns,
which automatically entails higher risk, and because of this risk, the government is not
ready to include the fund into its budget that requires conservative planning. Temasek,
like many other funds and businesses, sustained losses during the crisis. As figure 12
shows, the market value of Temasek's portfolio dropped significantly, from S$185 billion
in the financial year ending March 2008 to S$130 billion at the end of March 2009.
Similarly, the profit margin, expressed as a percentage of revenue, dropped from 24.2
percent to only nine percent during the same period.

Despite the tough market, Temasek

continued to actively manage its portfolio. During 2008 and early 2009, Temasek
divested about S$16 billion of its assets and invested S$9 billion in new assets, including
S$3 billion of rights offerings 33 of its portfolio companies.34 In fact, Temasek managed to
complete the 14-year long process of the privatization of the Singapore's power
generation sector, which produced 90 percent of the country's power. It sold Tuas Power

31

Ibid., 27-28.
"Temasek Review 2009."
33
In a rights offering or issue, a company sells new shares at a discounted price to its existing investors to
raise capital.
34
"Temasek Review 2009."
32
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to SinoSing Power (a wholly owned subsidiary of China Huaneng Group)35 for S$4.24
billion ($3 billion).36 This was followed by the sale of Senoko Power to Lion Power
Holdings (a consortium led by Japanese Marubeni Corporation) for S$3.65 billion ($2.40
billion) and the sale of PowerSeraya to YLT Power International of Malaysia for about
S$3.11 billion (all three companies for a total of S$11 billion).37

FIGURE 12 Year-end market value of Temasek portfolio (S$ billion)
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Source: Temasek Review 2009
* Until 1993, financial years ended 31 December. In 1994 and onwards, the financial
year ended 31 March.
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"Singapore: Temasek to Sell Electricity Generator," Mysinchew.com, October 8, 2008.
"Singapore Temasek to Sell Power Firm PowerSeraya," Xinhua, October 7, 2008.
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Since the start of the recent financial crisis, Temasek has divested a significant
amount of its stakes in the financial sector, most likely as a result of not so much bright
horizon of the financial system and financial products. Temasek sold its entire stakes in
Bank Internasional Indonesia (BII), (held since 2003), Merrill Lynch (held since 2007) ,
Barclays (held since 2007), China Minsheng Banking Corporation (held since 2004) ,
and E.SUN Financial Holding Company (held since 2006). As a result, the allocation of
financial services companies in Temasek's portfolio dropped from 40 percent to 33
percent between March 2006 and 2009 (see table 20).
Temasek also shifted its focus from Western markets to Asian and emerging
markets (including those in South America), and increased its investment in the real
estate, transportation, and logistics sectors. In September 2008, Temasek invested about
S$700 million in Li & Fung, a global supply chain management company providing
service for major brands and retailers.40 In October, Temasek, through its real estate arm,
Mapletree Investment, entered into a contract to develop a $400 million, 75-hectare
business park in Binh Duong Province in Vietnam. Mapletree is also involved in the
development of several logistics parks in Vietnam.41 In June 2009, Temasek acquired

38

Temasek initially acquired 9.4 percent stakes in Merrill Lynch in December 2007 and later raised it to
13.7 percent to become the largest shareholder in September 2008. On January 1, 2009, Merrill was
acquired by Bank of America. By end of March 2009, Temasek sold all its shares in Bank of America at a
significant loss. Merrill had to pay Temasek $2.5billion to offset losses Temasek incurred after acquiring
share in December 2007. For further information see "Merill Posts 3rd-Quarter Loss of $5.2 Billion," The
New York Times, October 16, 2008.
39
The Minsheng divestment was mainly due to regulatory reasons, based on which Temasek could not hold
share in more than two Chinese banks. Temasek has stakes in China Construction Bank Corporation and
Bank of China Limited.
40
"Temasek Review 2009."
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"Mapletree," http://www.mapletreeindustrial.com/.
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stakes in 01am International, a local company involved in supply chain management in
the agricultural products field.42
In early 2009, Temasek increased its stake in Neptune Orient Lines (NOL)
through a rights issue. NOL is one of the oldest companies (since 1975) in Temasek's
portfolio. As of end of March 2009, Temasek held about a 67 percent stake in NOL.
Earlier, in September 2008, NOL pursued a plan to take over the German container
shipping company Hapag-Lloyd, which could have made NOL the third largest container
carrier worldwide.43 The proposal caused an uproar among shipping workers in Germany,
and NOL dropped the deal. Other major investments by Temasek include a S$150 million
stake in Hong Kong-based Lung Ming Investment Holdings, which operates an iron ore
mining operation in Mongolia, a 15.4 percent stake in a Brazilian onshore oil field service
company, San Antonio International, and a 19.5 percent stake in ENK, a Korean supplier
of compressed natural gas (CNG) cylinders 44 This shows Temasek pursues a well
diversified portfolio (both in terms of industry and geography), and at the same time
avoids situations where its investment may create controversy.

TEMASEK IN TIMES OF ABUNDANCE
As mentioned earlier, the extent of the current research is limited by the
availability of reliable data. Consequently, in this section, I will focus on the period
immediately before the recent mortgage crisis. Of the 35 GLCs that were transferred to
Temasek in 1975, at least five companies are still in existence. These include DBS Group
Holding (corporate and investment banking), in which Temasek has a 28 percent stake,
42
43
44
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"Temasek Review 2009."
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NOL with a 67 percent stake, Singapore Airlines (SIA) with a 55 percent stake, Keppel
Corporation (offshore marine infrastructure) with a 21 percent stake, and Wildlife
Reserve Singapore (the parent company of Singapore zoo, Night Safari, and Jurong Bird
Park) with an 88 percent stake.
Between 1975 and 2000, at least 12 other GLCs—including MediaCorp (national
broadcaster), SingTel (Singapore Telecommunications), and the three power companies
discussed earlier—were transferred to Temasek. During 2001 and 2002, Temasek began
to expand its portfolio to the real estate sector. It acquired a 40 percent stake in
CapitaLand45 in 2000. In 2001, Temasek established its fully-owned property unit,
Mapletree Investments. Since 2002, Temasek has gradually shifted its focus from the
domestic market and OECD countries to Asia. As a result, the value of investment in
Asia (outside of Singapore), expressed as a percentage of the total value of Temasek's
portfolio, increased from 16 percent in 2004 to 24 percent in 2006 (see table 19).
Since 2004, Temasek has actively expanded its investment through joint ventures
between its portfolio companies and other entities around the globe, and has re-aligned its
portfolio with market realities. The main investment arm of Temasek in financial services
is Fullerton Financial Holdings (originally called Asia Financial Holdings-AFH).
Through Fullerton, Temasek acquired stakes in (and later divested from) Bank Danamon
Indonesia, Bank Internasional Indonesia (BII), Minsheng Bank (China), China
Construction Bank, Bank of China (BOC), ICICI Bank (India), First India Credit
Corporation, Hana Bank (South Korea), Alliance Bank (Malaysia), NIB Bank (Pakistan),
E.Sun Financial Holding (Taiwan), and Siam Commercial Bank (Thailand).
45
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Land).
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Other major investments during 2004 and 2005 included Hopson Development
Holdings (a developer of residential properties in China), Mahindra & Mahindra (India's
largest manufacturer of utility vehicles as well as the Scorpio SUV) through Temasek's
wholly-owned subsidiary Aranda Investments46, and Apollo Healthstreet (an Indian
medical outsourcing company) through Maxwell Mauritius, a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Temasek 47 Investments in Southeast and East Asia included a co-investment with
Cargill in oil palm plantation in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea; investments in PT
Chandra Asri (Indonesia's largest producer of ethylene), and i-Logistics Corporation (a
Japanese logistics firm specializing in international multi-modal distribution services); in
other parts of the world, a partnership with Troika Dialog Asset Management to target
markets in Russia and the former Soviet Union, a co-investment with two American
private equity firms (Silver Lake Partners and KKR) to form Avago Technologies, which
is involved in the semiconductor industry, and a co-investment with Istithmar, the SWF
of Dubai, in Thailand's healthcare sector.
One of the major, and controversial, investments was the acquisition of a stake in
the Thai wireless communication company Shin Corporation Public in January 2006.
Temasek, through two Thai-registered companies, Cedar Holdings and Aspen Holdings,
acquired 49 percent of the company from the family of the then Thai prime minister,
Thaksin Shinawarta, for $1.9 billion 49 By late May, Cedar and Aspen held a 96 percent
stake in Shin Corp, achieved through a mandatory offer to shareholders. Aspen is owned
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directly by a Temasek subsidiary, while Cedar is 49 percent owned by Temasek.50 In
Thailand, the transaction stirred up anti-Thaksin feelings, in particular, the belief that the
prime minister "avoided taxes and put an important national asset in the hands of
foreigners, namely Singapore's government-run Temasek Holdings."51 Temasek later
reduced its stake in Shin Corp and, as of the end of March 2009, Temasek held only a 42
percent stake.
Since late 2006, the pace of portfolio adjustment (investment or divestment) has
slowed down. In late March, Temasek, through Dover Investments—its wholly-owned
subsidiary —increased its stake in Standard Chartered Bank to about 19 percent.

Later

in December, Temasek also acquired about a 15 percent stake in Fraser & Neave Limited
through its wholly-owned subsidiary Seletar Investments, which marked its most
substantial investment in the food and beverage industry.54 In early 2007, Temasek also
boosted its investment in the technology sector and increased its stake in STATS ChipPac
(through its wholly-owned subsidiary Singapore Technologies Semiconductors) from 35
percent to about 83 percent.55
But perhaps the least discussed aspects of Temasek's operations are its
developmental initiatives and humanitarian efforts. On numerous occasions, Temasek
and its portfolio companies have assisted with crisis management and natural disaster
relief efforts in neighboring countries. In May 2003, Temasek and six of its portfolio
companies came to China's aid in 'its battle against the Severe Acute Respiratory
50
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Syndrome (SARS) epidemic by providing 20 ventilators for use in hospitals and two
thermal imaging scanners for use by the Civil Aviation Authority of China (CAAC). Ho
Ching, the Executive Director at the time, also paid a courtesy call on the Chinese vice
prime minister and health minister.56 Between July and August, Temasek and its portfolio
companies provided the same equipment to Taiwan, Indonesia, and Vietnam.
In January 2005, after South Asia was hit by the tsunami, Ho Ching, now the
CEO of Temasek, sent a sympathy message to victims and survivors of the disaster,
expressing Temasek's commitment to support relief and reconstruction efforts. She
maintained: "We have set aside $10 million for relief, recovery and reconstruction
support. We have already disbursed or committed $1 million for immediate relief in the
first week of the disaster... Apart from funds, we have also leveraged on our network of
partnerships with companies, NGOs, governments and private groups to focus on
resolving issues such as logistics, water, communications and medical care, to help aid to
reach those in need. We will continue to work with partners to support the recovery and
CO

reconstruction efforts."
Temasek's engagement in development and social activities started 1997, with the
Singapore Technologies Endowment Program (STEP). STEP organizes youth programs
throughout Asia and has more than 1,200 participants from 13 countries, including
ASEAN member states, China, India, Kazakhstan, and the United Kingdom. Recently,
Temasek established two philanthropic organizations, Temasek Trust and Temasek
Foundation. The former manages the donated funds received from Temasek and other
parties, while the latter identifies developmental opportunities in Asia. Funds donated to
56
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the Trust are managed actively by Temasek fund managers. Through this structure, about
S$16 million has been allocated to 14 programs in Asian countries, including China,
India, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore.59
In addition to community building and developmental projects, Temasek has also
targeted human capital development. In 2001, the Singapore Millennium Foundation
(SMF) was established with a focus on research and higher education. More than 200
postgraduate scholarships have been given out in areas such as engineering, physical and
material sciences, life sciences, and water and renewable resources. In 2007, SMF
awarded S$12.5 million for research in liver cancer, mental health, and bio-diesel fuels.
In August 2002, Temasek founded the Temasek Life Sciences Laboratory (TLL), which
coordinates the research efforts of a team of scientists from more than 25 countries,
focusing on molecular biology, genetics, plant and animal sciences, solutions for food
supply and safety, healthcare (e.g., the low-cost easy-to-use diagnostic kits for the H5N1
bird flu virus), and renewable bio-resources.60

RESPONSIBLE ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Temasek is an interesting case, in several respects. First, unlike many other SWFs,
which are funded by foreign exchange, the Ministry of Finance transferred a portfolio of
companies to Temasek. Second, Temasek has acted as a vehicle for privatization for the
government. Temasek was tasked to improve the efficiency of GLCs and to make them
internationally competitive for the purpose of selling them. This allowed the state to
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reduce its involvement in the economy, while remaining committed to long term
economic development and an open economy.
The third feature unique to Temasek is the issuance of bonds. As discussed earlier,
in 2005 and 2009, Temasek issued two series of 10-year bonds with a total value of $3.25
billion. There is no information regarding how and where these funds are being used, but
the fact that Temasek had to raise money on the commercial international market most
likely indicates the need for liquidity for daily operations of Temasek and its portfolio
companies, and perhaps for new portfolio investment.
Transparency is a feature for which many have praised Temasek. The SWF
Institute assigned an M-L Transparency index rating of ten to the fund. Since 2005,
Temasek has published annual financial reports. Additionally, Singapore has been a
member of the IWG of SWFs, which later became the International Forum of SWFs.
Despite all of this, many aspects of Temasek's operations remain unclear. For instance,
we do not know much about the operations of the fund during the period between its
inception in 1974 and the turn of the century. It is also not quite clear how the investment
(or divestment) decisions are made, or how much Temasek may have been contributing
to the national budget. Nevertheless, no evidence was found showing that Temasek assets
or returns ever used for balance of payments corrections.
Another non-transparent aspect of the fond is the nature of the relationship
between Temasek's business leaders (board of directors, management, and various
advisory boards), the management of the subsidiary and portfolio companies, and the
government. A number of board members of Temasek currently serve (or have served) as
board members or executives of other companies. Some of them have been government
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officials (see Appendix J). In addition to many years of experience, these board members
bring with them an extensive network of government officials and business leaders,
which most likely has influenced or facilitated business decisions.
Despite the close connection between Temasek and the Singapore government,
there has been no evidence of Temasek making overseas investments in non-commercial
or politically sensitive areas. In the case of the controversial investment in Shin
Corporation in Thailand, Temasek preferred the offloading of its investment to political
controversy. At the same time, government officials in Singapore remain sensitive to
public opinion with respect to the role of the government in the economy and Temasek's
internal affairs. In fact, both the Singapore Ministry of Finance and Temasek have, on
various occasions, reacted to major newspapers' op-eds or editorials on topics such as
government involvement in the economy, transparency, and the sudden change of course
with respect to the appointment of the new non-Singaporean CEO. For instance, in May
2000, two days after a column published in one of the major local newspapers (The Strait
Times) criticizing the continued government ownership of major companies, Temasek
issued a press release defending its position and stressing that its portfolio companies
performed on a commercial basis and that the process of privatization would not be a
quick one.61
During August and September 2009, both the Ministry of Finance and Temasek
responded to The Wall Street Journal, defending the fund's position with respect to issues
discussed previously in the Journal's opinion section. On the issue of transparency and
disclosure, the Ministry of Finance asserted that Temasek "discloses all relevant
information that Singaporeans need to judge Temasek's performance as a long-term
61
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investor ... Temasek itself discloses well beyond what it is required under the law."
Regarding the sudden departure of Goodyear, the Ministry argued that "what Temasek
stated about the mutual agreement not to proceed with the planned CEO succession is no
different from typical disclosure by large companies ... while it is ideal to have a
Singaporean [CEO], this is not always possible, as the field of candidates with experience
in running international operations is narrow."63 Temasek also reacted to another op-ed
that had called Temasek "another government appendage,"64 by stressing that Temasek
was "an investment company set up as asset owner to seek returns by taking investment
risks."65
The Singapore government involvement in Temasek and in the economy in
general goes well beyond the boundaries of economic statecraft. In fact, as early as the
1970s, the government of Singapore realized that smallness and domestic market
limitations are impediments to economic development and that efficient management of
the SOEs required an entrepreneurial entity, outside of the formal political structure. Dr
Goh Keng Swee, the architect of Singapore's modernization believed:
The role that is to be accorded to private entrepreneurs in the development
plans of underdeveloped countries not only depends on political attitudes,
but to some extent is influenced by the adequacy of the supply of
entrepreneurs ... The role of entrepreneurs, broadly, is to perform the
function of risk-taking by investing capital in new ventures. They
introduce innovations in processes or in products. It is on the successful
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performance of entrepreneurs that continuous economic expansion in
modern industrial society largely depends.66
Since 1965, when Singapore became an independent state, the government has
been continuously involved in running the economy, establishing new industries and
SOEs to run various economic sectors, such as maritime and shipping, power generation,
and telecommunication. The government also designed and led the import substitution,
and later the export promotion, economic development strategies.
In fact, the level of government involvement in the economy has been so great
that, according to some, it has become counterproductive. Lim et al maintained, "[the]
state capitalism built by civil servants turned entrepreneurs has added a new dimension to
the competition between the public and private sector, in that it has alienated local
business groups and to some extent the professional classes."67
State involvement in the economy in the case of Singapore is undeniable.
Nevertheless, the entrepreneurial spirit became embedded in the management of various
industries or state-owned companies, with Temasek being one example. While the GIC
and MAS each respectively manage the official reserves of the country, and administer
the monetary policy of the economy, Temasek manages the government's stakes in
various companies. As indicated in the latest Temasek Review, the fund has "a flexible
investment horizon and look[s] to create optionalities for future value,"

and it also has

"the flexibility of taking concentrated positions or investing with a long or short
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horizon."69 Almost the entire portfolio of Temasek consists of stakes in various
companies, resulting in a large holding of equities and either a less liquid position or
investment in low risk, fixed-income assets.
As mentioned earlier, when short on cash, Temasek issued bonds, like any other
commercial entity, to raise money for its operations. Additionally, Ho Ching indicated
that there was a possibility of bringing in co-investors in the long run to ensure the
sustainability of the fund's operations. She maintained that Temasek "would seek
'sophisticated co-investors' and would not sell the 'family jewels' for short-term gains."70
Although many questions (e.g., whether "sophisticated investors" refers only to domestic
investors or includes international investors, and, if so, whether Temasek would still be
considered a SWF or not) remain to be answered, this approach indicates the
entrepreneurial spirit guiding Temasek today.
Singapore is a small country, without any natural resources. It has access to a
small domestic market and a limited regional market. Since gaining independence,
Singapore has experienced several financial crises. However, the government—or, more
precisely—the "PAP did not abandon the colonial administration's commitment to free
trade, competition, and free enterprises, it felt that the state should... take the lead in
establishing new economic activities, especially in industries where the private sector had
neither the experience nor the capital to operate successfully."71
Today, Temasek manages a portfolio of companies on behalf of the Singapore
government. The government is allowed to withdraw up to half of the returns
accumulated within the current government term for budgetary purposes. Beyond this
69
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contribution, there is no evidence or indication that Temasek is (or will be) providing
resources to assist the government in coping with international financial imbalances or
meeting public pension fund obligations. As mentioned earlier, the GIC manages official
reserves and the CPF is the national pension scheme that manages funds contributed by
both employees and employers. Temasek, above all, is the embodiment of the Singapore
government's entrepreneurial spirit.
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CHAPTER VII
NATIONAL WEALTH FUND, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The fourth case study looks at the National Wealth Fund (NWF) of the Russian
Federation. This is an interesting case and indeed a unique opportunity to study a fund in
its nascent stage very closely. The NWF, which is often referred to as the welfare fund in
the media, was established in 2008 as a result of the split in the four-year old
Stabilization Fund. The NWF is, in a sense, a continuation of the Stabilization Fund.
Therefore we cannot study the history of one without studying the others'. The post-1991
events had a significant impact on the thinking of economic policy makers in Russia. The
Stabilization Fund was established to sterilize the windfall of oil revenues and providing
resources for correcting fiscal deficit. After 2008, the task of protecting against the
volatility of oil prices was transferred to the Reserve Fund, while the NWF was created to
provide resources for government pension obligations, or other fiscal needs.
Of the three political economy perspectives under consideration, the domestic
compensation thesis is most relevant to the case of the NWF today. The NWF's assets are
held in cash or western government bonds, and some was lent to domestic banks or
businesses after the recent financial crisis. The fund with its current asset volume,
allocation, and management could not be used as a means of economic statecraft. Neither
is it capable of serving as an expression of state entrepreneurship, as the spirit and talent
for being one is still missing in Russia. In fact, there is a domestic power struggle over
the NWF (and prior to that the Stabilization Fund), with various groups trying to gain
access to the funds' assets.
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The Stabilization Fund was created during a period of balance of payments
surplus, and as its name suggested, was in fact aimed at managing international
imbalances. Through this fund, large amounts of Russia's foreign debt (both sovereign
and banking sector) was paid off, some ahead of schedule. Russia's approach to managing
crisis is, in fact, different from other states. The NWF, which was created during the
period when Russia was hit by the global financial crisis, provided funds for bail outs.
However, economic hardship, to a great extent, undermined the mandated objective of
the fund. Before the NWF could formalize its investment criteria and asset management,
it had to provide some of its assets as domestic loans to banks and businesses.
Perhaps the most interesting issue with respect to the NWF is its position within
the Russian political apparatus. While the fund is officially managed by the Ministry of
Finance, it has been the focus of various centers of power within the Russian government.
The constant struggle has also resulted in the fund's inability to develop a solid agenda. In
terms of the research design, the short lifespan of the fund does not allow us to follow the
same structure of study as previous funds, i.e., comparing the fund's behavior at the times
of economic contraction with times of economic prosperity. Therefore, conclusions about
the purpose of NWF must be drawn in conjunction with the state's priorities that can
change over time.
Russia remains one of the least transparent states in many areas, including those
related to its funds. The website of the Ministry of Finance has dedicated sections to both
the Reserve Fund and the NWF; however, this information is limited to general literature
and chronological aggregate balances of the funds.1 There is no official information on

1
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198
the actual composition of the NWF assets and whether (or how much of) its assets are
held in the form of sovereign debt instruments (bonds).
The Russian fund continues to operate in a non-transparent way, and its
management remains closed to external enquiries. As with many other states, the Russian
official information did not match that provided by the IMF (available from 1994).
Therefore, any conclusion about the purpose of the NWF can be only as good as the
available data and information would allow.

CREATION OF NWF
The period between the collapse of the Soviet Union in August 1991 and the
creation of the Stabilization Fund in 2004 had a critical influence on the thinking of the
economic policy makers in Russia. During this period, the Russian Federation had
experienced not only the political, economic, and social problems associated with the
transition, but also a number of external economic shocks. The NWF of Russia was
officially established on February 1, 2008, following the split of the Stabilization Fund
into two separate funds, the Reserve Fund and the NWF. In order to better understand the
purpose of the NWF, we need to study the Stabilization Fund and look at the economic
and political environment prior to its establishment, and the relationship between the fund
and the Russian federal budget.
In the period between the collapse of the Soviet Union and 1998, the economy
was characterized by high inflation and large budget deficits. On October 11, 1994 (the
"Black Tuesday"), the exchange rate fell by 27 percent in a single day. A year later and
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in the summer of 1995, the monetary authorities introduced the currency band that
allowed for a moderate and periodic devaluation of ruble against foreign currencies.
Since the mid 1990s, economic policy was characterized by an incongruous combination
of tight monetary policy and excessively loose fiscal policy, which resulted in large scale
government borrowing, mainly through domestic treasury bills with exceedingly high
interest rates, sometimes "lingering 100 percent per annum."3 Under the pressure of the
IMF, the government bond market was opened to foreign investors, exposing Russia to
external market volatilities.
In a sense, the financial crash of 1998 can be attributed to the high exposure to the
global economy resulting from the massive foreign portfolio investment in Russia.
"Foreign portfolio investment skyrocketed from a respectable $8.9 billion in 1996 to an
incredible $45.6 billion in 1997 or 10 percent of GDP. ... At the peak of the stock market
in 1997, foreigners might have owned as much as 30 percent of the market capitalization
of some $100 billion."4 The IMF data on Russia's balance of payments (available from
1994) also shows a large amount of volatility between 1994 and 1998, with the balance of
payments mostly in deficit (figure 13). One important by-product of massive foreign
borrowing by the government was that the government did not focus on domestic sources
of revenue, e.g., taxes.
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FIGURE 13 Russian Federation balance of payments and oil prices
USD billion

USD per barrel

— — Balance of Payments (LEFT axis)

Average Crude Oil Price (RIGHT axis)

Source: "International Financial Statistics (IFS)." IMF, 2009.

The Asian financial crisis, which had started in the summer of 1997, reached
Russia in late October, and resulted in the fall of Russia's stock market by 19 percent
from its peak.5 Almost a year later, the exchange rate came under attack, creditors started
to withdraw their monies on a large scale, and the country's foreign exchange reserves
diminished significantly. Russia was forced to both devalue the currency and default on
some of its domestic debt. "Inflation that had fallen to the single digits surged to 85
percent for 1998 as a whole. The Russian stock market hit bottom with a staggering fall
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of 93 percent from its peak in October 1997. ... About half of Russia's commercial banks
went bankrupt."6
The turn of the century opened a new chapter in Russia's political economy. The
country had fought two wars in Chechnya since the collapse of the Soviet Union, had
undergone political and social turmoil, and was struggling with an out-of-control
economy. The economic stabilization began as early as 1999. The government cut
expenditures, and applied tax laws to large enterprises that had previously enjoyed
favorable tax rates. All types of revenue were routed to the federal budget. As a result,
federal revenue almost doubled between 1998 and 2002, from 11 percent to 20 percent of
GDP. 7
Since the turn of the century, Russia has made progress in joining the global
economic system. During May and June 2002, both the United States and the EU
recognized Russia as a market economy.8 A year later, President Vladimir Putin
announced that Russia's GDP would be doubled by 2010. In 2005 revenues from the oil
and gas sector accounted for 50 percent of the federal budget.9 The revenues from the oil
and gas sector consisted of "hydrocarbon extraction tax (oil and natural gas from all types
of hydrocarbon deposits, gas condensate from all types of hydrocarbon deposits); export
duty on crude oil; export duty on natural gas; [and] export duty on petroleum products."10
The Russian government realized that the maintenance of a balanced budget depended, to
a large extent, on the sustainability of revenues (including those from the oil and gas
6
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sector) and consistent levels of expenditures.
Against this background and on January 1, 2004, the Stabilization Fund was
established. The fund was the brain child of Andrei Ularionov, one of President Putin's
maverick economic advisors. The Stabilization Fund was designed to sterilize the
windfall of oil revenues by absorbing the excess liquidity (and, by doing so, controlling
inflation), and providing resources for correcting the fiscal deficit when the price for
Urals oil falls below the cut-off price." In practice the role of the fund was twofold. On
the one hand, it accumulated foreign reserves to maintain the stability of exchange rate
and prices, and later paid off Russia's sovereign debt. On the other hand, once it had
accumulated a certain level of funds, it could finance the domestic budget.
The fund was managed by the Russian Ministry of Finance, which set the
currency composition and asset allocation, with some asset management functions
delegated to the Central Bank of Russia. The Stabilization Fund accumulated assets
when the actual price of oil surpassed the cut-off price. Once the balance of the
Stabilization Fund exceeded 500 billion rubles, it could release funds to finance the
federal budget deficit, pay off foreign debt, or fund other obligations, including pension
payments.12
The fund's assets were to be invested in foreign sovereign debt. The Ministry of
Finance could fulfill this responsibility by doing one or both of two things.

1^
It could
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either invest the funds in foreign fixed-income instruments14 directly, or it could deposit
the money in the form of foreign currency in a Federal Treasury account held by the
Central Bank of Russia.15 The second scheme was most commonly chosen, with an asset
allocation of 45 percent in dollars, 45 percent in Euros, and 10 percent in the British
Pound.
It is not clear how and on what basis the returns were paid; nor is it clear whether
the Central Bank of Russia managed the funds on its own (and paid out the returns after
subtracting fees) or managed the funds on behalf of the Stabilization Fund. The Ministry
of Finance reported the fund's activities to the government on a quarterly- and annualbasis,16 and government passed the same to both Chambers of the Russian parliament
(Duma and the Federation Council). The Ministry of Finance has also made the monthly
aggregate balance of the fund (in dollar and rubles) available to the public since mid2006 (see Appendix L).
Rising oil prices in the period since 2004 led to the accumulation of funds in the
Stabilization Fund. A month after its inception, the fund received more than 106 billion
rubles as the federal budget surplus. By end of May 2004, the fund had a balance of 199
billion rubles and was able to pay out 333 million rubles for budgetary purposes. By the
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end of the year, the balance had increased to 522 billion rubles.17 In January 2005, the
18
Stabilization Fund was able to repay the IMF and the members of the Paris Club a
portion of the country's foreign debt, some ahead of schedule. 19 It also paid out 30 billion
rubles (about $1.04 billion) to the pension fund to finance the upcoming obligations.
Russia made further payments towards its debt in 2006, ahead of the maturity. Russian
finance minister Alexei Kudrin maintained that he was "in favor of making more
J1

effective use of Russia's available resources,"

and that by making early debt repayments

the country would save billions of dollars on fees and interest. In June 2006, Russia paid
the last $23.7 billion of its debt and completely discharged its obligations to the Paris
Club.22
Russia imposed further fiscal discipline and a tight monetary policy. During 2006,
currency controls were lifted, the ruble became fully convertible, and the inflation rate
was reduced to 9 percent. Still, in 2006, there was a great deal of debates over the
management of the fund. Kudrin argued that a major portion of the Stabilization Fund
should "be invested in foreign government bonds and the rest in large foreign
companies."23 This required an amendment to the Budget Code to allow investment in
foreign stocks. Most of the debates centered on the scope of investments and a possible
17
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hire of external fund managers. Some argued that this task should be delegated to the
Central Bank. There are no details about the type of instruments the fund was invested in.
In addition to the currency deposits with the Central Bank, it is believed that a portion of
the fund was invested in conservative foreign securities, such as United States treasury
bills until February 2008.24 The fund, as a result, remained a precautionary reserve and
efforts to open the portfolio to riskier assets remained futile. The fund's management was
nowhere near a profit maximizing entrepreneur.
The Stabilization Fund was a subject of heated debates and a great deal of
political contention in 2007. Various rent-seeking groups had an eye for the fund's
resources. President Putin was pushing for more public expenditures to be funded by the
Stabilization Fund. During his last year as president, he pressed for billions of rubles
from the fund for three government agencies, the Development Bank, the Investment
Fund, and the Russian Venture Company, which in return were supposed to fund
developmental projects involving power stations, roads, and waterways.

Putin also

urged the government in order to invest some of the Stabilization Fund in the domestic
stock market to prop up blue chip stocks such as those of Gazprom and Rosneft. Kudrin
rejected the president's suggestions maintaining: "I see no threat to our blue chips, the
government's investment only boosts speculative growth."
Many supported Kudrin's point of view. The chairman of the investment bank
Troika Dialog, Ruben Vardanyan, agreed with the minister of finance saying that an
influx of cash from the state would "overheat" the stock market.
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official in charge of the Stabilization Fund, warned that "irrational" spending could fuel
inflation and make the economy more dependent on the global oil market. Illarionov,
now a senior fellow at the Washington-based Cato Institute and a critic of the Kremlin,
admitted that the fund was diverging from its original purpose of absorbing excess
liquidity and protecting the economy against oil price volatility. He maintained that a
"stabilization fund by definition cannot be used and cannot be spent inside the country."
In a sense, there was a struggle over the Stabilization Fund in the Kremlin, with
OQ

the siloviki , or the Kremlin clan, fighting for more access to the funds, and Kudrin
persisting in his position of withholding the money. Some state-owned corporations such
as Russian Technologies proposed that the Stabilization Fund provides loans to domestic
companies. Even the Federation Council's Budget Committee said that the funds
should
in
be invested in state-owned companies' bonds or Russian companies' shares.

The

Kremlin clan is also said to have arranged for the arrest of Kudrin's deputy, Sergei
Storchak (responsible for the Stabilization Fund at the ministry
level) in order to pressure
^ 1
the Ministry of Finance to back down from its position.
Amid these power struggles, Putin announced plans for the split of the
Stabilization Fund into two separate funds, the Reserve Fund and the National Welfare
(or Wealth) Fund (NWF) in 2008.32 While the Reserve Fund was intended to supply
funds for budgetary purposes, the NWF was designed to increase, through the active
28
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management of funds, available resources (or maximizing wealth) in order to meet state
pension obligations, which were expected to run a deficit as early as 2012. Between
August 2006 and the end of January 2008, the balance of the Stabilization Fund almost
doubled. According to official data, as of the end of January 2008, the aggregate balance
of the Stabilization Fund was 3,851.8 billion rubles ($157.38 billion).33 According to
Kazakevich, the fund had earned an average annual return of 11 percent.34 There is no
official data on the structure of the fund in terms of foreign currency or debt instrument
holdings. Appendix L presents the monthly balance of the Stabilization Fund during this
period. On February 1, 2008, as global markets were still plunging, the split of the
Stabilization Fund went through.
The new Reserve Fund was similar to the Stabilization Fund, but differed from it
in that it accumulated not only oil revenues but revenues from the production and export
•JC

of natural gas as well. Its size was set to 10 percent of the forecasted GDP each year.
The monthly aggregate balance of the Reserve Fund is presented in Appendix M. The
government also introduced concepts and measures for the better management of the
fiscal budget. According to a budget study the key objectives of the proper budget
management was maintaining a "stable rate of government spending and private
consumption in the long range, and averting fluctuations of macroeconomic indicators,
such as inflation, currency exchange rate, amount of federal debt and interests rates on
financial markets."36
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In a move similar to that of the Norwegian government, the Russian government
introduced the new concept of "oil and gas deficit," which reflected the "difference
between federal revenues without oil and gas revenues and the amount with oil and gas
revenues factored in."37 The 2008 fiscal deficit was financed by the oil and gas revenues
(including those held by the Reserve Fund) up to an amount equal to 6.1 percent of the
forecasted GDP. The ceiling for oil and gas revenue transfer to the budget was set at 5.5
percent and 4.5 percent of GDP in 2009 and 2010, respectively. After 2010, the oil and
38

gas revenue transfer could not exceed 3.7 percent of the GDP.
On February 1, 2008, the NWF was endowed with an aggregate portfolio valued
at 783 billion rubles ($32 billion), held in a Treasury account at the Central Bank. In
October 2008, some of these deposits were transferred to Vnesheconombank (the stateowned Bank of Development and Foreign Economic Activity).39 The NWF's starting
portfolio consisted of foreign currencies, including $10.4 billion, €12.7 billion, £1.4
billion, and 7.2 billion rubles, and its mission was defined as a means to "support pension
system of the Russian Federation to guarantee long-term sound functioning of the system.
Fund's [primary] assignments are to co-finance voluntary pension savings of Russian
citizens and to balance budget of Pension Fund of the Russian Federation."40
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NWF TODAY AND IN TIMES OF HARDSHIP
The NWF is third in line when it comes to receiving oil and gas revenues. With
the changes in the budget process with respect to oil and gas revenues, the NWF receives
funds only if the Reserve Fund has reached 10 percent of the forecasted GDP.41 As
mentioned earlier, the Reserve Fund receives money only after a certain level of oil and
gas revenues has been allocated to the federal budget.42 The Ministry of Finance is the
manager of the fund and the Central Bank acts as the operational manager. By law, the
fund remains open to engaging an external fund manager, although the terms of
engagement have yet to be drafted.
According to the official website of the NWF, the Ministry of Finance reports the
value of the fund assets, the inflows and outflows, and the allocation of the fund each
month to the government, which subsequently reports the same to both Chambers of the
Russian parliament (Duma and the Council of Federation).43 The Ministry of Finance
claims that audits of the fund are conducted by Russian official agencies and that the
Accounts Chamber examines the management, accumulation, and expenditures of the
NWF on a quarterly basis. Despite these claims, details of the audits and their results are
not available to the public, and therefore are difficult to verify.
The Russian government has defined the limits within which the Ministry of
Finance can establish the NWF's portfolio. Table 21 summarizes these limits on the
various classes of financial assets that the fund may include. It is, however, not clear how
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the government determines the criteria. Additionally, the government establishes the
criteria determining the eligibility of debt securities. Only the debt instruments of certain
states—Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States—can be included. Additionally, the debt instruments must comply with certain
criteria with respect to the credit rating of the issuing agency. The foreign issuers must
have a long-term credit rating of at least A A - (Fitch and S&P rating) or Aa3 (Moody's
rating). The instruments should also have a fixed face value (denominated in approved
currencies), fixed coupon rate, and fixed maturity date, with no call or put option.44 There
is no information about the portfolio of the foreign debt instruments held by the NWF. It
has been said that $48 billion of the fund assets were invested in foreign bonds, including
those issued by government-related agencies in the United States and the United
Kingdom.45 As can be seen in table 21, the portfolio can only consist of up to 50 percent
equities. The criteria also allow the portfolio to be wholly in debt instruments or in cash
with the central bank. The overall criteria tends to favor low-risk or risk-free holdings.
This portfolio structure also indicates that wealth maximization in not the immediate goal
of the fund.

44
45

Ibid.
Courtney Weaver, "State Will Start Buying Shares This Week," The Moscow Times, October 20, 2008.

211
TABLE 21 NWF's investment criteria set by the Russian government (percent)
Debt securities of foreign states

0-100

Debt securities of foreign state agencies and central banks

0-30

Supranational agencies debt securities *

0-15

Deposits in banks, depository institutions and
Vnesheconombank **

0-40

Deposits in the Bank of Russia

0-100

Debt securities of legal entities

0-30

Equities of legal entities and shares of investment funds ***

0-50

Source: "National Wealth Fund." Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation,
http://wwwl.minfin.ru/en/nationalwealthfund/.
* Supranational agencies include, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Council of Europe
Development Bank (CEB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),
European Investment Bank (EIB), Inter-American Development Bank (IADB),
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Finance
Corporation (IFC), Nordic Investment Bank (NIB).
** The bank or depository institutions should have a long-term credit rating similar to
issuers of debt instruments. In the case of Vnesheconombank, maximum deposit amount
is set at 655 billion rubles.
*** Equities must be listed on one exchange market with the foreign equities be included
in MSCI World Index and FTSE All-World Index.

Additionally, the Ministry of Finance can establish its own criteria or
requirements within the limits imposed by the government. According to the Ministry of
Finance, up to 40 percent of the fund's assets may be denominated in rubles, whereas
holdings of foreign currency may constitute up to 100 percent of the fund's assets. The
foreign currency assets are to be 45 percent dollars, 45 percent Euros, and 10 percent
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pounds.46 Regarding the holdings of debt instruments, the Ministry of Finance has also
set maturity criteria: for instruments denominated in dollars and the Euros, between three
months and three years; for those denominated in pounds, between three months and five
years.47 The list of foreign entities, whose bonds are eligible for inclusion in the NWF's
portfolio is presented in Appendix N. The selection of these foreign entities is still subject
to the approval of the Central Bank of Russia.48 A key point is that the debt holding of
any one issue cannot exceed five percent of the aggregate value of that issue.49
In October 2008, in response to the financial crisis, the Duma decided to place
about $17 billion of NWF assets on deposit with the Vnesheconombank, which would
then lend the money to other banks and businesses, including $ 1 billion to
Rosselkhozbank and the agricultural bank.50 Vnesheconombank acted as the government
broker for the funneling of 410 billion rubles in lending to other banks,51 and injecting of
a further 175 billion rubles ($6.8 billion) into the domestic stock market.

The bank's

chief, Vladimir Dmitriyev, explained that the aim of the move was to diversify fund
reserves, make additional investments in the Russian stock market, and refinancing the
external debts of several companies in the mining and manufacturing sectors.
The S&P had previously criticized Kudrin's plans for using the NWF to support
financial markets, but he said that, in this instance, "[o]ur participation in the market will
46

"National Wealth Fund."
Ibid.
48
"Order of the Ministry of Finance No. 22, Dated January 24, 2008," (Ministry of Finance of the Russian
Federation). Quoted in "National Wealth Fund."
49
"Order of the Ministry of Finance No. 23, Dated January 24, 2008," (Ministry of Finance of the Russian
Federation). Quoted in "National Wealth Fund."
50
Andrew E. Kramer, "Russia Approves Loan Plan to Ease Credit Crunch," The New York Times, October
47

10, 2008.
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"Federal Law No.l73-FZ, Dated October 13, 2008 'Additional Measures to Support Financial System of
the Russian Federation,' Article 4," (Ministry of Finance of the Russina Federation, 2008). Quoted in
"National Wealth Fund."
52
"National Wealth Fund."
53
"Vnesheconombank to Bail out Companies This Week ", RosBusinessOnsulting (RBC), October 21, 2008.
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have a completely different goal... [it] will have some healing effect. Maybe we will
have to wait three to five years for the assets to grow, but that's okay."54 According to
Anna Zadornova, a Goldman Sachs analyst, the Ministry of Finance had to temporarily
"scale back or even abandon its plans to invest (Russia's) oil and gas revenue outside the
country."55
As of December 1, 2009, more than 65 percent of the NWF deposits at
Vnesheconombank had been lent to other banks, with about 29 percent of the deposits
used to support the Russian stock exchange and the remaining amount lent to small- to
medium-size companies. Table 22 shows the lending limits, the actual deposits level, and
the interest rates earned on NWF deposits as of December 1, 2009.56
The structure of deposits and their related terms and conditions, details of which
are not available to the public, are set by the Ministry of Finance. The NWF deposit
levels at Vnesheconombank and other deposit institutions including the Central Bank,
earn interest. Interest on deposits with Vnesheconombank is, for the most part, paid
quarterly. The Central Bank also pays interest on the funds. Although it is not clear what
rate is being paid and how it is calculated, the rate it is said to be based on the indices
approved by the government.
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Anatoly Medetsky, "Kudrin Says Pension Fund Next up for Stocks," The Moscow Times, October 13,
2008.
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TABLE 22 Structure of the NWF's deposits at Vnesheconombank (billion ruble)
Eligible Allocation
(as of December 1, 2009)

Maximum
Allowed

Actual
Amount
284.34
103.45

31 Dec 19
21 Dec 20

Interest rate
(percent)
7.0
8.5

Maturity

Loans to Russian banks

410.00

Russian stock exchange

175.00

175.00

21 Oct 13

7.0

30.00

20.00

25 Dec 17

8.5

40.00

0.00

655.00

582.79

Loans to small to mediumsize companies
Loans to the Agency for
Housing Mortgage Lending
Total

Source: "National Wealth Fund." Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation,
http://wwwl.minfin.ru/en/nationalwealthfund/.

The aggregate value of NWF assets has exhibited an upward trend over time.
Table 23 shows the monthly aggregate balance of the NWF since its inception. There is
little information on the use of the NWF's funds. According to the Ministry of Finance,
the fund's assets can only be used to "co-finance voluntary pension savings of Russian
•

citizens and to balance budget of Pension Fund of the Russian Federation."

S7

Each fiscal

year, the federal budget defines the amount to be transferred to the Pension Fund.

"Ibid.
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TABLE 23 Aggregate balance of the NWF
As of first of

dollar
(billion)

ruble
(billion)

December

2009

92.89

2,769.84

November

2009

93.38

2,712.56

October

2009

91.86

2,764.37

September

2009

90.69

2,863.08

August

2009

90.02

2,858.70

July

2009

89.93

2,813.94

June

2009

89.86

2,784.14

May

2009

86.30

2,869.44

April

2009

84.71

2,915.21

March

2009

83.86

2,995.51

February

2009

84.47

2,991.50

January

2009

87.97

2,584.49

December

2008

76.38

2,108,46

November

2008

62.82

1,667.48

October

2008

48.68

1,228.88

September

2008

31.92

784.51

August

2008

32.69

766.48

July

2008

32.85

770.56

June

2008

32.60

773.93

May

2008

32.72

773.82

April

2008

32.90

773.57

March

2008

32.22

777.03

February

2008

32.00

783.31

Source: "National Wealth Fund." Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation,
http://wwwl.minfin.ru/en/nationalwealthfund/.
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The government allocates about 10 percent of its revenues to the payment of
pensions. These payments are made through the Pension Fund and direct budget
payments.58 The actual amount paid from the budget to cover the Pension Fund deficit
was 88.2 billion ruble in 2007. Table 24 shows the projected transfer from the federal
budget to the Pension Fund for the period 2008-2010.59 It is not clear, however, whether
the entire amount is to be withdrawn from the NWF.

TABLE 24 Federal budget payment for the Pension Fund deficit (billion ruble)
2008

2009

2010

184.6

149.1

251.6

Source: "Main Results and Trends of Budget Policy 2008-2010," (Ministry of Finance,
Russian Federation)

In 2009, efforts concerning the topic of an independent or separate fund manager
gained pace. The Ministry of Finance, in coordination with other agencies, including the
Ministry of Economic Development and the Central Bank, managed to finalize a draft
58

Pensions to military personnel and their family members are paid directly through the federal budget.
The federal budget then transfers funds to the Pension Fund for three items, i.e., base pension, additional
provisions or benefits and compensations, and Pension Fund deficit. Source: "Budget Reform."
59
Ibid., 10.
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law (which it had initiated in October 200860) on the establishment of the Russian
Financial Agency (RFA). Pankin, the deputy finance minister, announced that he
expected that the law would go into force in 2010. The primary role of the RFA was to
efficiently manage the state's assets and debt obligations. The expected federal budget
deficit may, however, shift the focus to fund-raising. Pankin described the top priority as
"managing NWF funds and federal budget liquidity."61 Although the RFA still would still
be a state-owned agency, it can be seen as a first step towards a separate fund
management structure. Of course, depending on internal politics, the fund may either
move in the direction of more independent management or fall into the hands of silovikis,
Putinists, or rent seekers.

TORN FOR DOMESTIC COMPENSATION
The NWF is an interesting and, in a sense, unique case of sovereign fund. The
fund and its predecessor, the Stabilization Fund, have both been the center of power
struggles between various bases of power within the Russian government. This was
especially the case during Putin's second term as president. The Russian government has
been, in fact, divided between the Ministry of Finance headed by Kudrin and the rest of
the cabinet. Although the fund does not have an external, independent manager, Kudrin,
has to a certain extent, acted as the guardian of Russian national wealth. He managed to
resist the Putinist policy makers and cabinet members, whose push for progress was not
necessarily based on a long-term vision of sustainable economic growth.
60

The draft strategy indicated that up to 50 percent of the NWF could be invested in equities, and a further
30 percent in corporate bonds. The investment universe included both the emerging and the domestic
markets. The draft law also had provisions for a separate (even foreign) fund manager. Source: Bryanski,
"Russia Says No Change to SWF Strategy Despite Crisis."
61
"Russian Financial Agency Should Commence Business Starting 2010," Cbonds, August 14, 2009.
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At one point, Putin even denied that Russia had a sovereign fund.

fs)

In June 2008,

when the then United States Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Paulson, travelled to
Moscow to discuss the trade and investment between the United States and Russia, Putin,
then the prime minister, assured him that all the Russian investment in the United States
was private. In reference to the topic of SWFs, Putin said: "Since we do not have a
sovereign wealth fund yet, you are confusing us with someone else... but we are ready to
do it, especially if you want us to."

Putin's position implied that he believed a sovereign

fund was to serve any purpose that the government deemed appropriate. This does not
exclude economic statecraft in the future; however, at this time the money was needed
primarily for domestic purposes, specifically, the sustainment of a high level of public
expenditures.
In fact, Kudrin was besieged with demands to direct funds towards the public
welfare and the military. In early 2006, only two years after the creation of the
Stabilization Fund, the cabinet's deputy chief of staff, Mikhail Kopeikin, argued that
leaving the fund to accumulate revenues would result in the waste of almost 600 million
rubles over three years and that the fund should invest in riskier, high-yield assets. Kudrin
denied Kopeikin's request, and at one point even shouted at Kopeikin, asserting that
Kopeikin's claim was "completely uninformed," and that he had "cast a shadow over the
president and the government."64 Illarionov, once Putin's economic advisor and now a
Kremlin critic, argued: "I don't think they should take this money out at all, regardless of
62

In fact, with no foreign portfolio investment these funds do not meet the SWF criteria. It was said that
some of NWF assets were in foreign bonds, although that could not be verified. Nevertheless, there are
provisions and guidelines for investment in foreign instruments. That means the NWF is able to make
overseas investment.
63
David Lawder and Gleb Bryanski, "Putin-No Sovereign Wealth Fund in Russia Yet," Reuters, June 30,
2008.
64
Courtney Weaver, "Crisis Silencing Kudrin's Critics," The Moscow Times, November 7, 2008.
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the speed, regardless of the size. The resources of the stabilization fund cannot be used
first domestically, and second, in the investment of shares."65
In January 2008, as oil prices rose above $100 per barrel, Kudrin asserted that
"Russia, which channels most of its oil revenues into its Reserve Fund and [the] NWF
would refrain from spending any additional income immediately... we'll have more
money... we will spend it gradually and according to a plan."66 Later in October 2008,
Pankin, deputy finance minister, asserted that Russia did not plan to change the
investment strategy regarding its funds in response to market turbulences. 67 At the same
time, Illarionov asserted that the fund was becoming a "victim of the greed of several
groups."68
In fact, Kudrin's firm and relatively independent position with regard to
management of the NWF assets has paid off. According to Jonathan Schiffer, Moody's
chief sovereign ratings analyst, "Kudrin has played a very lonely but admirable role...
For all the volatility and the depreciation of the ruble, if you didn't have the stabilization
fund, the volatility [of ruble] would be multiplied two or three times. Kudrin has been
validated."69 Over time and especially during the recent global financial crisis, the
government's attitude has also mellowed. Some say that the views of Kopeikin, Sergei
Mironov (the Federation Council Speaker), and Boris Gryzlov (State Duma Speaker)
have turned in favor of Kudrin.
Nevertheless, when Kudrin revealed plans to tap into the NWF as part of the
economic stimulus package, he faced a challenge on a different front. The State Duma
65
66
67
68
69

Ibid.
Anatoly Medetsky, "Oil Takes a Trip Past $100 Plateau," The Moscow Times, January 9, 2008.
Bryanski, "Russia Says No Change to SWF Strategy Despite Crisis."
"Oil Fund Manager Warns on Spending."
Weaver, "Crisis Silencing Kudrin's Critics."
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had approved anti-crisis packages worth a total of $86 billion70 and, as a result, the
71
government had to use all its resources, including the Reserve Fund and the NWF.
Kudrin's announcement was followed by S&P downgrading its outlook rating for Russia.
Fitch Ratings also estimated that Russia would lose a total of $160 billion by the end of
2009, though Fitch and Moody's did not change their ratings.72 In response Kudrin stated:
"When I defended the oil fund, I always said we can spend it during the crisis. Maybe I
was expected to always say that we should not spend the oil fund, but this is wrong."

In

summary, the Russian funds (the Stabilization Fund and the NWF) have been more of a
subject of domestic political debates than a means of economic statecraft or a foreign
policy tool.
Some have also asserted that NWF funds (channeled through the
Vnesheconombank) have been used at the discretion of Prime Minister Putin, who
chaired the Vnesheconombank's oversight board. It is said that Putin helped oligarch
friends such as Oleg Deripaska, Roman Abramovich, Igor Vyuzin, and Sergei
Bogdanchikov pay their foreign debts. Deripaska received $4.5 billion to pay off RusAl
and Norilsk Nickel loans from the Royal Bank of Scotland; Abramovich received $1.8
billion to pay off Evraz' immediate creditors; Vyuzin's Mechel was bailed out with $1.5
billion; and Bogdanchikov's Rosneft received $4.5 million.74
There are two important factors preventing the NWF's assets from being managed
in an entrepreneurial way. First and most important, the fund has never had a coherent
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"Russian Capital Flight at $33 Bin in Aug-Sept.-Finance Minsiter," RIA Novosti, October 17, 2008.
This is a similar situation to other SWF discussed in earlier chapters, i.e., at the times of economic
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management. As discussed earlier, the Ministry of Finance is officially the manager of
the fund; however, its management has been overshadowed by the influence of other
centers of power. Second, there is no clear consensus as to the purpose of the fund.
Although at the time of its creation, the NWF was mandated to provide long-term support
to the Russian pension system, its purpose has been redefined by various parties, most
often as an ad hoc source of funding for various needs.
In Russia, the sense of entrepreneurship does not have a visible manifest and is
often times confused with rent seeking behavior, a legacy of the years of communist rule
and its command economy. Aslund has argued that "massive rent seeking characterized
•

•

the collapse of the Soviet system and the early post-communist period."

75

•
Innovation,

learning, and adaptation are absent from the fund's management. The majority of the
NWF assets were put in deposit accounts; only a small portion was invested in foreign
governments' bonds, a low risk investment.
Russia has had a troubled economy, as well as the occasional internal battles
between the government and other influential players, such as the oligarchs. Russia is
exposed to fluctuations in both foreign exchange and oil prices. In 1998, ruble started to
depreciate against the dollar, declining from 6 rubles to 10 rubles, and continued until it
became fully floating in 2006. During 2009, the interbank exchange rate fluctuated
between 36.53 rubles and 28.13 rubles against the dollar.76 Russia has also experienced
oil market volatility, which was severe during the recent global financial crisis. In 2008
alone, the spot price of Urals crude (Russia's main export) fluctuated between $137.61 (4
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Aslund,

Russia's Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed,
"Historical Exchnage Rates," (ONDA, 2009).
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July) and $34.81 (26 December) per barrel.77 Despite opening its economy, Russia
remains heavily dependent on its oil sector. According to Professor Vladimir Popov at the
New Economic School in Moscow, while fewer than 1 million of Russia's 142 million
78

people work in oil-related industries, they produce about half of the country's GDP.
Of the three political economy perspectives under consideration, the domestic
compensation thesis is most relevant to an analysis of the NWF today. Although Russia is
not a small state, it has very little control over its terms of trade, and, as discussed earlier,
global market fluctuations can have a significant impact on its economy. Russia is also a
resource-abundant country but like many other resource-abundant (oil exporting)
countries, its domestic economic structure has not developed or diversified. The personal
tax system is underdeveloped and the corporate tax remains low and determined
primarily by narrow political considerations.79 Having said all this, it should also be
noted that Russia is still a state in transition, both politically and economically.
Corruption and domestic political turmoil and occasional foreign economic shocks have
made the pace of the transition sluggish.
Changes are, nevertheless, taking place and Russia's approach to coping with
global financial crisis is not necessarily similar to that of other states. Instead of
borrowing, as the United States did, Russia financed its bailout funds through domestic
sources, including the Reserve Fund, NWF, and the national gold and currency reserves
held by the Central Bank.80 Figure 14 shows the use of both Reserve Fund and NWF
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resources during the crisis. As can be seen, the Reserve Fund resources were being
quickly used up, and, consequently, the NWF missed the opportunity to accumulate new
funds. Additionally, a portion of the NWF assets was redistributed domestically, in the
form of loans, through the Vnesheconombank.
Russia also initiated a pension reform in 2008 that relies more on the assets of the
NWF. In addition to the present-day Pension Fund that pays the current pensioners, the
government initiated a retirement plan system. In this system, employees pay a portion of
•
R1
their income into a personal retirement fund.

FIGURE 14 Monthly balance of the Reserve Fund and the NWF ($ billion)
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Source: "Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation." http://wwwl.minfin.ru/en/.
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In summary, the NWF in its current form cannot be deemed an instrument of
economic statecraft or a manifestation of state entrepreneurship. Its short lifespan makes
it difficult, however, to determine whether the fund will be used within the economic
framework of balance of payments smoothing, continue to provide resources in support
of the budget or, in accordance with its mandate, provide resources for the management
of future pension obligations. The lack of third party or externally audited information
that might serve as a basis on which to assess the validity of the official data certainly
limits the extent of the study.
The Russian fund continues to operate in a non-transparent way (a source of
concern to the IMF as early as 2004, prior to the establishment of the Stabilization Fund),
and its management remains closed to external enquiries. Martin Gilman, a former IMF
representative to Russia, maintained: "The preconditions for the fund's successful
operation were unlikely to fit together in the Russian context. There were too many
governance and transparency issues for a fund like this to really be effective. In a blunt
•

•
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categorization, Russia was not Norway-Russia was more like Nigeria."
As the NWF is only a few years old, things are bound to change, and both the structure
and management of the fund will formalize and mature overtime, perhaps in a decade or
so. As was the case with respect to other funds discussed earlier in this study, the state's
priorities will most likely change over time, and, consequently, so would the priorities
and purpose of the NWF. Until then, we may continue to observe the evolution of a fund
and the transition of its owner state.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER DISCUSSIONS

Why should we study SWFs after all? Many states in the West have had a variety
concerns regarding the investments of these funds. Although the anxiety on the part of
the recipient states has been overshadowed by the recent global financial crisis that
started with the massive defaults on sub-prime mortgages in the United States, the
concern still exists and will surface again once the full economic recovery is in motion.
The primary concerns are generally around a few major topics: SWFs posing a threat to
national security, the risk of protectionism in response to the proliferation of SWF
investments, and the risk of financial instability due to reckless decisions by SWFs.
During 2005 and 2006, the United States' concern was more from a national
security perspective while Europe was more concerned with the lack of reciprocity,
established standards, and openness. Policy makers in the Unites States were preoccupied
with the idea that the some foreign governments' ownership in specific areas might
expose the country to manipulation through economic means. Two specific examples are
the plan to take over the management of six sea port facilities by the state-owned Dubai
Ports World (DP World) and the purchase of Unocal sought by the China National
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). 1
In the case of the CNOOC, the intense political opposition in Congress halted the
formal process of the review of the offer. This caused the CNOOC to withdraw its offer
1

Interestingly, national security was not an issue in the 1980s when Japanese companies made major
investments in movie studios or the Rockefeller Centre. Many newspapers such as Metro or Boston Globe
are also owned by European investors. Or when in 2007 APM Terminals, a subsidiary of Danish APM
Moller, built its $450 million-575 acre facility in Portsmouth, Virginia. The company was the first
container terminal developed by a foreign and private company in the United States.
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in August 2005.2 After the uproar over the CNOOC case subsided, DP World, which had
acquired P&O, a British company whose assets included six port facilities in the United
States, faced the same kind of political opposition on the Capitol Hill. At the end, DP
World agreed to sell the facilities to a US-controlled firm.3
Germany chancellor Angela Merkel, while referring to SWFs as "new and
completely unknown elements," expressed her concerns over their investments in the
country and proposed drafting an investment law that would allow the government to
block takeovers by SWFs or other large state-sponsored investment agencies.4 President
Nicolas Sarkozy's concern about SWFs' investments in Europe was more due to the lack
of reciprocity. He demanded that the owner states of SWFs (for instance China) increase
their countries openness to the flow of capital from Europe.5 In the United Kingdom, the
chancellor of the exchequer, Alistair Darling, maintained that as long as SWFs do not
threaten national security or pursue political goals, they should be free to invest as they
please.6 The Swiss National Bank authorities' concern focused on the financial
protectionist policies that any unfavorable actions by the SWFs might trigger. The Swiss
demanded investment guidelines and more transparency.7
This research has, however, revealed that the bulk of these concerns are
unfounded. In fact, the dominant conceptions that SWFs are used only for balance of
payments corrections or as instruments of economic statecraft and foreign policy are not
justifiable. All of the SWFs studies here had a virtually constant balance of payments
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surplus, with only an occasional deficit, which were corrected in the next period or two.
Therefore in practice, there was no need for balance of payments smoothing. None of the
funds—even the GPF-Global that had incorporated non-commercial motives into its
decision-making—was shown to have pursued politically strategic goals for the purpose
of exerting power over another state. In the case of the GPF-Global, the non-commercial
motives were mainly concerned with socially responsible and ethical principles, rather
than politically strategic actions. Norway has indeed communicated with the target states
through divestment, exercise of ownership rights, or the mobilization of opinion around
universal principles such as human rights, but it has never exerted direct political power
over the target state.
Another major finding is that the political economy of crisis induces the same
kind of reaction by the owner states of SWFs. At times of crisis the economic strength of
the home state is of paramount importance. Therefore, SWFs use their resources to
support the domestic economy in times of crisis when it is deemed necessary. These
times of crisis also provided an opportunity to examine whether SWFs in fact pursue
politically strategic goals. For instance,, as a result of the recent financial crisis assets of
many large financial institutions suddenly became underpriced. If they were politically
motivated, SWFs could have made direct investments or acquired controlling stakes in
those financial institutions. However, as we saw, the flow of investment was reversed
from the Western markets to emerging markets. This supports the argument that SWFs do
not have politically strategic motives. Instead, they are concerned with the value of the
assets under their management. During times of normal economic activity, however,
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there is no single theory that can explain the behavior of SWFs. As discussed earlier the
SWFs' agenda is a reflection of various national systems of political economy.
These findings were based on the close examination of a cross section of four
SWFs. The findings of each case were discussed in the respective chapter, but while the
micro-level study of SWFs provided in-depth insights into the functioning and purpose of
individual fund, it is important to discuss the findings on a more generalized and macrolevel. Here, I provide a brief side-by-side review of the case studies.

FOUR CASES, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The SWFs of Norway, United Arab Emirates, Singapore, and Russia each
represent an interesting and unique case. The oldest funds in this group belong to
Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. Temasek was established in 1974, only nine
years after the country announced its independence, and ADIA was established in 1976,
after only five years of independence. Norway, on the other hand, first established the
Oljefondet (Petroleum Fund) in 1990, and then, in 2006, established the GPF-Global. The
Oil Stabilization Fund in Russia was launched in 2004 and was split into the NWF and
the Reserve Fund in 2008.
With the exception of ADIA—a stand-alone body within the Abu Dhabi
government—ministries of finance (or their equivalents) are the custodians of the funds,
while the management of the fund may have been delegated to other entities. In
Singapore and the United Arab Emirates, funds are managed by boards of directors
constituted of people closely connected to the government. In Norway, the fund is mainly
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managed by the investment arm of the Norges Bank, while in Russia the fund is managed
by the Ministry of Finance.
Despite the state's ownership and the government guidelines that must be
followed, the management of the funds has shown a certain level of independence. The
exact level of independence may have been stipulated by government regulations. The
management of SWFs is comparable to the management of SOEs, and, as Vernon argues,
"[m]anagers of state-owned enterprises commonly try to increase their independence
from government apparatus, a tendency variously described as a desire for autonomy or
discretion or increased bargaining power."8
In the case of Temasek, the board of directors has full control over the operations
of the fund and neither the president nor the Ministry of Finance can get involved in the
management of the fund. In the case of GPF-Global, the Norges Bank has a small margin
within which it can manage the portfolio freely. In the case of NWF of Russia, the quasi
independence is, in fact, a result of a power struggle between various centers of influence
and authority on the one hand and the minister of finance on the other. As regards ADIA,
the issue of independent management is not applicable as all investments have to be
approved by the board of directors, who also hold various government posts.
The SWFs of Norway, United Arab Emirates, and Singapore, all have diverse
portfolios, both in terms of instruments and geographical distribution of assets. In
Norway, 40 percent of the portfolio has traditionally consisted of equities. Since 2007,
the allocation of equities has been gradually increased to 60 percent. Although there is no
detailed information about ADIA's portfolio structure, approximately 75 to 80 percent of

8
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its portfolio is believed to be made up of non fixed-income instruments. Temasek's
portfolio consists entirely of corporate equities. The composition of Russia's NWF
portfolio is different from all other funds studies here in that it consists of large highly
liquid asset (currency) holdings, deposited with either the central bank or the state-owned
Vnesheconombank. A small portion of the assets are also said to be held in bonds. In
terms of the market value of each portfolio, GPF-Global (valued at about $455 billion as
of end of September 2009) and ADIA remain the two largest funds. There is no official
data on the size of ADIA; therefore, it is not possible to determine which of the two funds
is the world's largest. The market value of assets under the management of Temasek fell
to about $93 billion as of the end of March 2009. The aggregate balance of NWF as of
the end of 2009 was also about $93 billion.
With the exception of Temasek, all SWFs examined in this research were
established when both the balance of payments and the country's current account were in
surplus. The external account framework, as discussed earlier, does not apply to Temasek
as it was initially endowed with a portfolio of state-owned companies, instead of the
liquid assets derived from external accounts. Since the inception of Norway's Oljefondet
in 1990, the country has had a virtually constant balance of trade surplus; only in three
years has the balance of payments experienced a deficit. In Russia, both the balance of
payments and balance of trade have been in surplus since the creation of the Stabilization
Fund in 2004.The balance of trade of the United Arab Emirates has also been in surplus
since the creation of the fund. Additionally, none of these funds either were shown to
have been intended to provide or did provided resources for balance of payments
corrections.
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On the other hand, these funds—with the exception of Temasek—were used
either systematically or on an ad hoc basis (for instance when the country was hit by the
global financial crisis) to support the national budget. In Norway, the economic stimulus
package introduced in 2009 required the government to withdraw from the GPF-Global
about 14 times more than it withdrew in the previous year (see table 13). The United
Arab Emirates has most likely included the return on ADIA's assets as a revenue item in
the federal budget for many years. The country has used the Central Bank's massive
foreign assets that were accumulated between 2003 and 2007 to fight the recession. In
Singapore, running a budget deficit has not been allowed unless the government has
already built up surpluses during the same five-year term. Drawing on past reserves is
considered unconstitutional, except in the event of extreme need, in which case the
approval of both the President and the Parliament is required. The Russian Federation, on
the other hand, has relied on both the Reserve Fund and the NWF (and their predecessor,
the Stabilization Fund) for budgetary purposes. The NWF assets were even used
indirectly to bail out domestic banks and companies last year.
Table 25 summarizes the findings of the four case studies. As discussed earlier in
this dissertation, a fund's agenda can develop over time. Additionally, funds can pursue
multiple goals at any point in time. The key is to determine the most important goal. This
is a difficult task as the goals may occasionally overlap. This is especially the case in
regard to the various perspectives discussed under the umbrella of domestic
compensation and the general economic argument of balance of payments corrections.
Table 25 represents the dominant goals of each fund, based on the most recent available
information.
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Norway's GPF-Global—the world's most transparent SWF—makes investment
decisions that are based on a set of non-commercial principles that are closely aligned
with the Norwegian foreign policy. GPF-Global pursues a combination of goals,
maintaining a balance between profitability, socially responsible investment, and ethical
considerations. As discussed in Chapter IV, Norway has diverged from the purely
commercially-oriented investment path of other funds and used the fund to passively
impose sanctions on companies whose operations contradict the fund's Ethical Guidelines.
Although there is no evidence showing that the fund's financial leverage is applied at a
national level and directly over another state, it does not change the fact that the
management of the fund is influenced by the state's politics. ADIA, on the other hand,
has stayed out of the Emirate's politics and has both acted as a fund manager—seeking
(not always successfully) high returns—and provided sources of income for the federal
budget. In the absence of reliable information, however, determining which of these
goals takes precedence over the other is very difficult.
The case for Temasek and NWF is less complicated. Temasek is mainly the
entrepreneurial arm of the state. It has acted in the capacity of a vehicle for privatization
of the state-owned companies that were not internationally competitive. It is also barred
by law from providing funds for budgetary purposes or any public expenditure. Instead, it
has invested the returns in new or existing businesses, some domestic but mainly regional.
The management of Temasek and its investment decision making process follow
sophisticated business models. The volume of business deals and the manner in which
transactions are conducted—such as the extensive use of network of subsidiaries or the
development of partnerships—clearly show the state's entrepreneurial skills and spirit,
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particularly given the absence of a large private sector. In contrast, Russia's NWF has
been a vehicle for domestic compensation and has been torn between various centers of
power. During its short lifespan, NWF has accumulated liquidity, which has been used
for supporting troubled banks and companies affected by the recent financial crisis.

TABLE 25 Economic vs. international political economy
Economic
Perspective
SWF
GPF-Global, Norway *

BOP
Correction

International Political Economy
Perspectives
Economic
Statecraft

State
Domestic
entrepreneurCompensation
ship

•

ADIA, UAE
Temasek, Singapore
NWF, Russia

V

•
V

* As discussed, the Norwegian fund pursues a different economic statecraft from the
tradition view of statecraft, i.e., a benign foreign policy tool without exerting direct
power over the target state.
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CONCLUSIONS
There are a number of interesting and important conclusions we can draw based
on the findings summarized in table 25. First, each SWF is in some way unique. The
structure and nature of the SWFs are based on—to borrow Gilpin's term—the state's
national system of political economy. As I have emphasized at the beginning of this study,
the purpose was not to select a single theoretical perspective that would be the only
framework for explaining the behavior of SWFs. A single theory or paradigm is neither
sufficient nor appropriate, since the funds were shown to be theoretically progressive,
meaning that theoretical perspectives explaining their behavior varied, according to the
circumstances. States and the international environment have changed over time and so
has the agenda of SWFs. Therefore, depending on specific period of study, SWFs'
behavior can be explained within a specific theoretical framework. Notwithstanding these
variations, we may conclude that the purpose of these funds is not balance of payments
correction. At times of economic austerity, we hypothesized that the funds provide the
resources needed for maintaining domestic demand and rescuing troubled industries.
During periods when states were not financially constrained, the hypothesis was that the
SWFs would pursue the goals for which they were initially created. These hypotheses
were shown to be true in the cases of the four funds examined here.
Additionally, within the domestic compensation perspective and the various
internal politics associated with it, the types of domestic compensation provided by the
investor states are not the same. The evidence suggests that the domestic compensation
was not of a corrupt nature but was mainly for managing macroeconomic deficiencies
and diversification of the economic base of the country. In the case of ADIA or NWF, for
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instance, the funds were used to manage fiscal deficits, while for Temasek the
diversification of the economy was the immediate purpose of domestic compensation.
Second, by looking at the developmental stage of the state—in both economic and
political terms—we can predict the purpose of their fund. The research suggested that the
SWFs of states that are both politically and economically advanced and sustainable tend
to incorporate non-economic factors in their decision making process. For instance, in
Norway—which is a well-established democracy with a stable open economy and a
sustainable balance of payments surplus—the fund's agenda has become aligned with the
national political consensus and the state's foreign policy. On the other end of the
spectrum is the Russian Federation—a state that I would like to call "late capitalizer,"
after the term "late industrializer" in developmental studies. In Russia, the fund is mainly
used for domestic purposes and hence is subject to the influence of domestic politics. In
summary, the life cycle of a SWF's agenda is closely related to the national system of
political economy.
States such as the United Arab Emirates and Singapore are somewhat in between
the two ends of this spectrum. Over the past three decades or so, the United Arab
Emirates has had a thriving economy with a stable political system based on what
Davidson calls the "neopatrimonial model."9 Still, the state lacks an appropriate legal
framework for economic activities such as debt restructuring and disclosure. Singapore
has also had a relatively stable political system with an advanced framework for
commercial activities. However, as a city-state, its domestic market is extremely limited.
In these types of states, SWFs can act as entrepreneurs, a role that involves taking higher
economic risks while being conservative in regard to political risks.
9
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Third, and consistent with the above conclusions, it is inappropriate to pool all
funds together and treat them equally, as most analysts and policy makers do. As
discussed earlier, both the international environment and the state's domestic structure (in
all its political, economic, social, and cultural aspects) change over time. This means that
a state's priorities shift in response to the new environment and, consequently, so does the
fund's agenda. In other words, SWFs, like living creatures evolve over time. Viewing
SWFs—whose owner states are typically not at the same developmental stages—equally
can lead to inaccurate generalizations which, in turn, can result in inappropriate decisions.
For instance, when a commercially-based fund is deemed political, policy makers in the
recipient state can block the entry of the fund into their market. This also deprives the
recipient state of new funds that could potentially contribute to the increased economic
well-being of the recipient state, without imposing any political risks. SWFs could also
bail out failing corporations, in which case the recipient state would not need to transfer
the burden of the bailout to taxpayers, withdraw funds from official reserves, or resort to
external borrowing. On the other hand, if a politically-oriented SWF is treated as a purely
commercial fund, then conflicts are likely to arise between the recipient state and the
owner state of the fund. As a point of reference, none of the existing SWFs has acquired
any large stakes in a single state.
Fourth, the idea that the level of transparency can serve to indicate the real agenda
of a SWF is superficial, naive, and most importantly, logically flawed. 10 As has been
shown, Norway's GPF-Global—which is praised as the world's most transparent fund—
has incorporated non-economic factors in to its investment decision making. In fact, it

10
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has imposed investment sanctions on specific industries or states. The fund has also taken
sides with respect to political or military conflicts in Palestine and Israel, Burma and
Morocco. So, a lack of transparency can be a reflection of factors other than a hidden
agenda. Some states still lack established or advanced corporate laws, property laws,
disclosure policies, or an internationally accepted legal framework for commercial
transactions. The SWFs of those states would, most likely, follow the local norms or
culture. A lack of transparency can also be merely a reflection of the local cultural. While
access to many kinds of information is considered a right in the West, some countries
view this access as a privilege. This might explain why some funds are reluctant to
disclose information. Conclusions and findings discussed here have important
implications for the international political economy.

IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
First of all, concerns over the possibility of the existence of political motives of
SWFs are exaggerated. The fact is, the size of the holdings of these funds in foreign
entities is usually small. While, for instance, the Norwegian Storting has allowed up to a
10 percent stake in any single business, the average size of a holding of the GPF-Global
was only six percent. The recent global financial crisis also provided an opportunity for
testing the funds' investment goals. If any of the SWFs had hidden agendas or intended to
gain control over, for example, large financial institutions in the West, they could have
done so during and after the recent financial crisis. In fact, SWFs not only showed little
interest in bailing out the distressed financial institutions, but also shifted their portfolio
away from the troubled markets in the West to emerging markets mostly in Southeast
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Asia. This move indicates that economic profit is of greater importance than the
implementation of politically strategic decisions or economic statecraft.
A quick note on the use of term "strategic" is needed here. This term means
"forming part of a long-term plan or aim to achieve a specific purpose."11 However,
economists and financiers on the one hand, and political analysts and policy makers on
the other, tend to diverge in their interpretation of this term. While strategic planning or
moves in the business world refers to timely decisions to ensure the economic
profitability of an investment, politicians use this term to refer to actions that offer
political or military advantage over an opponent. This may have added to the politicians'
concern over the motives of the funds. Again, if funds' were used for politically strategic
purposes, we would expect them to take over key financial institutions in the West, in
order to exert financial power over the recipient states once the crisis was over.
The 2008 financial crisis provided an opportunity for observing possible political
strategic takeovers by the investor states. Interestingly, we saw that none of the investor
states used their funds for political purposes. In fact, most of the SWFs showed no
interest in buying low-priced assets that could potentially provide the investor states with
strategic influence. Instead they diversified further and diverted their portfolio, shifting
investment from the industrial countries to emerging markets. The states acted as
cautious entrepreneurs rather than maximizers of political power. Even in the case of
Russia, the fund's resources were not used to gain foreign political influence—the fund's
assets were held in form of bank deposits with domestic banks. Moreover, the creation of
Stabilization Fund (and later the NWF) was done in such a way that the fund and its
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resources were somewhat isolated from ongoing domestic factional politics. In summary,
SWFs have not been tools of economic statecraft, but their worst, they became objects of
contestation among rent-seeking domestic actors.
An important, yet rarely discussed, issue with respect to the relationship between
the sending and recipient states of sovereign funds is that there are dependencies that go
both ways. While the recipient states have various concerns about the foreign investments,
the owner states of the SWFs are also exposed to various risks. The SWFs' investment in
foreign states is subject to the same risks any multinational company, for instance, is
exposed to when making foreign investment. Foreign investment is always subject to
both political and economic risks, including risk of nationalization or expropriation,
market crashes, natural disasters, and environmental controversies. During the recent
financial crisis, for instance, ADIA incurred massive losses as a result of its investment in
Citigroup. In addition to these risks, SWFs investments are subject to political scrutiny
that can range from the unwelcoming attitudes of a recipient state to legal and legislative
barriers to entry.
Additionally, the recipient states' perception of the motives of SWFs has been a
source of concern for the owner states of SWFs. The representatives of a number of
SWFs, including those of Norway and Singapore, appeared before various committees of
the United States House of Representatives during 2008 and 2009, and testified regarding
the agenda of their funds in order to clarify any misperceptions. The representative from
Abu Dhabi took the lead in the International Working Group (IWG) of the SWFs
organized by the IMF to facilitate efforts for compiling a set of principles and practices
that reflect the behavior of the SWFs. The Singaporean fund also published a number of
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op-eds in the New York Times and occasionally engaged with the public by providing
responses to critics. The extensive work of the members of the IWG (later, the
International Forum of SWFs), whose members now include representatives from all four
SWFs discussed in this study, indicate the collective efforts on an international level to
facilitate the operations of the SWFs.
In fact, SWFs are, except for the ownership structure, not much different from
some of the large pension or reserve funds. Despite their large size and geographically
diverse portfolio, these pension or reserve funds have received little political criticism.
The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), established in 1932, is
in fact very similar to SWFs in terms of both the magnitude and structure of its portfolio.
CalPERS held about $205.7 billion worth of assets as of January 20, 2010. In 1999, the
board of directors of CalPERS was given absolute and exclusive authority over the
administration and management of the pension fund. The fund has a diverse portfolio
both in terms of geography and investment instruments. As of the end of October 2009,
over 64 percent of the portfolio consisted of equities (domestic and international), and a
further 24 percent of fixed income assets (domestic and international), and the rest
19
consisted of cash, real estate equities, and other instruments.
Another example is the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC), established
in 1980, which holds about $34.7 billion worth of assets as of January 21, 2010.13 The
portfolio of APFC, in 2009, consisted of 38 percent equities, 22 percent bonds, 12 percent
real estate, with the rest in cash, private equity, and other forms of investment. While
APFC's real estate holdings were confined to the United States, its stock holdings as of
12
13
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the end of September 2009 were spread over more than 50 different countries, including
China, India, Singapore, Norway, and the Russian Federation.14 Unlike CalPERS, APFC
has participated in the International Forum of SWFs.
Today's concerns over SWFs are somewhat comparable to the concerns that both
national governments and the international community had at the height of the expansion
of multi-national companies (MNCs) in the late 1960s. At the time, many scholars
believed that the rise of those new actors undermined nation-states. The opening lines of
Vernon's famous book, Sovereignty at Bay, capture its tenor very well: "Suddenly, it
seems, the sovereign states are feeling naked. Concepts such as sovereignty and national
economic strength appear curiously drained of meaning."15 George Ball, in 1967,
predicted increased conflict between MNCs and the nation-state, the former being a
modern concept evolved to meet the requirements of the modern age, and the latter being
old-fashioned and not adaptable to the complex needs of the present world.16 Other
scholars like Stephen Kobrin, however, argued that neither the end of the nation-states
nor compromised sovereignty ever materialized.17
The rise of SWFs shows that states are becoming increasingly responsible for the
management of their economies. In fact, the revival of the state and its increased
intervention in the markets in the wake of the recent financial crisis has already led to a
number of fierce debates that may shape future policies in significant ways. Many of the
world's largest corporations and financial institutions are now owned or controlled by
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states. This indicates that we need to review our expectations with respect to the role of
states, at least on the economic side. Liberal economists and advocates of the Washington
Consensus have argued that governments' involvement in the economy should be
minimal, but we have entered a new era that requires a greater degree of state
intervention. In addition to governments' bail-out plans and stimulus packages, changes
in demography have also necessitated increased state spending: "Aging populations will
10

consume ever more public healthcare and ever bigger pensions."

t

In summary, the rise

of the SWFs requires a "paradigm shift" in our approach to international political
economy.
We have to continuously seek to enhance our understanding of the functioning of
SWFs. We need to engage them in further dialogue, and the International Forum of SWFs
is only the first step in that direction. At the same time, the political concerns regarding
the potential negative impacts of SWFs on the recipient states should be reviewed in
close conjunction with the potential benefits of their investments. These funds, with their
long-term investment approaches can provide low-risk liquidity. "SWFs could also
contribute to greater market efficiency and lower volatility by diversifying the global
investor base."19 Recipient states can direct foreign portfolio investment to specific
industries by providing incentives, or providing guarantees of protection from legal risks
such as expropriation and nationalization. In summary, "state capitalism" should be
appreciated or, at least, regarded with less scrutiny. The sooner everyone recognizes and
embraces this paradigm shift, the smoother would be the transition from old percept to
the new.
18
19
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Although this research does not support the applicability of the economic
statecraft perspective, in its traditional form of pursuing power, to any of the funds
studied here, it does not totally refute the possibility of a fund moving in that direction.
The funds studied here were the world's largest in their own class (see Chapter III for
categorization), and therefore of more importance than other smaller funds. As has been
shown, SWFs have various stages of maturity, which depend on both the organizational
structure of the fund and the political economy of the owner state. Once all conditions are
right—i.e., the political system is durable and government is politically stable, the fund
has fully developed processes for financial activities, and more importantly, the state is
satisfied that it has sufficient financial resources, for its present and future needs—then it
may be more likely that a fund will be used by the government as a means of power. It is,
however, difficult to predict whether or when any of the SWFs will reach that level of
maturity.
The findings of this research have also underscored the markers based on which
we can assess the behavior of SWFs in the future. These criteria—including the structure
of the fund's governance and its location within the political administration; the structure
of the portfolio; and the geographical diversity of the portfolio—can shed some light on
whether the SWFs' behavior is essentially entrepreneurial or, on the other hand,
something less salutary. The entrepreneurial funds with the immediate goal of
maximizing returns tend to have statutory independence from central banks and other
government institutions. These funds typically have a larger portion of their portfolio
dedicated to riskier assets, such as equity or real estate, and are usually diversified
globally. On the other hand, SWFs with conservative and geographically-limited
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portfolios tend to be less advanced in terms of entrepreneurial approach. Additionally,
funds whose management is not independent of monetary policy makers are—by the very
nature of this dependence—constrained in their efforts toward profit maximization. In
summary, these markers can be used when evaluating other funds.
An interesting question one might ask is, what keeps domestic political actors
from taking control of the funds' resources, especially during times of crisis? By and
large, the current study showed that domestic political actors did not take over the funds'
resources, and the management of the funds maintained some level of independence from
domestic politics. However, we do not know whether the domestic actors chose not to
exploit the fund's resources or were simply not able to do so. One possibility is that times
of crisis created a quasi domestic political consensus around the necessity and priority of
rescue packages and a speedy economic recovery. In other words, domestic political
actors agreed to create safeguards that prevented opportunities for the extraction of funds
at time of economic crisis. Another possibility is that SWFs may have been far more
independent that originally thought. They were unaffected by domestic politics and
therefore performed independently of factional political struggle. Whatever the reasons
may have been, SWFs preserved a surprising degree of autonomy during the recent crisis,
a fact that supports the concept of SWFs as the expression of entrepreneurial states, as
opposed to economic statecraft or corrupted domestic compensation (compensating
voters or government supporters). Given all this, there are more reasons to study SWFs
in their own rights, rather than simply as an appendage of the state.
Future research could focus on a particular group of SWFs—for instance, noncommodity-based funds (such as China Investment Corporation, Australian Future Fund,
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and Korea Investment Corporation) and sub-national or non-carbohydrate-based funds
(such as the Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund and Kiribati's Revenue
Equalization Reserve Fund). Another area for further research is the study of groups of
SWFs that share characteristics such as geography, the state of the economy, or the
political system. A comparative study of SWFs and major pension funds or corporations
that pursue socially responsible goals, focusing on their rate of return or management,
could provide further insights into the functioning of these new state-owned global
economic actors.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADB

Asian Development Bank

ADIA

Abu Dhabi Investment Authority

AHSTF

Alberta Heritage Saving Trust Fund

BIA

Brunei Investment Agency

CEB

Council of Europe Development Bank

CIC

China Investment Corporation

DIC

Dubai Investment Corporation

EBRD

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

E&S SF

Economic & Social Stabilization Fund

FTSE

Financial Times Stock Exchange

GIC

Government Investment Corporation

GLC

Government-linked Companies

GPF

Government Pension Fund

IBRD

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IFC

International Finance Corporation

IMF

International Monetary Fund

KIA

Kuwait Investment Authority

KIC

Korea Investment Corporation

KN BHD

Khazanah Nasional Berhad

LSE

London Stock Exchange

MAS

Monetary Authority of Singapore

MSCI

Morgan Stanley Capital International

NBIM

Norges Bank Investment Management

NDF

National Development Fund

NF

National Fund

NIB

Nordic Investment Bank
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Nil

Net Investment Income

NIIC

Net Investment Income Contribution

NSF

National Stabilization Fund

NWF

National Welfare Fund

NYSE

New York Stock Exchange

PRF

Permanent Reserve Fund

QIA

Qatar Investment Authority

SF

Stabilization Fund

SGRF

State General Reserve Fund
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APPENDIX B
SMALL STATES IN ARMSTRONG DATA SET1

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (20)
Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia,
Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome & Principe,
Seychelles, Swaziland, Mayotte (F), Reunion (F), St Helena & Dependencies (UK)

SOUTH ASIA (3)
Bhutan, Maldives, British Indian Ocean Territories (UK)

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA (8)
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, United Arab Emirates
Canary Islands (Sp) Ceuta & Melilla (Sp) Madeira (P)

EASTERN EUROPE & CENTRAL ASIA (4)
Estonia, Latvia, Macedonia FYR, Slovenia

WESTERN EUROPE (14)
Andorra, Cyprus, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, San Marino,
Azores (P), Faroe Islands (DK), Gibraltar (UK), Guernsey (UK), Isle of Man (UK),
Jersey (UK)

1

Armstrong et al., "A Comparison of the Economic Performance of Different Micro-States and between
Micro-States and Large Countries."
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LATIN AMERICA & CARIBBEAN (26)
Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica
Panama, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent & Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad &
Tobago, Anguilla (UK), Aruba (NL), British Virgin Is (UK), Cayman Islands (UK),
Falkland Islands (UK), French Guiana (F), Guadeloupe (F), Martinique (F), Montserrat
(UK), Netherlands Antilles (NL), Turks & Caicos (UK), US Virgin Islands (US)

EAST ASIA & PACIFIC (27)
Brunei, Fiji, Kirbati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Fed States), Mongolia, Nauru, Palau,
Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, American Samoa (US),
Christmas Island (AUS), Cocos Islands (AUS), Cook Islands (NZ), French Polynesia (F),
Guam (US), Macao (P), New Caledonia (F), Niue (NZ), Norfolk Island (AUS), Northern
Marianas (US), Tokelau (NZ), Wallis & Futuna (F)

NORTH AMERICA (3)
Bermuda (UK), Greenland (DK), St Pierre & Miquelon (F)
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APPENDIX C
BRIGUGLIO'S LIST OF SMALL STATES1

SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES (21)
Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cyprus,
Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Kiribati, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Seychelles, St Lucia, St
Kitts & Nevis, St Vincent & Grenadines, Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Vanuatu

LARGE ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES (2)
Jamaica, Singapore

NON-ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES (14)
Belize, Botswana, Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Kuwait, Liberia,
Mauritania, Oman, Panama, Suriname, Swaziland

DEVELOPED STATES (1)
Iceland

1

Briguglio, "Small Island Developing States and Their Economic Vulnerabilities."
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APPENDIX D
KEY THEORETICAL MARKERS

A)
B)
C)

Economic Statecraft
State Entrepreneurship
Domestic Compensation

A

1

Political leaders refer to the fund as a means of statecraft or
foreign policy tool

X

2

Fund manager follows government directives (no
independent management

X

3 Fund invests in sensitive industries such as defense

B

C

X

4

State has historically acted as an entrepreneur and
intervened in the economy, or there is the tradition of SOEs

X

X

5

Fund's performance is based on economic principles or fund
reacts to movements in the market

X

X

6

Fund's management is delegated to an independent and
professional fund manager

X

X

7 Fund's portfolio consists of more risky assets (equities)

X

8

State is small, traditionally open, resource-abundant or in
general, vulnerable to external shocks

X

9

Fund's account is integrated into the national budget and
government withdraws fund from its account regularly

X

10

There is a well-established domestic redistribution
mechanism

X

11 There is no efficient tax system

X

12 Fund's portfolio is more conservative (less risky assets)

X
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APPENDIX E
GPF-GLOBAL'S CASH FLOW1

The cash flow of the GPF-Global is calculated as the sum of:
1. Total tax revenues and royalty deriving from petroleum activities collected
pursuant to Petroleum Taxation Act (no. 35 of June 13, 1975) and the Petroleum
Activities Act (no. 72 of November 29, 1996)
2. Revenues deriving from tax on CO2 emissions due to petroleum activities on the
continental shelf
3. Central government revenues deriving from the removal or alternative use of
installations on the continental shelf
4. Revenues deriving from the State's Direct Financial Interest in petroleum
activities2
5. Any government sale of stakes representing the State's Direct Financial Interest in
petroleum activities,
6. Central government revenues from net surplus agreements associated with certain
production licenses
7. Dividends from Statoil ASA,
8. Transfers from the Petroleum Insurance fund
Less:
1. Central government direct investments in petroleum activities
2. Central government expenses in connection with the Petroleum Insurance fund
1

"Section 3: Government Pension Fund Act: Provisions of the Management of the Government Pension
Fund ", (Ministry of Finance, Norway, 2005).
2
Defined as operating and other income less operating and other expenses.
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3. Central government expenses in connection with the removal or alternative use of
installations on the continental shelf
4. Any government purchase of stakes as part of the State's Direct Financial Interest
in petroleum activities

Subsequently, net financial transactions associated with petroleum activities are the sum
of gross revenues from government sale of shares in Statoil ASA, less government capital
contributions to Statoil ASA and companies attending to government interests in
petroleum activities.
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APPENDIX F
EXTERNAL MANAGERS HIRED BY NBIM 1

Equity External Managers (as of December 31, 2007):
1. Aberdeen Asset Management
2. Altrinsic Global Advisors, LLC
3. APS Asset Management Pte Ltd
4. Atlantis fund Management Ltd.
5. BlackRock International Ltd. & BlackRock Capital Management Inc.
6. Capital International Ltd.
7. Dalton Capital (Guernsey) Ltd. (FunNex)
8. Fidelity Pensions Management
9. Gartmore Investment Management PLC
10. GLG Partners
11. Intrinsic Value Investors (IVI) LLP
12. Janus Capital Management LLC
13. Legg Mason Capital Management Inc
14. NewSmith Asset Management LLP
15. Primecap Management Company
16. Scheer, Rowlett & Associates Investment Management, Ltd.
17. Schroder Investment Management Ltd.
18. Sparx Asset Management Co. Ltd.

1

"The Government Pension Fund Global, External Managers," Norges Bank, http://www.norgesbank.no/templates/article
41392.aspx.

19. T Rowe Price Associates Inc.
20. Tradewinds NWQ Global Investors LLC
21. Wellington Management Company PLC
22. Columbus Circle Investors
23. Jupiter Asset Management Ltd
24. OrbiMed Capital LLC
25. W.H. Reaves & Co, Inc.
Fixed-income External Managers (as of December 31, 2007):
1. Advantus Capital Management Inc
2. Aspect Capital Ltd.
3. Babson Capital Management LLC
4. Barclays Global Investors, N.A
5. Bridgewater Associates, Inc
6. Daiwa SB Investments (UK) Ltd.
7. Diversified Credit Investments, LLC
8. Ellington Global Asset Management, LLC
9. European Credit Management Limited
10. Hyperion Brookfield Asset Management Inc.
11. Insight Investment Management (Global) Limited
12. Lehman Brothers Asset Management LLC
13. Logan Circle Partners, L.P.
14. Nomura Asset Management U.K. Ltd.
15. PanAgora Asset Management Inc
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16. Pareto Investment Management Ltd.
17. Putnam Advisory Company LLC
18. Smith Breeden Associates, Inc
19. State Street Global Advisors
20. TCW Asset Management Company
21. Greylock Capital Management LLC (fond)
22. Smith Breeden Credit Partners LLC (fond)
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APPENDIX G
EXCLUDED COMPANIES FROM GPF-GLOBAL 1

20 Jan 2010

Tobacco production

17 Tobacco companies

19 Nov 2009 Norilsk Nickel (Russia)

Environmental damage

03 Sep 2009

Surveillance system

Elbit System Ltd (Israel)

13 Mar 2009 Dongfeng Motor Group (China)

Sale of trucks to Burma

30 Jan 2009

Textron Inc. (US)

Cluster weapons

30 Jan 2009

Barrick Gold Corporation (Canada)

Environmental damage

09 Sep 2008

Rio Tinto3 (Australia)

11 Jan 2008

Hanwha Corporation (South Korea)

Cluster munitions

Serco Group Pic. (UK)

Nuclear weapons

GenCorp Inc. (US)

Nuclear weapon parts

Environmental damage

09 Nov 2007 Vedanta Resources Pic. (UK)

Environment, Human/Labor

Sterlite Industries Ltd. (India)

Environment, Human/Labor

Madras Aluminium Company Ltd. (India)

Environment, Human/Labor

11 Apr 2007

DRD Gold Limited (South Africa)

Environmental damage

06 Dec 2006

Poongsan Corporation (South Korea)

Cluster munitions

'"Companies Excluded from the Investment Universe," Ministry of Finance,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pension-flind/ethical-guidelines-forthe-government-pe/companies-excluded-from-the-investment-u.html?id=447122.
2
The excluded tobacco companies include, Alliance One International Inc., Altria Group Inc., British
American Tobacco BHD, British American Tobacco Pic., Gudang Garam tbk pt., Imperial Tobacco Group
Pic., ITC Ltd., Japan Tobacco Inc., KT&G Corp, Lorillard Inc., Philip Morris International Inc., Philip
Morris Cr AS., Reynolds American Inc., Souza Cruz SA, Swedish Match AB, Universal Corp VA and
Vector Group Ltd.
3
A joint venture partner with Freeport McMoRan Copper&Gold Inc. in the Grasberg mine in Indonesia.
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06 Jun 2006

05 Jan 2006

Wal-Mart Stores Inc. (US)

Human/Labor rights violation

Wal-Mart de Mexico SA de CV (Mexico)

Human/Labor rights violation

Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc

Environmental damage

BAE Systems Pic. (UK)

Nuclear weapon parts

Boeing Co. (US)

Nuclear weapon parts

Finmeccanica Sp.A. (Italy)

Nuclear weapon parts

Honeywell International Inc. (US)

Nuclear weapon parts

Northrop Grumman Corp. (US)

Nuclear weapon parts

United Technologies Corp. US)

Nuclear weapon parts

Safran SA (France)

Nuclear weapon parts

31 Aug 2005 Alliant Techsystems Inc. (US)

Cluster bomb parts

EADS Co. 4
EADS Finance BY 5

Cluster bomb parts
Cluster bomb parts

General Dynamics Corporation (US)

Cluster bomb parts

L3 Communications Holdings Inc. (US)

Cluster bomb parts

Lockheed Martin Corp. (US)

Cluster bomb parts

Raytheon Co. (US)

Cluster bomb parts

Thales SA. (France)

Cluster bomb parts

06 Jun 2005

Kerr-McGee Corporation6 (US)

Violation of ethical norms

22 Mar 2002

Singapore Technologies Engineering

Anti-personnel landmines

4
5
6

European Aeronautics Defense and Space Company (EADS Co.).
Bonds of EADS Finance BV were excluded as the company was indentified with its parent EADS Co.
Revoked in 2006.
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APPENDIX H
ADIA EXECUTIVES1

BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahayan, Chairman
Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahayan
Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahayan
Sheikh Ahmed bin Zayed Al Nahayan, Managing Director
Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan
Sheikh Mohammed bin Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan
Mohammed Habroush Al Suwaidi
Dr. Jua'an Salim Al Dhaheri
Hamad Mohammed Al Hurr Al Suwaidi
Saeed Mubarak Rashid Al Hajeri

MANAGEMENT
Sheikh Ahmed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Managing Director
Salem Rashed Al Muhanadi, Executive Director, Finance and Administration
Khalifa Al Mansouri Executive Director, Accounts
Hareb Masood Al Darmaki, Executive Director, Private Equity
Hussein Sayegh, Executive Director, Operations
Mohammed Saif Al Suwaidi, Executive Director, Treasury
Majid Salem Al Roumaisi, Executive Director, Real Estate
1

"Company Profile: Abu Dhabi Investment Authority."; "Abu Dhabi Investment Authority."
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Mohammed Ahbabi, Executive Director, Internal Audit
Hamad Kurdous Amri, Executive Director, Alternative Investments
Saeed Mubarak Rachid A1 Hajeri, Executive Director, Emerging Markets
Salem Mazouy, Executive Director, Valuation and Follow Up
Khalifa A1 Muhairi, Executive Director, Information Technology
Mohammed Hinai, Finance and Administration Director
Abdulrahman A1 Qumzi, General Services Director
Majed A1 Rumaithi, Human Resources Director
Bill Schwab, Global Head of Real Estate (since January 2009)
Jean Paul Villain, Head of Strategy (also Senior Investment Advisor)
Euart Glendinning, Global Head of Corporate Communications and Public Affairs (since
May 2008)
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APPENDIX I
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF ADIA 1

<
Q
<

1

"Abu Dhabi Investment Authority."
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APPENDIX J
TEMASEK BOARD OF DIRECTORS1

S DHANABALAN
Chairman since September 1996 (also Chairman of DBS Group from 1999 to 2005;
Chairman of Singapore Airlines from 1996 to 1998)

KWA CHONG SENG
Deputy Chairman and Director since September 1997 (also current Chairman and
Managing Director of ExxonMobil Asia Pacific; a Board Member of DBS Group;
previously Chairman of MediaCorp)

HO CHING
Executive Director and CEO since January 2004 (wife of the Singapore Prime Minister;
Director since January 2002; President and CEO of the Singapore Technologies Group
from April 1997 to December 2001)

KUA HONG PAK

Director since November 1996 (also a Board Member of PSA International)

KOH BOON HWEE
Director since November 1996 (also Chairman of DBS Group; previously Chairman of
Singapore
Airlines, and Singapore Telecommunications)
1
"Temasek Holdings."

278
GOH YEW LIN
Director since August 2005 (currently Managing Director of GK Goh Holdings, and
Board Member of the National University of Singapore)

SIMON ISRAEL
Executive Director since July 2006 (Director since August 2005; previously 10 years
with the Danone Group as Chairman Asia Pacific)

TEO MING KIAN
Director since 2006 (also Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Permanent
Secretary of National Research and Development in the Prime Minister's Office; Current
Chairman of Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority and Inland Revenue
Authority of Singapore; Executive Chairman of the Singapore Economic Development
Board from February 2001 to October 2006.)

MARCUS WALLENBERG
Director since July 2008 (also Chairman of Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB),
SAAB AB and AB Electrolux; Deputy Chairman of L M Ericsson; also a recent
Chairman of the International Chamber of Commerce.)
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APPENDIX K
TEMASEK MAJOR HOLDINGS1

Percent*
FINANCIAL SERVICES
Bank of China Limited **

4

China Construction Bank Corporation **

6

DBS Group Holdings Ltd

28

Hana Financial Group Inc **

10

ICICI Bank Limited **

8

NIB Bank Limited **

74

PT Bank Danamon Indonesia Tbk **

68

Standard Chartered PLC

19

TELECOMMUNICATION & MEDIA
Bharti Airtel Limited

5

MediaCorp Pte. Ltd

100

Shin Corporation Public Company Limited **

42

Singapore Technologies Telemedia Pte Ltd

100

Singapore Telecommunications Limited

54

REAL ESTATE

1

CapitaLand Limited

40

Mapletree Investments Pte Ltd

100

"Temasek Holdings."

TRANSPORT & LOGISTICS
Neptune Orient Lines Limited

66

PSA International Pte Ltd

100

Singapore Airlines Limited

55

SMRT Corporation Ltd

54

INFRASTRUCTURE, INDUSTRIAL & ENGINEERING
Keppel Corporation Limited

21

Sembcorp Industries Ltd

49

Singapore Technologies Engineering Ltd

50

ENERGY & RESOURCES
Singapore Power Limited

100

TECHNOLOGY
Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing Ltd

59

STATS ChipPAC Ltd

84

CONSUMER & LIFESTYLE
Fraser and Neave, Limited

15

Li & Fung Limited

5

Wildlife Reserve Singapore Pte Ltd

88

* Data as of March 31, 2009.
** Includes stakes acquired through wholly-owned Fullerton Financial Holdings.
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APPENDIX L
STABILIZATION FUND AGGREGATE BALANCE 1

As of

1

dollar
(billion)

ruble
(billion)

30

January

2008

157.38

3,851.80

1

January

2008

156.81

3,849.11

1

December

2007

144.43

3,517.05

1

November 2007

147.60

3,649.25

1

October

2007

141.05

3,519.09

1

September 2007

132.91

3,409.07

1

August

2007

127.48

3,263.56

1

July

2007

121.68

3,141.35

1

June

2007

116.85

3,026.68

1

May

2007

113.70

2,920.50

1

April

2007

108.11

2,812.21

1

March

2007

103.55

2,708.85

1

February

2007

99.77

2,647.21

1

January

2007

89.13

2,346.92

1

December

2006

83.21

2,189.52

1

November 2006

76.62

2,049.30

1

October

2006

70.73

1,894.09

1

September 2006

64.73

1,730.64

1

August

82.14

2,207.33

2006

"Stabilization Fund of the Russian Federation."
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APPENDIX M
RESERVE FUND AGGREGATE BALANCE 1

December

2009

dollar
(billion)
45.07

November

2009

77.18

2,242.09

October

2009

76.37

2,298.00

September

2009

85.74

2,706.82

August

2009

88.53

2,811.34

July

2009

94.52

2,957.54

June

2009

100.95

3,127.93

May

2009

106.81

3,551.47

April

2009

121.06

4,117.67

March

2009

136.33

4,869.74

February

2009

137.34

4,863.80

January

2009

137.09

4,027.64

December

2008

132.63

3,661.37

November

2008

134.60

3,572.78

October

2008

140.98

3,559.19

September

2008

142.60

3,504.62

August

2008

129.68

3,040.37

July

2008

130.30

3,056.52

June

2008

129.32

3,069.94

May

2008

129.80

3,069.47

April

2008

130.48

3,068.43

March

2008

127.81

3,082.28

February

2008

125.19

3,057.85

As of first of

1

"Reserve Fund."

ruble
(billion)
2,238.58
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APPENDIX N
ELIGIBLE FOREIGN ENTITIES FOR INVESTMENT 1

1- AUSTRIA: Autobahnen- und Schnellstrassen- Finanzierungs- Aktiengesellschaft
(ASFINAG) and Oesterreichische Kontrollbank Aktiengesellschaft (OKB)
2- THE NETHERLANDS : Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten (BNG)
3- FRANCE: Caisse d'Amortissement de la Dette Sociale (CADES), Credit Foncier de
France (CFF), and Dexia Group
4- CANADA: Export Development Canada (EDC)
5- UNITED STATES: Federal Farm Credit Banks (FFCB), Federal Home Loan Banks
(FHLBanks), Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), and Federal
National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
6- SPAIN: Institute de Credito Oficial (ICO)
7- GERMANY: Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau Bankengruppe, and Landwirtschaftliche
Rentenbank
8- UNITED KINGDOM: Network Rail MTN Finance CLG Pic

1

"National Wealth Fund."
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